



Unity in Adversity

Immigration, Minorities and Religion in Europe

Edited by **Vít Novotný**



Wilfried
Martens Centre
for European Studies

Unity in Adversity:
Immigration, Minorities and Religion in Europe

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Vít Novotný
Editor



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The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies is the political foundation and think tank of the European People's Party (EPP), dedicated to the promotion of Christian Democrat, conservative and like-minded political values.

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Martens Centre Profile

The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, established in 2007, is the political foundation and think tank of the European People's Party (EPP). The Martens Centre embodies a pan-European mindset, promoting Christian Democrat, conservative and like-minded political values. It serves as a framework for national political foundations linked to member parties of the EPP. It currently has 31 member foundations and three permanent guest foundations in 24 EU and non-EU countries. The Martens Centre takes part in the preparation of EPP programmes and policy documents. It organises seminars and training on EU policies and on the process of European integration.

The Martens Centre also contributes to formulating EU and national public policies. It produces research studies and books, policy briefs and the twice-yearly *European View* journal. Its research activities are divided into six clusters: party structures and EU institutions, economic and social policies, EU foreign policy, environment and energy, values and religion, and new societal challenges. Through its papers, conferences, authors' dinners and website, the Martens Centre offers a platform for discussion among experts, politicians, policymakers and the European public.

Foreword

European integration is more important today than ever before. We live in a time when many major developments are taking place in parallel, probably more than has ever been the case in the history of humanity. Digitalisation is shaking up the world's business and social models. Migratory flows of an unprecedented extent are reaching our continent. Climate change is undermining the basis of our existence. Autocrats are threatening our liberal democratic order. Islamic terrorism is challenging our open societies.

These challenges cannot be successfully met by one country alone, but only together, through joint European action. Otherwise, global developments will simply sweep away most of what is dear to us in Europe. Only with the joint economic power of Europe will we be able to actively shape globalisation and set effective standards. Only together will we be able to prevail over a terrorism that operates globally.

But unity needs a deep-seated common spirit if it is to last. To be able to act together in the long term, we have to be aware of who we are and where we come from. Despite all our differences, the peoples of Europe are united by shared historical experiences, common Judeo-Christian values and humanist thinking. We share a common democratic tradition, a deep-rooted foundation in the rule of law and a unique social model. All of these elements constitute a European way of life that unites us and is unique in the world. If we want to be able to defend it together, it is high time we reflected on the very foundations of our unity.

This publication is an essential element in this process of reflection on our European selves. The contributions from the Martens Centre's member foundations from across Europe demonstrate the creativity of our political family. At the same time, they also represent the united values of the European People's Party (EPP), while simultaneously working out what it is that gives us our common identity. We in the EPP do not believe in giving in to fear, or even in exploiting fear. We believe in solutions. We stand for a European way of life that means freedom instead of oppression, democracy instead of dictatorship, cooperation instead of egoism, security instead of hate and hope instead of anger. This differentiates us from the populists on both the right and the left.

The coming years will decide the future of our continent. It is up to us to provide the most suitable answers to the challenges of our time. Populists can only destroy the present. We will build the future. This book will help to lay the foundations.

Manfred Weber
Chairman of the Group of the EPP in the European Parliament

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Roland Freudenstein, Policy Director at the Martens Centre, suggested the idea of developing this volume. The project and the concepts of culture, religion and ethnicity were debated at the Martens Centre’s cooperation and planning seminar (Think-In) in Marathon in June 2015, and at a meeting of the authors for the present volume in Brussels in February 2016. In a peer-review process, each author commented on a chapter of the volume written by another author.

Colleagues at the Martens Centre provided valuable assistance. Ingrid Habets provided helpful comments and assisted with the chapter template. Teona Lavrelashvili commented on several chapter drafts. Martin Tokár, Kristina Potapova, Sofia Karttunen and Gavin Synnott assisted with administration, references and language editing. Several of the chapter authors, Roland Freudenstein and Jos van Gennip from the Martens Centre’s Academic Council kindly commented on the Introduction and Synthesis. José Luis Fontalba and RARO S.L. designed the cover. Anna van Oeveren and the Victoria Agency worked tirelessly on typesetting the text. The text was professionally edited by Communicative English.

The Editor

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Editor's Introduction¹

Issues of identity, religion and culture have preoccupied intellectuals, politicians and policymakers since the beginnings of civilisation in Europe. The ever-shifting societal and political context is making these topics particularly poignant in the second decade of the twenty-first century. A new political climate has arisen. The contributing factors include the British people's decision to leave the EU in the referendum on 23 June 2016 and the emergence of a nexus of global authoritarian powers, immigration and terrorism. Adversity, external and internal, is challenging European unity.

On the European centre-right, the issues of identity came into focus in the middle of the 2010s as part of a wider debate about the consequences of globalisation, European integration and immigration from predominantly Muslim countries. With the worst of the financial and economic crisis having been warded off, the identity discussion has become an important topic for the European People's Party (EPP).

CHANGING POLITICAL CLIMATE

Europe is currently in the midst of an era shaped by disorder and illiberal players, both inside and outside the EU.² A culture war³ between internationalists and nativists,⁴ between globalists and patriots,⁵ is threatening to split European societies. The divide between internationalists and nativists has existed for many decades in the West. It has been thrown into sharp relief by, first, the general and presidential elections in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland over the past few years and, second, the election of President Trump in the US in 2016. (It should be noted that this divide is not identical to the division between supporters and opponents of European integration.)

European populist movements are feeding on global competition, unemployment and the refugee crisis. Although the reasons for these movements' revolt against the established elites continue to be analysed, it seems that cultural explanations are more plausible than economic

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- 1 I would like to thank Matevž Tomšič, Sergiu Constantin, Marek Degro and Peeter Võsu. Correspondence with these authors helped to inform some of the arguments in this chapter.
 - 2 Munich Security Conference, *Munich Security Report 2017: 'Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?'* (Munich, 2017), 6.
 - 3 J. Sobota, 'Řekněte nám pravdu! Ohrožuje politická korektnost naší společnost?' [Tell us the Truth! Does Political Correctness Threaten our Society?], *Respekt* 26 & 27 (2016), 21.
 - 4 I. Krastev, 'The Specter Haunting Europe: The Unravelling of the Post-1989 Order', *Journal of Democracy* 27/4 (2016), 9.
 - 5 Demos, *Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? Summary Report* (London, 2017).

ones.⁶ It is already clear that ‘losers have votes, too’, and that identity and feelings of loss have contributed to the protests at the ballot box.

There are differing views on how the ‘revolt against the elites’ has come about. One holds that the ‘forgotten part’ of the population has been sidelined as the result of an organic process in which people in the media, politics, economic management and the non-governmental sector have come to form similar views due to their personal character traits and similar education and life experiences. Thus, the argument goes, the domination of this more successful group prevents the competition of ideas.⁷ Another view emphasises that the West is governed by unelected administrative, economic, political and intellectual elites who are ‘bent on transforming Europe against the clear will of the European people.’⁸

Those worried about the populist revolt hold that 2016 was the year in which ‘authoritarian populist politics broke through to the “mainstream”’.⁹ They maintain that pluralism, rather than elitism, is the first target of the authoritarian tendency.¹⁰ They assert that the existence of illiberal governments within the EU is now a reality: these governments officially peddle conspiracy theories and display hostility towards the free media, judicial independence, local and international NGOs, and academic institutions.¹¹ They note that authoritarian populism could destroy the liberal–democratic order. They point out that, globally, authoritarian regimes—particularly those in China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela—have been taking coordinated measures to contain democracy, as part of an ‘authoritarian mobilisation’.¹²

In contrast, those who defend the new populist movements deem that ‘Brussels is incapable of organizing the ranks of defense for Europe’ in response to mass immigration, and that the

6 J. Haidt, ‘When and Why Nationalism Beats Globalism’, *The American Interest* 1/12 (2016); and A. Kaletsky, ‘Pensioners and Populism’, *Project Syndicate*, 28 October 2016.

7 Czech-German political scientist P. Robejšek, quoted in Sobota, ‘Řekněte nám pravdu!’ [Tell Us the Truth!], 20.

8 V. Orbán, ‘Hungary and the Crisis of Europe’, *National Interest*, 26 January 2017. According to another observer who looked at Central and Eastern Europe (a region strongly represented in the present volume), the elites leading the societal transformation after 1989 learnt from the West. However, the rest of society was indirectly told that it was ‘incapable and backward’. In the 2010s, the economic and refugee crises in Western and Southern Europe have given an opportunity to those in Central and Eastern Europe who were ‘forgotten’ to teach the Western Europeans a lesson. See O. Slačálek, quoted in Sobota, ‘Řekněte nám pravdu!’ [Tell us the Truth!].

9 Demos, *Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?*, 18.

10 Krastev, ‘The Specter Haunting Europe’, 8.

11 Compare with Krastev, ‘The Specter Haunting Europe’, 5. In 2016, Freedom House recorded setbacks in political rights, civil liberties or both in the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Poland and Spain. See *Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017. Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy* (Washington, DC, and New York, 2017).

12 L. Diamond et al. (eds.), *Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press and The National Endowment for Democracy, 2016), 4 and 220.

aspirations of the majority of the people are simply different from the aspirations of the elites.¹³ Patriotic calls for the preservation of European culture are a logical response to this to this failure on the part of the elites.

Terrorism, a related phenomenon, is becoming an important issue on the public agenda. In a 2016 Eurobarometer survey, 40% of the respondents said that they considered the risk of a terrorist attack to be high.¹⁴ Again, however, there are different depictions of the terrorist threat. It is jihadist terrorism, closely linked to the rise of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, which has captured the attention of the media and politicians. Although the vast majority of the recent jihadist attacks in Europe have been conducted by EU citizens, at least half of the public in the eight European countries surveyed by Pew said that 'they believe that refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country'. In only two countries included in the survey did the majorities not share this view.¹⁵ Indeed, a Europol survey of terrorist activity showed a steep increase between 2011 and 2015 in the number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism.¹⁶ The same report also stated that there was no evidence that terrorists would *systematically* use the flow of refugees, although two individuals involved in the November 2015 Paris attacks did enter the EU through Greece, posing as refugees.

Right-wing and separatist terrorism did not seem to feature high up on the scale of public concerns. The 2016 Europol report gave a more complex picture. In 2015 the majority of court convictions and penalties for terrorism were handed out in relation to jihadist terrorism. However, when measured by the number of attacks, those classified as separatist terrorism accounted for the largest proportion in the same year (these mostly took place in France and Spain).

Finally, the ideology of Islamism is varied and only jihadist Islamism promotes violence. Still, many forms of Islamism pose a threat to Europe's liberal democratic order. They militate against democratic institutions and propagate various forms of religious and political activism, from instituting shariah law to pan-Islamic political unity and the establishment of a caliphate in Europe.

IMMIGRATION AND MINORITIES

Immigration is probably the most important challenge. As the Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev has put it, '[o]f the many crises that Europe faces today, it is the migration crisis that most sharply defines the changing nature of European politics. . . . In a world of vast inequalities and open borders, migration becomes the new form of revolution.'¹⁷

13 V. Orbán, 'Hungary and the Crisis of Europe'.

14 European Parliament Eurobarometer, *Europeans in 2016: Perceptions and Expectations, the Fight Against Terrorism and Radicalisation* (2016).

15 Pew Research Center, '2. Negative Views of Minorities, Refugees Common in EU', 11 July 2016.

16 Europol, *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2016* (The Hague, 2016).

17 Krastev, 'The Specter Haunting Europe', 8 and 14.

For decades, the EU has been struggling to create workable common policies on immigration and asylum. As a result of the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2010–12 and the Syrian conflict (2011–present), hundreds of thousands of people fleeing civil conflicts, war and poverty began their flight to Europe. The uncontrolled, irregular inflow of refugees and immigrants dramatically increased in the summer of 2015, before subsiding in mid-2016 thanks to an agreement concluded between the EU and Turkey and the closure of the Western Balkan route. This mass immigration brought with it an influx of images, emotions and arguments.¹⁸

Fearing the Islamisation of European societies, a substantial portion of the European population now thinks that ‘further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped’, according to a Chatham House poll published in February 2017.¹⁹ In the Pew survey mentioned above, at least half of the respondents in nine European countries said that ‘Muslims in their country want to be distinct from the larger society’. People on the political centre–right are more concerned about the presence of refugees than are those on the left,²⁰ being perhaps more sensitive to how migration changes the lives of host communities.²¹

Following Krastev again, Europe’s migration crisis is not about a lack of solidarity. Instead, it is about ‘a clash of solidarities’, of ‘national, ethnic, and religious solidarity chafing against our obligations as human beings’.²² The Central and Eastern European countries’ ‘rejectionist’ approach to immigration perhaps best symbolises overall European attitudes (with the exception of those countries that have voluntarily taken in large numbers of refugees, such as Germany and Sweden). In Central and Eastern Europe, the dark history of mismanaged ethnic conflict, as well as the ‘demographic panic’ caused by emigration from mostly small and medium-sized nations, is contributing to a refusal to accept migrants and refugees from the current wave of migration that originates in Asia and Africa.²³ Unresolved questions surrounding the status of traditional minorities bode badly for the accommodation of the new immigrants. The historical image of the region acting as a bulwark against Islam has been given more space by local elites than the equally historically correct image of it being a bridge between Christianity and Islam.²⁴

Existing debates on ethnic and religious diversity in Europe

The emotional discourse that is surrounding the massive arrival of refugees and migrants into Southern, Western and Northern Europe is feeding into existing debates on societal cohesion in Europe.

18 Ibid., 9.

19 Chatham House, ‘What Do Europeans Think about Muslim Immigration?’, 7 February 2017.

20 Pew Research Center, ‘2. Negative Views of Minorities’.

21 Krastev, ‘The Specter Haunting Europe’, 14.

22 Ibid., 9.

23 Ibid., 10.

24 A. Balcer, ‘Eastern Europe and Islam—Not Only Hatred and Fear’, *Aspen Review Central Europe* 2/5 (2016).

Among the many aspects of societal cohesion, religious fundamentalism deserves a mention. A six-country survey of Western European Muslims and Christians that was conducted in 2013 found consistent fundamentalist beliefs among 44% of European Muslims, as opposed to among less than 4% of European Christians surveyed. Of the Muslims in the sample, 65% stated that religious rules were more important than the laws of the country. Fundamentalist attitudes were strongly correlated with homophobia and anti-Semitism.²⁵ Under pressure from local Muslim communities, schools in some Western European cities are even becoming afraid of referring to the Holocaust and other forms of persecution.

The debate on refugees fleeing to Europe is also framed by existing discussions on models of immigrant integration. There is a widespread agreement, at least on the centre-right, that multiculturalism has been inadequate as an approach to managing ethnic diversity.²⁶ In Europe, multiculturalism is generally understood to be a legal or implicit 'recognition and accommodation of minority rights',²⁷ as related to non-European immigrants and their descendants. European autochthonous, old or traditional minorities (the terms are used interchangeably in this volume) are usually, although not always, excluded from the concept.

There are different opinions on how the concept of multiculturalism came about. One school of thought holds that multiculturalism is a spontaneous process of members of communities settling in one place geographically and congregating around shared customs and cultural habits. Another, critical, view is that multiculturalism is an ideology of cultural relativism. According to these critics, this ideology wrongly claims that differences between cultures are automatically beneficial to society. This critical school of thought disagrees, believing that certain traditions, values and behavioural patterns are incompatible with the EU's normative framework and are in opposition to the European cultural setting. Despite the profound differences in the understanding of multiculturalism, the existing schools of thought agree that multiculturalism has failed to generate shared loyalties to European countries and their constitutions.

Like the definition of multiculturalism and the reasons for the concept's inadequacy, the formulation of alternative models of coexistence has been imbued with ideological conflict. Interculturalism, a concept touted by the Council of Europe and the European Commission, has been gaining ground too slowly to function as an alternative to multiculturalism. Interculturalism promotes cross-cultural dialogue in the common human rights framework.²⁸ It balances individual and collective rights on the one hand, and individual freedom and

25 Berlin Social Science Center, 'Islamic Fundamentalism is Widely Spread', 9 December 2013. According to a separate 2016 survey, 4% of British Muslims 'sympathise with people who take part in suicide bombings' and 23% 'support the introduction of Sharia law'. See Channel 4, 'C4 Survey and Documentary Reveals what British Muslims Really Think', 11 April 2016.

26 Council of Europe, *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* (Strasbourg, 2008), 9.

27 D. G. Papademetriou et al., *Managing Religious Difference in North America and Europe in an Era of Mass Migration*, Migration Policy Institute (Washington, DC, 2016), 10.

28 Council of Europe, *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* (Strasbourg, 2008).

viable communities on the other.²⁹ For reasons that go beyond the scope of this contribution, the concept of interculturalism has, at least so far, not been widely accepted by European policymakers and politicians.

The conceptual vacuum concerning the management of our multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies is contributing to problems with formulating policies for immigrant integration. Calls for fostering shared loyalties to Europe's national constitutions, and—by extension—the European project,³⁰ are coming at the 'inconvenient' time of a populist surge and of rising anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim hatred.³¹

How to integrate immigrants and develop responses to the recent refugee influx is not the only debate surrounding ethnic and religious minorities in Europe. Some traditional minorities organise themselves politically, through regional or ethnically based parties, to promote the interests and rights of their members and communities. This ethnic or regional organisation is not easily accepted by those political parties that organise themselves based on values or class interests.

The autochthonous minority issue also takes on a special dimension in Central and Eastern Europe. Following the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, supranational bodies adopted a set of minority protection instruments. This was in response to the rise of ethno-nationalist sentiments in the region (accompanied by violent conflicts in the disintegrating Soviet Union and Yugoslavia). Instruments adopted by the Council of Europe provided for special minority rights; the High Commissioner on National Minorities attached to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe became an institution to prevent conflicts. Legal recognition of minorities continues to be a sensitive issue in several European countries, including France and Greece. In contrast, some national governments have adopted a myriad of often ineffective legal instruments, a development frustrating for both national minorities and majorities. Both international and national legislation for minorities tend to be poorly implemented. The EU has shied away from including minority rights (such as linguistic rights) in the *acquis communautaire*, instead leaving this to national legislation.

The coexistence of Europe's national majorities with the Roma minority has been particularly fraught with difficulties. Burdened by centuries of marginalisation and self-exclusion, the Roma constitutes the largest European minority without its own state, formed of between 6 and 12 million people, depending on the source consulted. Most of the Roma are autochthonous. Other Roma are migrants, such as those who have moved, in recent decades, from Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe. Whatever their legal status, the social, economic and

29 Interculturalism also stresses that 'immigrants should, as everybody else, abide by the laws and respect the basic values of European societies and their cultural heritage'. See Council of Europe, *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue*, 11

30 V. Novotný, *Politics of Identity In Focus: What Next after Multiculturalism*, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (Brussels, 2015).

31 European Commission, '2016 Annual Colloquium on Fundamental Rights', 18 November 2016.

political situation of the Roma is not satisfactory. De facto segregation in schools is a serious problem, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Authorities often place Roma children in schools for disabled children almost automatically, because the children do not speak the official language well. However, several European countries have included affirmative action measures in their domestic policies on education.³² In some Western European countries, Roma face collective expulsions, despite being EU citizens.

SECULARISATION

Europe is having to face the challenges of authoritarianism (internally and externally), terrorism, Islamism, immigration and diversity management against the backdrop of the steady secularisation of European societies. Secularisation is only one of the material changes in our societies, which also include technological developments, demographic changes, long-term immigration trends and globalisation. According to some, secularisation is the result of improving material conditions and existential security.³³ Others point to the work of activist elites in changing European societies. What some Christian Democratic observers see as undue pragmatism and an aversion to transcendent values, as aggressive modernisation, has led to a fast-paced, almost 'revolutionary' decline in Europe's Christian identity.³⁴ The same observers also note that a renewed affinity with faith-based thinking (without resorting to 'testimony politics') should be at least considered when seeking responses to the challenge posed by modernisation.³⁵

Still, as evidenced by declining Church attendance and the gradually decreasing importance that individuals across Europe attach to God, secularisation seems to be marching on,³⁶ inexorably. The once dominant role of religious leaders on moral and social issues has diminished; the voices of churches now compete with many other voices. The role of religious rituals and symbols in public life has been 'reduced or abandoned'.³⁷ Religion has somewhat declined as a predictor of voting behaviour; however, religious values continue to predict affiliation with the centre-right.³⁸

32 Since the early 1990s, Romania has reserved places for Roma pupils and students in high schools and universities, a system generally praised as an example of good practice.

33 P. Norris and R. Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn.).

34 J. van Gennip, 'Society, Values and Politics: Reflections on the Basic Dilemmas of European Society and the Demand for Moral Choices', in C. Arvanitopoulos (ed.), *Reforming Europe: The Role of the Centre-Right* (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 2009), 71–91.

35 J. van Gennip, *Ethics and Religion: What's the EU Got to Do with It?*, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (Brussels, 2015).

36 Norris and Inglehart *Sacred and Secular*, 228.

37 *Ibid.*, 196.

38 *Ibid.*, 228.

The above-mentioned public concerns over Islam can perhaps be attributed to the continuing secularisation in Europe. Religious symbols and practices, including those pertaining to Islam, appear to threaten the 'liberal pillars of free speech, gender equality, and equal rights for previously stigmatized groups such as homosexuals'. The belief that a strong Muslim identity undermines national identity is related to these concerns.³⁹ And one should not forget deeper issues, such as the rooting of many parts of shariah law in premodern social norms.⁴⁰

EPP DISCUSSIONS AND THE PRESENT PROJECT

The cultural conflict, feelings of loss of status and identity in a globalised world, secularisation, Islamism, uncontrolled immigration, the uncertain position of minority groups (including the European Roma) and the lack of direction of immigrant integration are political issues that need to be answered in a constructive manner. These issues are also ones where the tone set by politicians matters tremendously. On the centre-right, engaging with the 'forgotten part' of society becomes the crucial challenge.

Joint programme 'The Politics of Culture, Ethnicity and Religion'

The EPP includes centre-right member parties with differing ideological backgrounds and histories. When the EPP was established in 1976, it consisted of Western European Christian Democratic parties. This core has gradually been enlarged to include conservative and liberal-conservative parties throughout the continent, including those from Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. Today the EPP is the political family of the European centre-right, and it sees itself as 'a party of values without confessional or church bindings.'⁴¹

The EPP adopted its latest long-term programme, the *Party Platform*,⁴² at its congress in Bucharest in 2012. The *Party Platform* reaffirmed the EPP's values and set them in the context of twenty-first century politics. These values are the dignity of human life, freedom and responsibility, equality and justice, truth, solidarity and subsidiarity. The *Party Platform* also confirmed liberal democracy and the social market economy as necessary elements without which the common good cannot be achieved.

Despite the agreement on these basic values and concepts, national and regional EPP parties do not always fully share views on issues such as immigration, approaches to our multi-ethnic societies, the role of religion, religiously inspired extremism, minority policies and societal

39 Papademetriou, *Managing Religious Difference in North America and Europe*, 6.

40 This is despite the fact that the Koran defends principles such as individual liberty and free speech. M. Fazlhashemi, 'The Conflict between Islam and Modernity', *The Japan Times*, 19 January 2016.

41 B. Tensen et al., *The Christian Democratic Origins of the European People's Party*, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (Brussels, 2014), 2.

42 EPP, *Party Platform*, adopted by the EPP Statutory Congress, Bucharest, 17–18 October 2012.

cohesion. Questions of identity, unity and diversity in Europe continue to be debated within the EPP.⁴³

In order assist the EPP's discussions, from 2015 to 2017 the Martens Centre has run a joint programme, titled 'The Politics of Culture, Ethnicity and Religion'. Consisting of the present volume and a series of common projects with the Centre's member foundations, the goal of the programme has been to bring national-level discussions to the European table, to contribute to bridging internal EPP differences and to draw lessons from these exercises.

This volume

The present volume is the third in a series of joint research projects that the Martens Centre (previously the Centre for European Studies) has conducted with its member foundations. The first book, *Opening the Door? Immigration and Integration in the European Union*, was published in 2012. *From Reform to Growth: Managing the Economic Crisis in Europe* was issued in 2013. In those two volumes, authors nominated by the member foundations produced country or region chapters.

The present volume is different, in that the member foundations were invited to take up a cross-cutting EU-wide topic from a list developed by the Martens Centre staff. The project and the concepts of culture, religion and ethnicity were debated at the Martens Centre's cooperation and planning seminar (Think-In) in Marathon in June 2015. A number of members volunteered for a topic and appointed an author or a group of authors to cover the topic. The Martens Centre coordinated with the authors, and issued contracts. The Martens Centre then organised a meeting of the authors in Brussels in February 2016 and commented on chapter drafts. Advanced chapter drafts underwent a peer-review procedure, during which pairs of authors commented on each other's drafts. The Martens Centre coordinated the work and prepared the final Synthesis.

The chapters in this volume reveal a wide variety of conceptual, ideological and political perspectives. The theme of European identity and culture brings unity to the publication. Central and Eastern European authors dominate, reflecting the Martens Centre's member foundations which volunteered to participate in this joint project. In total, 15 member foundations nominated 16 authors.

Table 1 shows the list of chapters, their authors and the foundations that recommended or appointed the authors.

43 Among the several EPP fora for these debates, the Working Group on Intercultural Relations and Interreligious Dialogue of the EPP Group in the European Parliament should particularly be mentioned.

Table 1 Chapters, their authors and participating foundations

Authors	Chapter	Foundation
Miroslava Szitová, Marek Degro and Miroslav Pollák	Local Solutions to Immigrant and Roma Integration	Anton Tunega Foundation
Sofiya Tsvetkova	Terrorism: History, Definition and the Case of Bulgaria	Association Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria
Rien Fraanje	Room for Religion: Liberal versus Christian Democratic Arguments for the Presence of Religion in the Public Domain	CDA Research Institute
Luigi Crema	The Solidarity Principle and the Current Migration Emergency	De Gasperi Foundation
Vladimír Hanáček and Jan Málek	The European People's Party and Human Rights	European Academy for Democracy
Ioanna Charalambous, Michalinos Zembylas and Sotiris Themistokleous	New Migration and the European Dilemma of Unity and Diversity	Glafkos Clerides Institute
Matevž Tomšič	Building a Common European Identity: Between Unity and Diversity	Institute dr. Jože Pučnik
Oľga Gyárfášová and Grigorij Mesežnikov	Public Policy, the Integration of New Minorities and Party Competition	Institute for Modern Slovakia
Serban Iosifescu	Autochthonous Minorities and the Structuring of National Education Systems	Institute for Popular Studies
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Lucie Tungul	Explaining Immigration to the European Public	TOPAZ

The volume is organised into two sections. The first covers challenges to European values, religion and human rights. The second section is devoted to immigration and minorities.

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The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily shared by all the participating political foundations, authors or the EPP.

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European values, religion and human rights

Building a Common European Identity: Between Unity and Diversity

Matevž Tomšič

Recommended by the Institute dr. Jože Pučnik, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Abstract Without common cultural foundations, Europe will not be able to function in the long term as a unified political entity. This brings to us to the issue of the roots of European identity. The fact is that Europe has a common cultural heritage. However, its heritage is strongly heterogeneous since it is based on both the Judeo-Christian religious tradition and the tradition of Enlightenment rationalism. Europe is made up of different ethnic and religious communities, each with their own identities, which cannot be merged into a single cultural category that transcends the differences between these communities. European unity can only be built on recognition of and respect for the individual and collective differences. However, it also requires that certain core norms and principles are respected and that individuals and groups act in accordance with them.

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, THE FUTURE OF ITS VALUES

There are moments that represent breaking points in the life of a particular human community. They occur when its members begin to intensively question the validity of the assumptions and the fundamental principles on which it is based. This usually happens when societal upheavals call into question the existing legal order when it becomes evident that the current pathway is not necessarily the only possible one, and perhaps not even the best one. Such a crisis of society is always a crisis of values as well. Thus, the global crisis which began a few years ago was not only of an economic nature but had deeper roots, linked to the very essence of human existence in modern society.

The EU represents a special case among supranational associations since it aims to transcend mere economic or other specific forms of integration. Instead, it seeks to establish a common political system that regulates the most important areas of life in terms of setting basic rules and standards. In general, we are speaking about a political entity that in terms of the level of integration lies between a confederation and a federation.⁴⁴ However, the developmental trajectory of the Union's political setting is still uncertain. The future of its integration will determine the future of its values, since these largely depend not only on its ability to resolve economic problems, but also on the strength of its 'glue'. By this we mean the common European identity

44 See, for example, L. Siedentop, *Democracy in Europe* (London: Penguin Books, 2000).

which is embodied in a self-consciousness and a feeling of one's own uniqueness (which is, necessarily, connected with a sense of difference in relation to 'others'). This awareness is the basis for loyalty and solidarity within a particular social entity

EUROPE AS A CULTURAL ENTITY

The process of institutional integration at the European level was, for decades, dominated by a neo-functionalist approach⁴⁵ based on technocratic and non-political problem-solving.⁴⁶ This approach was derived from the implicit assumption that if the economy prospers and thus the well-being of the people grows, other matters will be resolved, almost automatically, so to speak. The cultural aspects of integration were neglected as they were considered irrelevant. However, with the strengthening of political integration it has gradually become clear that Europe as a political community cannot function without a platform of common values. Europe needs to become a political body that has a common identity and shares a common feeling of belonging.

This raises the question of the essence of European culture. The problem is that those characteristics that are the result of European cultural development are mostly shared by the entire Western civilisation. In his famous and distinctly controversial study on the 'clash of civilisations', Samuel Huntington classified Europe (not the whole of it but, nevertheless, most of what is now the EU) as part of the Western civilisation which has common cultural foundations.⁴⁷ According to him, the key features of Western civilisation are a classical heritage (Greek philosophy, Roman law), Catholicism and Protestantism as a common religious background (which provides a feeling of collective belonging, as well as common moral guidelines), social and political pluralism (social differentiation and the autonomy of different groups), representation (various autonomous institutions that represent social interests), the rule of law (the central role of the law), the separation of secular and spiritual authority, and individualism as the basic orientation for values. Although these properties do not only exist in the context of Western civilisation, their coexistence and interconnectedness are typical of how the West differs from other civilisations. This means that the two categories, that is, 'Europe' and 'the West', are not easy to separate. The European culture is the one that represents the spiritual basis for the

45 The core notion of the neo-functionalist approach is that functional cooperation at the supranational level in key policy areas would prove so successful that the main policy stakeholders (business and interest groups as well as the general public) would press for the extension of supranational decision-making (Sanders et al., *The Europeanization of National Politics?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 18).

46 See, for example, P. Rosemond, *Theories of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).

47 S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

emergence of modern Western society, with parliamentary democracy and a market economy as its main institutional components.⁴⁸

In addition, European spiritual heritage is greatly diversified. European culture is based as much on faith as on reason, that is, on the Judeo-Christian religious tradition as well as the tradition of Enlightenment rationalism. As stated by Remi Brague in his book with the indicative title *Europe, the Roman Road*, in cultural terms Europe is the true successor of Roman civilisation, as it has taken over the capacity to absorb achievements from other cultures and integrate them into its own framework.⁴⁹ In this context, it is characterised by greater openness to the 'outside world' than is the case with other civilisations. However, when we talk about European cultural specifics and their legacy, it is necessary to be aware that these not only include freedom and democracy, but also ideological exclusivism and imperialist expansionism.⁵⁰ Both totalitarianisms of the twentieth century, the Nazi-Fascist one and the Communist one, grew on European soil and were dangerous rivals to the democratic system. Although democracy prevailed in the end, the experience of the two totalitarianisms demonstrates that the development of democracy cannot be taken for granted but must be something for which citizens constantly and actively strive.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY

Any political setting needs cultural foundations if it wants to survive and develop in the long term. It is on these foundations that legitimacy rests, as 'the capacity to produce and maintain a belief that political institutions, or forms, are the most appropriate for the society'.⁵¹ This legitimacy results in acceptance by the citizenry of the fundamental norms and principles of a particular political system, and compliance with them. This also holds for a democracy. In this context it refers to agreement on the fundamental values that are the basis for the creation of a legislative framework within which democratic political life takes place. These are values such as freedom, respect for human personality and tolerance, as well as self-confidence and the ability to stand up for one's rights.

48 Huntington's approach was heavily criticised by many authors. They attributed to it cultural determinism and reductionism in terms of the simplification of certain cultural phenomena (especially the nature of Islam). See, for example, T. Ali, *The Clash of Fundamentalisms* (London: Verso, 2002) or E. Said, 'The Clash of Ignorance', *The Nation*, 22 October 2001. Although he sometimes neglects—or at least downplays the importance of—intercultural diversities, he convincingly shows the relevance of different cultural traditions for political relations and dynamics.

49 R. Brague, *Evropa, Rimski pot* [Europe, the Roman Road] (Celje: Mohorjeva družba, 2003, Slovenian translation).

50 M. Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin Press, 1998).

51 S. M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Bombay: Vakils, Feffer and Simons, 1959), 29.

The legitimacy of the democratic system thus presupposes a consensus in terms of the commitment of the citizen body to key democratic norms and principles, as well as recognition of this type of institutional setting as the only acceptable political option.⁵² For democracy to function successfully, a common identity for the political community, that is, awareness of their common origin, is necessary.

Modern democracy was developed in the context of the nation-state, where national identity forms the common integrative framework for the citizenry. Analogous to this, democracy at the level of the EU therefore needs some kind of European identity. There are many critiques of the ‘democratic deficit’ in European political life.⁵³ They usually refer to the underdeveloped participatory component at the EU level, since the citizens lack opportunities to take part in the decision-making process. These accusations are to some extent justified. However, it is necessary to be aware of the specifics of the European political agenda. The democratic model that is in place at the level of the nation-state cannot be mechanically transplanted to the Union level. For European participatory democracy to happen, there needs to exist what Weiler calls a ‘European demos’, that is, a European body of citizens (civil society and the public) with strong common feelings of belonging.⁵⁴ Currently, national identity is still the dominant form of identification for the citizens of European countries, although this does not necessarily exclude pro-European feelings.

This brings us to the question of the essence of European identity. Pluralism as one of the central features of the European cultural tradition is the main reason for the lack of consensus on what the common underlying features are which would serve to provide an identity for the European people. This was very clearly manifested in the dilemma of whether or not to mention the role of Christianity in the preamble of the European Constitution. The positions of the EU’s member countries varied widely on this issue (they accepted a compromise that stated the importance of Europe’s religious heritage). Europe is made up of various ethnic and religious communities with their own identities, which cannot be merged into a single cultural category (for example, through the mechanism of the ‘melting pot’ as in the formation of the American nation). The creation of some kind of ‘European nation’ would be the utopia—at least in the short-term perspective. The vast majority of Europeans still feel a much stronger attachment to their own nations than to Europe as a whole. European unity and solidarity should thus be based solely on respect for individual and collective differences. For the European institutional setting to achieve ‘unity in diversity’, an ongoing dialogue between the representatives of culturally diverse entities, established on an equal basis, would be necessary.

One must pose the question of what the role of a common institutional framework for its member countries would be, particularly in terms of whether it would be able to strengthen the quality of governance. Recently, in many European countries we have witnessed a deterioration

52 M. Tomšič, *Politična stabilnost v novih demokracijah* [Political Stability in the New Democracies] (Ljubljana: ZPS, 2002).

53 See, for example, M. Haller, *European Integration as an Elite Process* (London: Routledge, 2008).

54 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices’, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40/4 (2002), 563–80.

in the quality of governance.⁵⁵ This is reflected particularly in financial instability (high public debt), as well as phenomena such as corruption and clientelism. It seems that the EU still does not possess effective mechanisms to ensure compliance with common European rules.

EUROPEAN VALUES AND THE CHALLENGES THEY ARE FACING

The street protests (often violent ones) that have taken place in the EU in recent years—in some countries (France, Greece and Hungary) they even appeared before the global crisis—are manifestations of the discontent of the citizens (or at least some social groups) with the current socio-economic and political situation. The outbreak of the crisis and the difficulties in dealing with it only strengthened this potential for conflict. Many measures taken by national and EU political and financial institutions aimed to stabilise the public finances, particularly in the most crisis-affected countries, led at least in the short term to a deterioration in the standard of living for many citizens. Such a deterioration can lead to the escalation of social conflicts and thus political destabilisation, both at the level of the member states and at the EU level.

The crisis can hardly be seen as a favourable environment for strengthening the common European identity. On the contrary, it creates favourable conditions for the rise of populist and authoritarian tendencies. Protagonists of such tendencies from the left and the right wing of the political spectrum usually express very anti-European sentiments. Both share a reluctance for and even openly reject the fundamental European principles of freedom, openness and tolerance.

The capability of the Union to set up efficient institutional mechanisms depends not only on the well-being of its citizens, but also on the prospects of a further deepening of the ties between Europeans and their feelings of belonging. There should be common EU policies and activities to ensure the application of the ‘rules of the game’ that are in place in the Union (for example, in crime prevention, fighting different types of extremism and dealing with illegal migration). Special efforts should be made to improve the functioning of the judiciary and other institutions that ensure the rule of law. There should be effective monitoring of the conduct of these institutions at the member-state level. In particular, in some of the newer EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, the judiciary and other elements of the state apparatus are still strongly influenced by individuals from the former Communist regimes, whose attitudes present significant obstacles to the performance of these institutions in terms of the protection of human rights and liberties. Furthermore, there is evidence of severe violations of these rights, even at the highest levels of the judicial structure.⁵⁶ Assistance has to be provided to the

55 M. Tomšič and U. Vehovar, ‘Quality of Governance in “Old” and “New” EU Member States in a Comparative Perspective’, *Sociológia* 44/3 (2002), 367–84.

56 One of the most evident examples of such malign practice can be found in the Slovenian ‘Patria case’ where the former prime minister and the leader of the Slovenian Democratic Party (Slovenska demokratska stranka, the largest centre–right party in the country), Janez Janša, was sentenced and imprisoned on the basis of bogus accusations of the ‘reception of the promise of bribery’ in the public procurement tender for armoured cars from the Finnish manufacturer Patria. The sentence was eventually annulled by the Slovenian constitutional court.

former Communist countries for the further dismantling of the 'old' regime's structures and corresponding informal centres of power.

A strong challenge to the European institutional setting and to its underlying values and principles is posed by the ongoing migrant crisis. It has become evident that the Union has no plan in place for how to deal effectively with the great mass of people from its nearer and more distant surroundings who wish to settle within its borders. The integration of migrants, particularly those from Muslim countries, has mostly failed, as is reflected in numerous social problems, such as low education and high levels of unemployment in these communities, high crime rates and rising religious extremism among the migrant population. The latter represents a serious threat to the security and stability of European society. The terrorist rampage of November 2015 in Paris was not only a murderous attack on the lives of Parisians and visitors to that city, but also a clear assault on the most fundamental European values and the European way of life. The same holds for the Brussels attack in March 2016. It was an assault on freedom, openness and *joie de vivre*—the very values that represent a complete negation of the mindset of (among others) Islamist fanatics. Although we cannot explain the rise of terrorism solely as being a result of migration, and can even less ascribe collective responsibility to the Muslim community, we can claim that the uncontrolled influx of illegal immigrants contributes its share to the destabilisation of the EU.

These criminal acts—like many similar ones before—have strongly dispelled the idea of multiculturalism. The fallacy of this ideology is in its denial of the relevance of cultural differences and their impact on the functioning of society. It often neglects the fact that the system that has developed in Europe, with parliamentary democracy, a market economy, human rights and other elements, rests on specific cultural foundations. And in particular, multiculturalism is prone to ignore the possibility that certain traditions are simply incompatible with European norms and principles.

Europe has to remain an open place for all people who want to live in it in accordance with its values. It must provide aid and assistance to those whose lives are in danger because they come from areas stricken by armed conflict or are victims of persecution by violent autocratic regimes. However, there has to be zero tolerance of all those who threaten not only the security but also the fundamental values of European society. Those cultural practices that violate the European way of life are simply illegitimate.

No one should be allowed to restrict the freedom of its citizens to express their opinion or to dress, eat and socialise in their own way, except where public security and human dignity are at stake, as is the case with the burka. Attempts to introduce rules that are in opposition to European laws (as is the case with shariah law) are unacceptable and should be legally sanctioned. The European elites and civil society need to invest more effort to curtail such tendencies. As part of this effort, selective immigration policies should be adopted, introducing cultural compatibility and the potential to integrate among the criteria for accepting individual immigrants.

However, it is hard to criticise Muslims for not respecting our values and traditions in a context in which many Europeans themselves do not nurture them. In recent times, we have witnessed growing values disorientation. This is largely related to the strengthening of ideologies that belittle the fundamental accomplishments of European civilisation, proclaim value relativism and try to redefine some of the fundamental institutions (such as family). It is therefore necessary to strengthen awareness of a common sense of belonging as the basis for the creation of a ‘European demos’. There should be self-reflection and the ability to self-criticise, certainly, but also self-confidence and pride in our own cultural (and other) achievements. Only in this way will it be possible to resist those who want to destroy those values.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In its 2012 Bucharest *Party Platform*, the European People’s Party argues for ‘fostering a strong sense of European identity, as an indispensable precondition to a dynamic Union’, which ‘must be based on the social, cultural and spiritual diversity of our continent.’⁵⁷ However, the balance between unity and diversity is not clearly defined. Further, it is not stated that some cultural traditions are simply incompatible with the European normative setting.

For a firm European identity to be developed, the following actions are recommended:

- State institutions and civil society organisations at all levels should provide the conditions for the development of a ‘European demos’: cultural education, targeted communication, cooperation and dialogue in the sphere of civil society.
- These same institutions and organisations should develop policies aimed at strengthening the rule of law. This includes the monitoring of national judiciaries and assistance in reforming institutions of the rule of law. European institutions should also invest effort in dismantling the structures that provide a basis for authoritarian politics in former Communist countries (by assisting with reforming institutions of the rule of law and providing support for independent media and civil society organisations).
- Governments at both the EU and national levels should implement selective immigration policies. Increased efforts at all levels should be made to intensify the integration of migrants.
- All levels of government need to make it a top priority to combat extremism and to intellectually engage with ideologies that neglect, or are even hostile to, European culture. From the legal and political viewpoints, there has to be zero tolerance of the breaching of common European norms and principles.

57 European People’s Party, *Party Platform*, final text adopted by the European People’s Party Statutory Congress, Bucharest, 17–18 October 2012.

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The Islamist Challenge: How Europe can Defend its Values

Thomas Volk

Recommended by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Berlin, Germany.

Abstract The Islamist terrorist organisation Islamic State (IS) controls a territory as big as Great Britain. Through its Salafist ideology it exerts a daily influence on more than eight million people in Syria and Iraq. Approximately 30,000 fighters are affiliated with Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's IS, most of them coming from Tunisia—with the European contribution mainly coming from France and Germany. Many EU member states face the challenge of the increasing Islamist radicalisation of their own citizens, despite these citizens having grown up and having been socialised in their respective EU countries. Those who are joining Islamist organisations include not only a huge number of converts but also many third-generation Muslims in European countries—of whom an astonishing proportion are women. Therefore, new and Europe-wide coordinated efforts should be made to prevent radicalisation, including the formation of responsible partnerships between security, education, media and Islamic institutions.

INTRODUCTION

'No one is as murderously "Islamophobic" as Islamists are'.⁵⁸ These are the words British journalist Nick Cohen used several years ago to say that it is Islamists who, through their actions, do the greatest damage to the public image of Islam.⁵⁹ In fact, there have been signs of unease about Islam in Western societies for years—ever since the Islamist terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US, and the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005. A rising tide of right-wing populism is being witnessed in many European countries. The growth of political parties and movements such as Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) in Germany is symptomatic of what is going on in many EU member states: anti-immigration and Islamophobic sentiments have been on the rise since terrorist attacks inspired by Islamists became part of the European reality. It seems that Muslims in general—and not just Islamists—are being understood by many as inherently 'other' in the context of an allegedly Christian European identity.

Still other terrorist attacks have made it clear that radical Islamism is a serious threat to European societies: the attacks on the editors of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* and on a

58 N. Cohen, 'The Secret Scandal of Britain's Caste System', *The Guardian*, 26 June 2011.

59 With some 1.6 billion believers, Islam is the second-largest monotheistic religion.

Jewish supermarket in Paris in January 2015, those in Paris in November of the same year in which 130 people were killed and the March 2016 attack in Brussels. It is clear that European states are targets for Islamist groups and individual Islamist perpetrators. European societies are being terrorised to increase the fear of Muslims—which creates fertile ground for the Islamist radicalisation of those who are feeling stigmatised. This chapter aims to shed light on the important differentiation between Islam and Islamism, and demonstrates innovative approaches to preventing Islamist extremism in Europe.

First of all, one needs to differentiate clearly between Islam and Islamism.⁶⁰ Islam generally advocates a holistic approach, in that it is not only a monotheistic religion but also an ideology, a basis for law and even includes aspects of economic thinking. Consequently, the majority of Muslims believe that Islam is predestined to be the all-encompassing and ultimate religion of all people. In contrast, a popular definition of Islamism is that ‘Islamism begins where religious Islamic precepts and norms are interpreted as binding rules for political action. Islamism is a political ideology, which claims to be universally valid and legitimises the use of violence on occasion in order to realise goals defined as “Islamic”.’⁶¹ However, Islamic precepts and norms themselves are so diverse that even decades of study of Islamic writings by scholars cannot necessarily produce conclusive certainties. It cannot be highlighted enough that Islamism is a political ideology that misuses religion for its political aims, whereas Islam is in itself a holistic religion, a worldview and a basis for economic and legal thought.

While a differentiated examination of the various Islamic and Islamist movements may be laborious, it is nonetheless necessary. This is because the majority of Muslims condemn acts motivated by Islamism, and in most Muslim-populated countries, the majority of the victims of Islamists are Muslims.

ISLAMISTS REJECT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND LIVE BY THE WORD OF GOD

While there are numerous different Islamist manifestations, one common feature is the rejection of national sovereignty and strict adherence to the Islamic holy texts as representing God’s commands, which must not be questioned. One manifestation of Islamism, and the one that is currently showing the fastest rate of growth, is Salafism. Its name refers back to the ‘pious predecessors’ (*as-salaf as-salih*)—the first three generations of Muslims—and aspires to a particularly strict way of life modelled on that of the early period of Islam. Salafism is the guiding ideology of the Wahhabi monarchy in Saudi Arabia, as well as the core concept behind the terrorist organisation which has called itself IS since June 2014. As in Islamism in general, there are essentially three groupings in Salafism as well. *Purist Islamists/Salafists* live according to

60 For further information on this topic, see T. Volk, *Islam and Islamism. Clarification for Turbulent Times*, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Facts & Findings no. 164 (Berlin, 2015).

61 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Landesbehörden für Verfassungsschutz, *Salafistische Bestrebungen in Deutschland* (Cologne, 2012).

the fundamental rules of shariah (a collation of the Koran and the Sunna, i.e. the corpus of reports on the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad, which have not been combined in a consistent overall body of text), but are largely apolitical and opposed to militancy. *Political Islamists/Salafists* seek to bring about a turning away from democracy and the establishment of a theocratic form of government. *Jihadist Islamists/Salafists* form the smallest grouping, but a particularly dangerous one because of their militant intentions. The distinctions between these three forms of Islamism/Salafism are somewhat fluid.⁶² While Islamism does not necessarily entail violence, a purist or quietist or even political Islamist attitude by itself still embodies anti-democratic thinking. Its proponents reject the free and democratic constitutional system and despise authorities representing the rule of law.

According to the domestic intelligence service in Germany, the number of Salafists living in Germany was higher than 8,000 in 2015—while more than 700 left the country to join IS. This worrying trend appears to be continuing as a result of the ongoing atrocities perpetrated by the terror organisation in Syria and Iraq. As the high level of brutality, intransigence and radicalness of IS is particularly attractive to young would-be European emigrants,⁶³ its pulling power is likely to increase with every further inhumane atrocity perpetrated by IS. After all, it is estimated by the US Central Intelligence Agency that 10% of the approximately 30,000 followers of IS are of European origin—most of them coming from France and Germany. To eliminate this attractiveness will require a concerted, Europe-wide coordinated prevention strategy to sustainably counter the increase in Islamist actions. As Islamists categorically reject the European way of life with its rule of law and inalienable rights and freedoms, successful prevention strategies are much more important than de-radicalisation attempts. It must be a common endeavour to achieve the redirection of potential radicals before the process of Islamist radicalisation can even start.

THREE MAJOR PHENOMENA PARAPHRASE DEVELOPMENTS IN MANY EUROPEAN STATES

‘Generation pop-jihad’

Even though there has not yet been a valid empirical study of the typology of people joining IS, there are indications of various motivations. As well as people acting out of ideological conviction, who justify their decision to travel on the basis of religious principles, there are also adventurers and criminals who want to live out their fantasies about killing and violent acts with impunity, which they can do in IS-controlled territory. There are also a small number of people who appear to wish to travel to Syria and Iraq for humanitarian or solidarity reasons in order to assist their ‘siblings in faith’. Yet others can be classed as hangers-on, who are hoping that their

62 T. Volk, *Neo-Salafismus in Deutschland*, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Analysen & Argumente no. 155 (Berlin, 2014).

63 R. Clement, “‘Größte Herausforderung ist der islamistische Terrorismus’”, *Deutschlandfunk.de*, 31 August 2014.

emigration will help them to satisfy their wish for feelings of comradeship and belonging and a sense of security, as well as giving meaning to their lives; some of these people also consider themselves part of an Islamic avant-garde or a superior generation.⁶⁴ The sociologist Aladin El-Mafaalani recognises the characteristics of a youth and protest movement in Salafism, which he believes to be attractive to many young people because of the way it combines asceticism with nostalgia.⁶⁵ He has the following to say on this subject: ‘A strict dress code, regulation of sexuality and anti-consumerism—to our eyes that should be pure poison to a youth movement. But today, asceticism and nostalgia combined with a self-confident collective demeanour denote rebellion’.⁶⁶ In addition, the impression of increasing Islamophobia in Western societies appears to be driving young people in particular into the arms of Islamist extremists.⁶⁷ For those young men and women following this movement, Salafism has become the ‘new punk’, giving its followers the tools for provocation and segregation, and even justification for violent acts. Within this phenomenon we can observe an increasing number of ‘homegrown jihadists’, meaning citizens of European countries who were born and have been socialised in EU member states and are not immigrants from a third country.

‘Jihad marriage’

In Germany it is interesting to note that those departing are not exclusively ‘German-born Muslim males with a migration background’,⁶⁸ but that some 10% are converts and a further 10% are women.⁶⁹ The rise in the number of women from all over Europe making the trip is particularly significant. There are various reasons motivating women to take the decision to leave. In particular, many young women make a very conscious and voluntary decision to go and live in IS-controlled territory at the side of one of the mujahidin, the fighters for God, and to submit themselves unconditionally to the supposed rules of the nascent Islamic society of the early seventh century. This phenomenon, frequently referred to by the term ‘jihadi brides’, is resulting in ever greater numbers of young girls from various European countries taking the decision to abandon their existing environment and travel to Syria. Contact is initially made with mujahidin via social media and other online platforms. Without alerting those in their immediate surroundings, young girls abandon their existing lives and travel to Turkey overnight, from where they then proceed secretly to Syria. The widely publicised picture of a seemingly

64 M. Abou Taam, *Syrien-Ausreisende und –Rückkehrer*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Dossier Islamismus (2015), 45.

65 J. Brühl, ‘Burka ist der neue Punk’, *Sddeutsche.de*, 31 January 2015.

66 A. El-Mafaalani, ‘Die Macht der Provokation’, *Qantara.de*, 27 July 2015.

67 In her book *Zum Töten bereit*, which translates as ‘Willing to Kill’, Lamy Kaddor makes the argument, as do many others, that increases in Islamophobia and Islamic tendencies reinforce each other in a vicious circle (L. Kaddor, *Zum Töten bereit. Warum deutsche Jugendliche in den Dschihad ziehen* (Munich/Berlin: Piper Verlag, 2015)).

68 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Landesbehörden für Verfassungsschutz, *Salafistische Bestrebungen in Deutschland*, 99.

69 Ibid.

strong IS follower fighting fearlessly for a good cause, the feeling of ‘being accepted as you are’ (including your hijab and living your life according to Muslim principles), as well as clear rules for living your life according to the principles of shariah all appear to add to the attraction for the many girls who have made this journey. The wives of IS fighters who are killed also gain fame and respect within the Islamist scene as widows of supposed martyrs.⁷⁰

‘Cyber-jihad’

The third phenomenon is connected to the Internet and can best be characterised as ‘cyber-jihad’. Social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, are the key access point for Islamist groups in the process of contacting and radicalising individuals. Internet platforms are not only used for propaganda activities but also serve as potential new outlets for attacks. As the analyst René Rieger highlights, public administrations are still not sufficiently prepared to avert cyber-attacks, which might be used by Islamist groups to take down the databases and/or software of public authorities in the near future.⁷¹

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Islamist radicalisation has been increasing steadily for years. There are a number of reasons why people succumb to it, including political, ideological, sociological and psychological influences. Several factors frequently reinforce each other and lead to radicalisation irrespective of gender and social and religious origins. Concepts to counter Islamism aim to nip radicalisation tendencies in the bud or stop or even reverse them.⁷² Young people demonstrating a commitment to the free and democratic constitutional system and the rules of the secular state remain of crucial importance to society as a whole. It is essential to show greater self-confidence in promoting a ‘values-defending culture’ in Europe, aimed at safeguarding our fundamental liberties and basic rights. Anybody who has consciously decided to embrace an Islamist world view, thereby placing God’s sovereignty over national sovereignty, rejecting gender equality and wanting to use shariah instead of European laws, will be very hard to re-socialise. Prevention is therefore crucial.

The prevention of Islamist radicalisation is a challenge for society as a whole. A historical-critical exegesis of the Koran, the expansion of Islamic religious education in schools, the employment of more Muslim chaplains and the setting up of websites promoting a carefully considered Islam that appeal to young people will help to curb the alarming tendency of increasing Islamist radicalisation.

70 See also *WDR*, ‘Bräute für das Kalifat’, documentary from a film festival, 28 June 2016.

71 R. Rieger, ‘Cyber Jihad. Multiple Sicherheits Herausforderungen für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in K. Abmeier, P. Bahr and T. Volk (eds.), *Monitor Religion und Politik* Sankt Augustin/Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), 61–70.

72 H. Fouad, ‘Islamismusprävention aus Sicht der Sicherheitsbehörden’, 2016.

Promote a historical–critical exegesis of the Koran

One central challenge for Islamic theology is the development of a historical–critical exegesis of the Koran so that misguided extremists will no longer be able to justify their atrocities using Muslims’ holy texts. At the centre of such historical–critical work should be efforts to place the passed-down written records of Islamic tradition into the context of their formation, both in place and in time. It should be possible to interpret passed-down statements from the early seventh century for application to societies of the twenty-first century. Of course, the initiative for such textual criticism of the Koran within Islam needs to come from Muslims themselves. Some isolated examples of such interpretation of the Koran do already exist in the Muslim world. Koran expert Abdel-Hakim Ourghi states: ‘Ever since the eighth century, attempts have been made to reform Islam, but the reformers frequently paid for their efforts with their lives. A reform in the European context requires a historical–critical reading of these sources, for instance to question Islam’s claim for dominance and to revitalise its ethical and humanistic force’.⁷³ As long as it is impossible to discuss problematic sections of Islamic texts and these are not subjected to a historical–critical analysis, there will always be religious illiterates who misinterpret the texts (intentionally) in order to misuse them for their extremist purposes.

Expand Islamic religious education and interreligious projects at schools

The majority of the Islamists taking the trip to IS-controlled territory can be described as religious illiterates. Only very few of them appear to be capable of understanding the complexity of the Islamic texts in their entirety—let alone in Arabic, the holy language of Islam. As the Salafist movements tend to operate using the local language (e.g. French in France and English in the UK), such movements are finding it easy to convert young people to their cause using simple—supposedly religious—messages.

The introduction of religious education geared towards Muslim pupils by teaching staff educated in their respective countries is therefore a necessary step in preventing the strengthening of Islamist movements. Young Muslims in particular must be encouraged to engage in a considered, historical–critical interpretation of their faith and become familiar with the diversity of branches of Islam and different possible interpretations. Approaching their religion confidently and being able to articulate opinions about the Islamic principles of faith, as well as being familiar with the theological content of Islam, will make young people more self-assured when faced with potential recruitment attempts by Islamists. It will also strengthen the important idea that Muslims too are entitled to religious education and are therefore granted opportunities to discuss religious issues at school like their non-Muslim fellow pupils. Islamic religious education in schools can also prevent content that is not in accordance with a free and democratic constitutional system being taught in dubious backstreet mosques. Greater efforts should also be made to enhance competences in interreligious dialogue in order to stress the numerous common elements of the monotheistic religions.

73 H. Wilmes, ‘Interview mit Forscher Abdel-Hakim Ourghi: Die Islamkritik muss zum Islam gehören’, *General Anzeiger*, 26 May 2015.

Employ more Muslim chaplains in prisons

Muslim chaplains play a central role in prevention in an Islamist context. Prisons represent an ideal breeding ground for radicalisation. During a time when people are looking for stability and orientation, for meaning and resocialisation, increasing numbers of prison inmates are coming into contact with others who have already been radicalised and are hoping that through these Islamist circles they will find an alternative to their previous way of life. El-Mafaalani has described how serious the situation is by stating that ‘some prisons are recruitment offices’.⁷⁴

Besides radicalisation in prisons, there have been increasing reports of Salafist activities in the vicinity of prison buildings and, recently, of refugee accommodations. Groups of Salafists are frequently waiting outside with the specific intention of offering newly released prisoners or refugees help and assistance with integration into daily life. Salafists provide support with finding a place to stay and finding work, introduce people to a new circle of ‘friends’, and give them practical advice and help. In this context, El-Mafaalani coined the following phrase: ‘Salafists are better social workers’. They look after other people’s interests, they are there when they are needed, and they provide the feeling of a replacement family, a community and a sense of belonging.

It is therefore a matter of urgency for the number of Muslim chaplains to be increased substantially. More Muslim chaplains should also be employed in the military and the police. Again, choosing the right contacts for collaboration is of great importance. The obvious solution here is to cooperate with university departments of Islamic theology to provide training for specialist personnel to ensure that Muslim chaplains working in the sensitive penal environment are law-abiding and committed to the free and democratic constitutional state and a historical–critical interpretation of the Koran.

Strengthen education about Islam on the Internet—provide more alternatives to Islamist websites

Anybody who wishes to seek information about Islam on the Internet these days will quickly find themselves on one of the numerous Islamist websites. In a world characterised by digitisation and at a time when young people obtain most of their information from the Internet and only rarely from books, information about Islam that is accessible online is becoming increasingly important. Islamist organisations are continuously expanding their online presence. Most of them have their own Facebook and Twitter profiles and professional-looking websites. Some even have their own YouTube channels.

Today, it is more important than ever to be proactive and offer alternatives to Islamist websites by using videos and websites to promote an Islam that is considered peaceful and lived peacefully. For example, non-governmental organisations should collaborate with university departments of Islamic theology and Islamic studies to produce informative video clips about Islamic religious content and issues Muslims face in daily life. These video clips should be easy

74 J. Brühl, ‘Burka ist der neue Punk’.

to understand and appeal to the young. Moreover they need to be marketed effectively through the media with the assistance of prominent models of the Muslim faith. Successfully reclaiming the Internet for the purposes of promoting a peaceful interpretation of Islam will require more forceful online action and measures to provide practical answers to day-to-day issues in a comprehensible (youth-friendly) language, thus denying Islamist movements one of their most important recruitment and propaganda platforms.

To sum up, this chapter recommends the following policy actions:

- promote a historical–critical exegesis of the Koran;
- expand Islamic religious education and interreligious projects at schools;
- employ more Muslim chaplains in prisons; and
- strengthen education about Islam on the Internet, for example by providing more alternatives to Islamist websites.

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Terrorism: History, Definition and the Case of Bulgaria

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Abstract The concept of terrorism has a long history. A brief overview of its evolution since the nineteenth century shows its transition from state violence, through a fight for and limited to nationalist or political causes, to indiscriminate disruptive violence by non-state actors. Against this background, the chapter seeks to refine the definition of present-day terrorism: it must be understood as a ‘living’ concept, rooted in historical and political contexts. The chapter showcases the main arguments for this using the Bulgarian experience. Applying the living concept approach also reveals important boundaries between civil and political actions, on the one hand, and terrorist acts, on the other. The existence of socio-political conflict is a precondition for the emergence of both, but the presence of violence is an important distinguishing factor. The chapter suggests that decision-makers should avoid associating terrorism only with Islam and immigration in order not to feed racism and xenophobia. Moreover, they need to pay attention to the economic and social factors that contribute to terrorism, while still keeping in mind that in Europe today most terrorist acts have an Islamist background.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is an omnipresent phenomenon that has no particular affiliation to race, personality type, geography, religion or political cause—it is a strategy of political impact that has many incarnations. Hence, terrorism as a concept has long suffered from imprecise definition. More often than not it has been used as a catch-all, derogatory and politically loaded label. This lack of a clear and practical definition makes it all the more difficult to draw the line between terrorist acts and civil and political actions. This chapter argues that terrorism is a term that can be better defined if perceived as a ‘living’ concept, that is, as a concept contingent on the particular political and historical context, which evolves in time alongside societal and political trends.

Reconciling the histories of terrorism: the importance of historical and political context

To demonstrate the need to apply the analytical framework of a living concept, one needs to briefly scrutinise the historical development of the term ‘terrorism’. It dates back to the French

Revolution, as used in Burke's essay,⁷⁵ to describe the systematic use of terror by a regime for political ends, that is, the embodiment of state violence carried out in the name of the public good.

Academics have offered historical categorisations of the concept. According to Rapoport, since the 1880s there have been 4 waves of terrorism, each lasting for approximately 40 years: anarchism, anti-colonialism, new leftism and the current wave of religious fundamentalism.⁷⁶ Shughart refines this historical account, limiting it to the period from the end of the Second World War to the beginning of the twenty-first century and organising it into three distinct, although occasionally overlapping waves: terrorism in the name of national liberation and ethnic separatism (post-war anti-colonial terrorism that sought to eliminate foreign rule by violent means and establish the right to self-determination with the waning of the French and British empires in the period from May 1945 until the 1960s), terrorism of a left-wing nature (from the late 1960s until the fall of the Berlin Wall, whereby the internationalisation of terrorism was largely achieved), and Islamist terrorism (from the Iranian Revolution of 1979 until the present day).⁷⁷

These sweeping historical overviews are particularly useful in tracing the evolution of terrorism from state violence (Rapoport's first wave) into pride-inspired fighting for nationalist or political causes (Shughart's first two waves), to indiscriminate disruptive and destructive violence by non-state actors (the current wave). In this way we can see how a label that in the early nineteenth century belonged to those who launched revolutionary conflict from below has been transformed from a descriptive pride-inspired term into a pejorative category. Thus, it becomes clear that the definition of terrorism is rooted in the historical and political context at hand.

A historical perspective is important in defining terrorism, as it poses vital questions to be answered in the course of constructing the concept of contemporary terrorism. As the overview above points out, there is little justification for claiming, as does Kaplan, that 'in terrorism, nothing but the names, the causes, and the technology really changes'.⁷⁸

THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM: LINES OF DISTINCTION FROM POLITICAL AND CIVIL ACTION

The historical evolution of the term makes it easier to identify the emergence of several distinctive elements of terrorism in respect to contemporary developments.

75 E. Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (ed. L.G. Mitchell, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

76 D. C. Rapoport, 'The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism', *Current History* 100/650 (2001), 419–24.

77 W. F. Shughart II, 'An Analytical History of Terrorism: 1945–2000', *Public Choice* 128 (2006), 7–39.

78 J. Kaplan, 'History and Terrorism', *The Journal of American History* 98/1 (2011), 101–5.

Terrorism as an intentional act or threat of indiscriminate violence to cause fear

First and foremost, terrorism is the use or threat of violence to induce fear,⁷⁹ more often than not in the guise of the indiscriminate and indirect targeting of individuals. But is all political violence terrorism? Are all social movements that resort to violence terrorist organisations? Not necessarily, and the line of distinction here is motivation. There is the risk of confrontation and violence in every legitimate civil protest⁸⁰ since these are rooted in the existence of socio-political conflicts. At the same time, the motivation and goal of a protest, unlike those of a terrorist act, is not to cause fear. Terrorism, by contrast, is defined by the intended effect of the use of violence and the purpose of the terrorist act—in Garrison’s words terrorism is ‘the use of violence to cause fear in order to force change in societal behaviour or to force a society to acquiesce to the goals of the terrorist.’⁸¹ Terrorism is thus to be defined not by looking at the acts alone but by the use of terror as a strategy for change.⁸² The psychological effect is the goal, not the particular target—the casualties simply convey the message that everyone everywhere can fall victim to an attack.⁸³ It is random violence that induces fear, as it fosters the belief that anyone can be a target and that collateral damage is not a concern.⁸⁴ In particular, the predominant contemporary terrorism of religious fundamentalism is an ‘ideology calling for violent acts’.⁸⁵

Terrorism as an act of communication

Terrorism has a symbolic and communicative nature. It is ‘primarily a spectacular method of communication aimed at audiences far from the target itself’.⁸⁶ Since the specific goal of terrorism is fear, it needs to be a public act so that the targeted audience can see and react to it. Extensive media coverage is crucial for the terrorists in order to frighten citizens into putting pressure on leaders to take a certain policy line.

At the same time, one should bear in mind that Islamist terrorists mostly do not strive to shift public opinion in their favour through publicity; rather they seek greater prominence with

79 W. Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2012).

80 B. Nathanson, ‘Operation Rescue: Domestic Terrorism or Legitimate Civil Rights Protest?’ *The Hastings Center Report* 19/6 (1989), 28–32.

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84 S. D. Levitt and S. J. Dubner, *Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything* (New York: William Morris, 2005).

85 S. H. Weissman, K. G. Busch and R. Schouten, ‘Introduction to the Issue: The Evolution of Terrorism from 1914 to 2014’, *Behavioral Sciences and the Law* 32/3 (2014), 259–62.

86 B. Cage, ‘Terrorism and the American Experience: A State of the Field’ *The Journal of American History* 98/1 (2011), 74.

potential recruits. Therefore, the other side of the argument, that loss of public support for terrorists might considerably harm their prospects for success, is of little concern for groups such as Islamic State. By contrast, the generation and expansion of public support is of utmost importance for civil and political actors and the causes they advocate—thus this could act as a great line of distinction.

Terrorism as a rational act

Terrorism is not irrational in the sense of being completely random and lacking a cost–benefit or impact calculation. Although victims are random, targets are purposefully chosen because of the communicative impact sought—they usually have some symbolic, cultural, economic or utility value.

Terrorism in the name of a cause

Terrorism is ‘political in aims and motives’.⁸⁷ Contemporary cultural connotations of the term underline the illegitimacy of terrorism as a method for inducing social change. Rather it is perceived as a violation of state sovereignty and moral norms. And there is nothing wrong with this development, as long as the judgement is not prejudiced by political and cultural stereotypes that allow the easy categorisation of a civil protest motivated by a lack of systemic channels to voice concerns as a terrorist act.

Terrorist perpetrators as state or non-state actors

A prominent debate in the field concerns whether or not a state can be the perpetrator of a terrorist act. Based on the living concept argument, one can claim that with the evolution of the international community and the standards for the protection of human rights and the treatment of a state’s own citizens, a state cannot be said to carry out domestic terrorism—in such cases it is to be defined as a failed state. Thus, contemporary terrorism remains the exclusive domain of non-state actors, although a state can support terrorism or export it through support for terrorist organisations.

The definition of terrorism as socially negotiated

In scrutinising the concept of terrorism, one must not forget that violence has very frequently been part of the formation of the state. Therefore, the definitional debate on terrorist violence should not be exclusively contextualised within a sound historical perspective.⁸⁸ Rather, it should also take into consideration that there is always a political process behind the categorisation of certain acts as terrorism and seek the agents driving this categorisation within the political context, as well as the conditions within the society that are conducive to or receptive of this categorisation. Since terrorist acts are politically motivated, the definition of terrorism is also

87 B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 43.

88 Cage, ‘Terrorism and the American Experience’.

socially and politically negotiated.⁸⁹ What is defined as terrorism depends on the predominant political trends and entities, as well as their interpretation of historical and contemporary developments. At the same time, this categorisation needs to be favoured, accepted or at least tolerated by the broader public.

CASE STUDY: THE BULGARIAN EXAMPLE

Although Bulgaria is among the countries where popular conviction has it that terrorism has played little to no role in the formation of society, a closer look at its history reveals that it includes a few examples of terrorist acts which have influenced the trajectory of the historical and social development of the state. The following section uses examples from the Bulgarian experience to support the argument of the living concept approach to redefining terrorism. The first two cases show how the political and social context redefined terrorism and differentiated it from acts of civil protest, thereby granting or withholding legitimacy at different times in history. The remaining cases illustrate the need for an ongoing fine-tuning of the definition, even within the same particular social and political context, to respond to ongoing developments.

Violence in the history of the state: the socially negotiated label of terrorism

A stark example of how the definition of terrorism is subject to a social and political process of negotiation, rooted in a particular historical moment, is offered by the case of the bombing of the church of St Nedelya by the extreme left wing of the paramilitary organisation of the Bulgarian Communist Party (Balgarska Komunisticheska Partiya). On 16 April 1925, the organisation carried out the most lethal terrorist attack in Bulgarian history—blasting the roof off of the church of St Nedelya in an attempt to assassinate the Bulgarian monarch King Boris III and the political and military elite of the state. The terrorist attack happened during the funeral of a general who had been killed by Communist activists in a previous attack. The organisation responsible is a classic example of a terrorist organisation (characteristic of the left-wing terrorist wave), founded after the Communist Party in Bulgaria was banned upon the failure of the September 1923 revolt against the monarchy. This particular organisation and its deeds, however, were not regarded as being of a terrorist nature during the Communist period, when its activities were very much forgotten and swept under the carpet. However, with the fall of Communism and the onset of democracy in Bulgaria, its historical categorisation as a terrorist organisation has been re-established.

Terrorist violence to vent social grievances: the Turkish minority during the ‘Revival Process’

Another case of a blurring of the lines between terrorism and civil protest is the activities of ethnic Turks during the ‘Revival Process’ in Communist Bulgaria. In the period 1984–7, the

89 C. Terwindt, ‘Protesters as Terrorists? An Ethnographic Analysis of the Political Process Behind the Broadened Scope of Anti-Terrorism Legislation’, *Crime, Law and Social Change* 62/3 (2014), 207–34.

attempts of the Communist state to assimilate ethnic minorities, in particular the Turkish ethnic minority, by force reached its peak, whereby the names of people of Turkish descent were changed to Bulgarian ones, their cultural and religious rites were limited and then banned, and the use of the mother tongue was repressed. In this period, organisations emerged that resorted to violence in order to protest against the government policy—forests were set on fire; hotels, trains and railway stations were bombed; and government officials were targeted. Despite the terrorist nature of the acts, there is now a consensual understanding that they were provoked by unjust policies of repression, which denied citizens equal rights and opportunities, and employed violence to repress the expression of their ethnic differences and identities. Since there were not any existing legitimate mechanisms through which those minorities could channel their grievances, violence was a strategy of necessity. Thus, this is a case of domestic terrorism that offers the ultimate example of the blurring of the boundaries between terrorism and violent forms of protest, especially with the benefit of hindsight. Because of the indiscriminate nature of some of the attacks, these activities can be categorised as terrorism, but due to the just claims of the perpetrators they are not judged severely by public opinion and collective memory. Moreover, with the onset of democracy, the integration and peaceful coexistence of Bulgarians from different ethnic backgrounds, the Turkish minority in particular, serves as an example of a rare success story in the Balkans.

The Bourgas bus station bombing: the advent of modern transnational terrorism

Bulgaria experienced its first instance of transnational terrorism on 18 July 2012, when three buses containing Israeli tourists were targeted at the bus station in the seaside city of Bourgas. The attack, carried out by a suicide bomber later found to have ties to Hezbollah, resulted in 7 deaths and 35 injuries, and caused shock and turmoil in the media and society. This was a clear case of a terrorist act aimed only at generating fear and sending a political message of insecurity, especially for Israeli citizens. Prior to the attack, Bulgarians had thought that their country was immune to religion-inspired transnational terrorism, the logic of this thought very much running along the lines of being ‘too small to matter’. As it turns out, this is not the case. The attack exposed two shortcomings of the ‘common psyche’ when it comes to terrorism. The first is the misleading assumption that terrorism is something unprecedented in the country, when the historical examples above clearly show that the opposite is true: it is simply a different form of terrorism, produced by different historical and political conditions. The second is the illusion that some countries are immune to terrorism simply because they are too small, insignificant and distant from the geopolitical battleground of the Middle East. This latter misconception in particular shows that there was little understanding in Bulgarian society of the nature of modern terrorism, which is increasingly unpredictable and threatens all EU member states equally, due to their symbolic value as targets. Partly as a result of this case and partly due to overall security trends, in the summer of 2016 the Bulgarian Parliament embarked on drafting anti-terrorism legislation.

Roma radicalisation: structural causes for the success of terrorist recruitment

For the past few years, there have been concerns about the radicalisation of the Roma population in the city of Pazardzhik. The combination of poverty, poor social conditions, isolation and

disengagement, and the fact that the majority of the Roma are Muslim have been frequently quoted as conducive factors for radicalisation. In 2012, 13 Muslim priests from Pazardzhik were convicted for promoting anti-democratic ideas after a special raid by the State Agency for National Security confiscated computers, books and other materials from the suspects. In July 2015 another court case was brought against 14 individuals for promoting materials produced by Islamic State, spreading religious intolerance and hatred, and calling for jihad. The Bulgarian state guarantees freedom of religion and equal treatment for citizens of all religious backgrounds. Therefore, attempting to impose a religious creed is a crime. In response to the threat of radicalisation, the Council of Ministers adopted a strategy for the prevention of forced radicalisation on 30 December 2015.

This case shows that when defining terrorism it is important to look into the root causes and realise that they are not always of a purely ideational or ideological nature. Sometimes structural causes favour radicalisation, and activities that take advantage of such structural conditions to spread or impose terrorist doctrines should fall under the category of terrorism. However, it should also be clear that often ideology and religious fanaticism contribute to social marginalisation and therefore themselves add indirectly to the factors favouring radicalisation.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Conceptual clarity is very important to finding both the dividing line between terrorism and civil protest and solutions to modern religious terrorism. The main argument of this chapter is that the definition of terrorism as a living concept is intricately related to the particular historical, political and social context in which it exists. Although this definition usually contains all of the distinctive elements mentioned in the second half of the chapter, it is always the product of a process of political and social negotiation and therefore always contains elements of social or political bias.

The case studies of both domestic terrorism in the twentieth century and modern transnational terrorism in Bulgaria confirm the usefulness of the living concept approach. On the one hand, the historical examples from the previous century show how in time an act can be spared the label of terrorism or delegitimised by acquiring such a label depending on the political context. The cases related to the modern phenomenon show that the term should be open to redefinition within the social, political and legal context so that the societal response can be adapted to the new reality.

As the Bulgarian experience confirms, contextualisation assists with the realisation that terrorism is not a new phenomenon or an enemy that needs to be defeated, but rather an old problem that needs a new definition. On this basis the following recommendations can be made:

- Within the context of the current transnational religious wave of terrorism, decision-makers should be mindful of the risk of reserving the label of 'terrorism' only for Islamic-related fundamentalism and radicalisation. Not all terrorist acts are Islamist in nature.
- A clear pragmatic definition of terrorism should take the approach of a living concept and pay attention to the economic and structural elements favouring terrorism. Such a definition

on the European level, communicated to the public, would give a realistic idea of the nature of the threat, and prevent populists from using the label in support of their anti-immigration and xenophobic ideas, or socialists from scaremongering about over-securitisation and the loss of liberal rights. Completely denying the Islamist nature of acts of terrorism, however, will also help the populists because it corroborates their claims of overly politically correct elites.

- Member states that experience homegrown terrorism should therefore seek to refine the concept to pay closer attention to the presence of political or ideological motivations. This could be especially useful in the case of lone fighters. Not questioning the motivation behind the act more carefully before labelling it as terrorism risks using the term as a blanket concept of little substance.

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Euroscepticism and Nationalist Populism⁹⁰

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Abstract In recent years Eurosceptic parties have gained significant ground in national and European Parliament elections in many EU countries. This trend is related to the effects of the ongoing economic crisis, which has drastically affected the political and electoral behaviour of citizens across Europe. The increased migrant and refugee flows to the EU from African and Asian countries have also played a significant role in the growing success of the above-mentioned parties. Nationalist and populist voices have gained strength as public perceptions of European integration seem to have changed for the worse. In many cases, Eurosceptic political parties are calling for the dissolution of the EU or at least a curtailing of its ultra-national character. The chapter recommends that mainstream parties deal with the issues raised by the populist parties rather than tackling populism as a political opponent, and that they use simpler—but not simplistic—language.

INTRODUCTION

A spectre is haunting Europe. But it is not the spectre of Communism that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels pointed to in 1848. It is that of Euroscepticism, combined with a mixture of nationalism and populism, and it can be observed practically all over Europe. Despite national or other local differences, in almost all EU countries Eurosceptic political parties have gained and continue to gain ground. This is not simply a coincidence; it is a trend that is unlikely to disappear soon because it is a symptom of a far larger crisis. This trend is reflected in electoral results across Europe. Thus, a major question emerges: what can pro-European parties do to defeat Eurosceptic parties?

THE CRISIS AND ITS CAUSES

Ever since the establishment of the European Communities in the 1950s, the project of European integration has been based on two major pillars: on the one hand securing peace and stability, and on the other, ensuring prosperity for the European nations. The horrifying legacy of the two World Wars, which had devastated Europe, was still fresh in the minds of most Europeans in the middle of the twentieth century. Despite the difficulties, in the decades that followed,

⁹⁰ Research for this study was concluded in December 2015. Later events are not analysed here.

the European project managed to thrive. Six and a half decades after the signing of the Treaty of Paris of 1951, the EU has expanded to most parts of Europe: from Portugal to Poland, and from Ireland to Cyprus. But at the same time, the political forces that oppose European integration have also been gaining ground all over Europe: clearly this is not just a coincidence. Eurosceptic voices are not something new, as they have existed for many decades. However, it is only in the last few years that they have grown so much and, fuelled by nationalist populism, have become so loud and, due to the circumstances, been able to challenge both pillars of European integration.

Euroscepticism has benefited from the negative effects of the economic crisis, which started in the US in 2007–8 and very soon spread to the rest of the world, including Europe. Economic stagnation led to an increase in unemployment and consequently to a fall in living standards among a large proportion of the population. As a result, political parties which either oppose European integration in general or which would like to see the EU evolving into a loose trade zone have managed to increase their popularity, even though the economic crisis is not the only reason for their success. Their rejection of the concept of an ever closer union is directly related to their nationalist ideological background, which makes them perceive the EU as a supranational organisation that undermines nation states' power and authority. The EU's inability to respond effectively to the economic crisis has created fertile ground for the unprecedented success of Eurosceptic parties across Europe: according to their narrative, which has proven to be appealing to a great part of the European electorate, the EU and the euro are not the answers to the problem, but rather major parts of the problem itself.⁹¹ It is definitely no coincidence that European citizens' level of trust in the project of European integration has fallen almost as rapidly as their standard of living.⁹² 'Europe is war. Economic war. It is the increase of hostilities between the countries,' Marine Le Pen, the leader of the French National Front (Front National, FN), has argued.⁹³

At the same time, the increase of migrant and refugee flows from African and Asian countries to the EU has given additional impetus to Eurosceptic parties, especially far-right ones. Using a black and white argumentation, these parties are taking advantage of economic insecurity and are directly associating the increase of migrant and refugee flows with social problems such as unemployment and criminality. Moreover, they present these flows as a menace to the predominantly Christian character of the European continent, to traditional values and to national security, especially when it comes to Islamist terrorism. In a rapidly changing world, the Eurosceptic parties' nationalist rhetoric sounds like a plausible alternative to the many European citizens who have either been affected by the manifold crises or who are afraid that they will be affected by them. The anti-EU turn in public opinion can be directly associated with Eurosceptic nostalgia for the 'paradise' of lost national sovereignty, which was sacrificed for an EU so distant from the needs of the Europeans themselves.

91 A. Klapsis, 'Economic Crisis and Political Extremism in Europe: From the 1930s to the Present', *European View* 13/2 (2014).

92 J. I. Torreblanca et al., 'The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism', European Council on Foreign Affairs Policy Memo (London, May 2013).

93 M. von Rohr, 'Interview with Marine Le Pen: "I Don't Want this European Soviet Union"', *Der Spiegel*, 3 June 2014.

PARTIES AND ELECTIONS

In order to demonstrate the existence of sufficient common ground for populism, nationalism and Euro-scepticism in different countries, the following selection presents a range of such parties that are playing a key role on the European political scene. The selection provides a balance between geographical and populational representation; governmental and oppositional parties, of long standing and newly arrived, and from the right and the left wing; and from new and old member states, whether or not they are facing a severe economic crisis.

The UK: under-represented populism

The UK Independence Party (UKIP) was founded in 1993 by members of the Anti-Federalist League, as a result of opposition to the Maastricht Treaty. As its name implies, it has one key policy: to remove the UK from the EU and regain what UKIP describes as the UK's national sovereignty from Brussels. UKIP advocates stopping payments to the EU and withdrawal from EU treaties, while maintaining trading ties with other European countries.⁹⁴ It also combines anti-immigration policies with an ultra-conservative social agenda and a mix-and-match economic patchwork of classical liberalism and leftist policies.⁹⁵ It has performed increasingly well in European Parliament elections (as seen in Table 1 below), but in general elections, due to the effect of the first-past-the-post voting system, the party has failed to make the breakthrough it has been hoping for. Although it managed to elect just one MP in the 2015 general elections, it secured third place in the overall number of votes. As a result, it has succeeded in imposing an anti-EU sentiment on the political agenda. It broke the ground for the EU referendum in the UK, opening the way for British nationalism. As the only political party openly supporting Brexit, UKIP attained a major victory in the June 2016 EU referendum, paving the way for a historic change in the relationship between the UK and the EU.

Table 1 UKIP's electoral results (%)

1999 European elections	7% (3 MEPs)
2001 general election	1.5%
2004 European elections	16% (12 MEPs)
2005 general election	2.3%
2009 European elections	16.5% (13 MEPs)
2010 general election	3.2%
2014 European elections	27.5% (24 MEPs)
2015 general election	12.6% (1 MP)

Source: UK, The Electoral Commission, 'Previous UK General Elections'.

94 UKIP, 'The UKIP Manifesto 2015'.

95 UKIP, 'Patrick O'Flynn Lays Out UKIP's Economic Plan'.

France: the family business of populism

The FN was founded in 1972 to unify a variety of French nationalist movements that existed at the time. Jean-Marie Le Pen was its first leader and he managed to gradually pull his party from the margins to the political epicentre. In 2002 he won a surprise second place in the first round of the presidential election, forcing the political mainstream to support Jacques Chirac in the second round. In 2011 Marine Le Pen took over the leadership from her father. Since then she has distanced herself from some of his extreme views, while remaining boldly anti-EU and continuing to present immigration as a threat to France.

Marine Le Pen has managed to gain a prominent role on the political scene while calling for France's exit from the EU, unless it can withdraw from the free movement of people and leave the euro, which the FN claims has failed. In the 2014 European Parliament elections Le Pen broke yet another electoral record, taking first place with 25% of the vote.⁹⁶ The attacks on the offices of *Charlie Hebdo* and Paris by Islamic State boosted her xenophobic rhetoric and subsequently public support for her party. In the first round of the 2015 regional elections the FN came first, garnering roughly 28% of the nationwide vote and leading in 6 of the 13 regions. It may have failed to win a single region, but the FN beat its previous record number of votes, collecting 6,600,253.⁹⁷ Once again the entire political mainstream had to forge an alliance to urge the French people into tactical voting in order to avoid a major electoral victory for the FN. But it is clear that although Le Pen's party has been stymied, it is far from defeated.

Poland: conspiracy theories and authoritarianism

In Poland, Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) was founded in 2001 by the Kaczyński brothers, Jarosław and Lech. The party won the 2005 elections and Lech Kaczyński served as president, before his death in a plane crash in 2010. Jarosław, who served for as prime minister from 2006 to 2007, formed an unstable coalition with minor/politically marginal parties. While in opposition (before and after being prime minister) he cultivated conspiracy theories and anti-Russia and anti-EU rhetoric (although he did not suggest a complete withdrawal from the EU). The year 2015 gave the party a double victory: its candidate, Andrzej Duda, was elected president in August and in October PiS won an absolute majority in the Polish parliament's lower house—the first time any party has done so since 1989.⁹⁸

PiS combines a deeply socially conservative stance with a nationalist discourse and a leftist set of economic policies. It promotes some very bold anti-immigrant ideas, for instance, suggesting that the Syrian refugees threaten Poland's Catholic way of life and would bring new diseases to Poland. However at the same time, the party opposes the British plans to limit immigration from EU member states, since more than 800,000 Polish nationals work in the UK. According

96 France, Ministère de l'Intérieur, 'Elections: les résultats'.

97 *L'Express*, 'Régionales: zéro région pour le FN, mais un record de voix historique', 13 December 2015.

98 J. Cienski, '5 Takeaways From Poland's Election', *Politico*, 25 October 2015.

to the opposition, as a governing party, PiS has been trying to impose its political agenda by pushing the boundaries of democracy. It has been accused of trying to manipulate state institutions, causing widespread national and international dismay.⁹⁹

Germany: a party that wants Islam out of the country

For most of its recent history, Germany has been the only major European country without a significant right-wing anti-EU party. The rise of the Eurosceptic Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) has changed this. Although it came just short of crossing the 5% threshold in the 2013 federal elections, the party did achieve electoral success in the 2014 European Parliament elections, securing 7.1% of the vote a little over a year after its foundation.¹⁰⁰ It has continued its electoral success at the regional level and today, according to the polls, has the support of more than 10% of the public, especially in the eastern part of Germany.

The party's founders were 68 economists, business leaders and journalists. It utilises hard-line nationalist rhetoric. At the time of its founding, the party was mainly critical of the existence of the euro, the use of bailouts by the eurozone and the deepening of the European integration process. It now favours a strong anti-immigration approach. The overheated refugee debate¹⁰¹ and the threat of an attack by Islamist extremists on German soil have fuelled AfD's political impact, although it is not clear whether, in the long term, the party will maintain its current popularity when the refugee crisis settles down.

Greece: populist twins

In Greece, the economic crisis has had a major influence on political radicalisation and has fertilised populism, nationalism and anti-Europeanism. The party Golden Dawn (Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος – Χρυσή Αυγή) is a characteristic example, born during the crisis. Until the 2012 elections electoral support for the party had not totalled more than 0.3%. But during the two general elections held in 2012 it won almost 7% of the vote, and this increased to 9.4% in the 2014 European Parliament elections, before falling again to 6.9% in the September 2015 general election. The party became world famous not only for its ultra-nationalist, anti-immigrant, anti-EU, vulgar, neo-Nazi rhetoric, but also for the criminal activities of some of its members. A number of its adherents have been known to form so-called battalion squads. In 2012 one of these squads went so far as to kill an anti-fascist rapper musician.¹⁰²

99 *The Guardian*, 'Tens of Thousands March in Warsaw Against "Democratship" Government', 12 December 2015.

100 Germany, Federal Returning Officer, 'Election Results'.

101 *Der Spiegel*, 'Fear, Anger and Hatred: The Rise of Germany's New Right', 11 December 2015.

102 *Electionsnet.org*, 'Τα τελικά αποτελέσματα των βουλευτικών εκλογών' [Results of the Greek General Elections of 20 September 2015]; A. Klapsis, "'Here to Stay?': Golden Dawn, From the Political Margin to the Political Foreground', in K. Ifantis (ed.), *Is Europe Afraid of Europe? An Assessment of the Result of the 2014 European Elections* (Athens: Minoas, 2014).

The economic crisis also fuelled left-wing populism in Greece, represented by the Coalition of the Radical Left (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς, Syriza),¹⁰³ support for which was at 4.13% in 2009, but had reached 35.46% by September 2015. The party denounced Greece's creditors as 'terrorists' and appealed to 'the will of the people' to 'tear up' the bailout agreements with them. Syriza's leader, Alexis Tsipras, preferred to play with people's emotions rather than suggest ways to end the crisis. Following the January 2015 elections, Syriza was the major partner in a coalition government that promised to resist the European austerity measures and to negotiate a 'political solution' to the financial problems of the country. Within six months it had called for a referendum to denounce the proposed agreement by the European Commission. Just a few days after the referendum and in contradiction of the majority 'No' vote, Tsipras consented to a new bailout agreement, continuing the austerity policies and forgetting his unrealistic and irrational promises to the people. In September of the same year the party called early elections, which it won with 35.46% of the vote.

If that was not enough of a paradox, Syriza twice formed a government in 2015 with the Independent Greeks, an ultra-conservative, nationalist party with strong views about illegal migration, Greece's relationship with Turkey and the role of the Greek Orthodox Church.

ODD SIMILARITIES

Although these various populist parties reflect distinct national problems and political or historical backgrounds, they also have many similarities. The major one is their rhetoric. Populists tend to oversimplify complex issues, leading to the distortion of a modern political Manichaeism (e.g. the winners of globalisation vs. the losers, the good citizens vs. the bad elites). They offer the public unrealistic, magic solutions to important problems, based more on sentiment than rationale. Catchy slogans replace solid political arguments and proposals.

Despite their differing ideological traits, populist parties all challenge the status quo, basing their arguments on actual systemic inefficiencies. They promote themselves as the voice of public discontent by exploiting the anxieties and fears of the electorate.¹⁰⁴ To embed their anti-establishment character, populists are always highly Eurosceptic, presenting the EU as a threat to traditional values and national interests.

Populist parties have similar communication strategies, consisting of noise-producing and attention-seeking tactics. They prevail in the social media arena, which often performs like a populism laboratory. Comparative research has shown that proportionally they have a bigger social media impact than mainstream traditional parties.¹⁰⁵ For example, in Germany, there

103 Syriza, 'About Syriza', last updated June 2015.

104 S. van Kessel, *Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent?* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 9–14.

105 P. Kakolyris, 'Political Fragmentation and the Role of Social Media', paper presented at the 2nd Conference of the Department of Political Science and International Relations (University of Peloponnese), Loutraki, 11–13 December 2015.

are marginally more AfD followers on Facebook and Twitter than followers of the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands), even though the AfD has only a fraction of the Christian Democratic Union's electoral support. In Britain, there are marginally more UKIP followers on social media than followers of the Conservatives or the Labour Party, even though it only has one MP.

One of the reasons for this is the anti-system character of social media compared with the traditional mass media. But simplicity is the key factor that connects social media with populist views. In the 140 characters of a tweet it is impossible to analyse all the dimensions of a political problem, but there is space for the poster to give the audience a 'catchy title', an idea easy to understand within seconds. By their nature, social media formats are best suited to short answers, simple ideas and vivid images containing a lot of emotion. Populist parties are heavy producers of these political products.

THE CHALLENGE OF EURO-SCEPTIC AND NATIONALIST POPULISM

The electoral success of Euro-sceptic political parties challenges the pro-European political establishment. The first and most apparent consequence of this success is that nationalist-populist parties have managed to impose their agenda on the public debate. In order to avoid the loss of voters to their right, centre-right parties have tended to adapt their rhetoric to meet this agenda on a number of issues, including EU solidarity, security and migration policy. This may seem to be a natural reaction, but in reality it is self-defeating, not to mention that it validates the populist argumentation (no matter how poor the latter actually is).¹⁰⁶ Voters who are attracted by the nationalist-populist narrative are more likely to remain supporters of populist parties. However, there cannot be a common response to populism and nationalism, since not all European problems can be instantly solved. No single model can be applied across the different countries, political cultures, electoral bases and so on.

It has been suggested that in order to deal with the problem, all political parties that reject both nationalism and populism, and are pro-European, should try to form a sort of *cordon sanitaire*. The notion behind this idea is that if nationalist-populist political forces are isolated, they will gradually lose their influence on public opinion. However, experience has shown that the implementation of this tactic may only be partly successful as it may also result in making Euro-sceptics appear anti-systemic and thus actually boost their popularity. At the same time, using nationalist-populist parties as electoral or governmental partners could prove even more harmful in the long-run, as this legitimises their role in political affairs. Pro-European political parties seem to be trapped between the hammer and the anvil. For the centre-right parties it would be far more effective to stick to their principles and defend them, rather than adapting them for short-term electoral benefit. Even if this tactic does not pay off immediately, it is the only way to deal with nationalist populism without letting such parties become an ideologically dominant force.

106 *The Economist*, 'Playing with Fear', 12 December 2015.

The real answer to the problem posed by the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties is to tackle the sources of the problems raised by populists. Centre–right parties should not try to win the wrong battle: it is not necessary to try to gain moral superiority; rather they should go into real battle with the challenges and problems that have actually fuelled populism. Without tangible results in the economy and without coherent EU policies and solidarity among member states on the issue of migration, Eurosceptics will most probably gain more ground in the near future. They will be able to present the EU as the source of every problem and themselves as the crusaders of change for the benefit of the least privileged. A rethink of the basic concept of European integration, with an emphasis on common European values (such as peace, development, cooperation, solidarity and prosperity for all) is the only viable alternative to Euroscepticism.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this context, centre–right parties should explore ways to:

- deal with the issues raised by the populist parties rather than tackling populism as a political opponent;
- remember the consequences of nationalism in Europe not as an old-fashioned school lesson, but as a possible new reality;
- speak a simpler—but not simplistic—language;
- limit the influence of populists in the social media arena, where they usually prevail and are able to broaden their political/electoral audience;
- use new technologies and political innovation to instigate active citizenship and political/electoral participation;
- open up models of internal organisation to reach new electoral audiences; and
- have an active and visible presence in local communities to make people more interested in the mainstream by forging stronger links to local groups.

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Room for Religion: Liberal versus Christian Democratic Arguments for the Presence of Religion in the Public Domain

Rien Fraanje

Recommended by the CDA Research Institute, The Hague, the Netherlands.

Abstract This chapter compares the works of two prominent but totally different thinkers who each published a book in 2012: American philosopher Martha Nussbaum and former Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams. Each author advocates that there should be room for religion in the public domain. Nussbaum puts forward mainly liberal arguments, while Williams imbues his line of reasoning with Christian Democratic notions such as pluralism, sovereignty and human solidarity. Where Nussbaum proposes that religious reasoning may not be withheld from the public domain, Williams argues that religious stories must be heard in the public debate. To what extent can the views of Nussbaum and Williams help the European People's Party to arrive at a widely supported opinion on the presence of religion in the public domain? Nussbaum's more minimalistic reasoning offers the Christian Democratic parties within the European People's Party a basis on which to build bridges with liberal parties.¹⁰⁷

INTRODUCTION

Religion has two faces. On the one hand, it can be a source of inspiration for tolerance, caring and the promotion of social cohesion. The other face of religion—exclusion, intolerance and struggle—is not something that occurs more often, but it is something that is increasingly entering our homes through television, the Internet and newspapers. In many European countries this downside to religion has prompted debates on the presence of religion in the public domain. The view that religious opinions and customs should be barred from the public domain is gaining ground.

The European People's Party (EPP) accommodates various political movements which vary in the weight they attach to the presence of religion in public life. The Christian Democratic parties which laid the foundations of the EPP particularly emphasise the great social importance that religion represents in many societies. However, many of the liberal parties which linked up with the EPP later are more inclined to see religion as a private matter that should be kept out of the public domain.

107 A version of this chapter that focused on the Dutch situation was previously published in *Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid* 3 (2015), 92–102.

This chapter compares the arguments of two prominent but totally different thinkers: Martha Nussbaum and Rowan Williams. Both argue that there has to be room for religion in the public domain, but each does this from a completely different perspective. The former holds a liberal view of religion, while the latter emphatically takes a Christian Democratic perspective in favour of including religious arguments in the public debate. Nussbaum argues that religious arguments *should not be kept out of* the public domain, while Williams argues that religious arguments and stories *must be heard* in public debate. The differences between Nussbaum and Williams cannot conceal that they are both convinced that religion has a place in the public domain and that it should not be reduced to something private; whereas secularism in public life entails that religious convictions can only be professed and experienced behind closed doors. To what extent can the views of Nussbaum and Williams help the EPP to arrive at a widely supported opinion on the presence of religion in the public domain?

MARTHA NUSSBAUM: OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF FEAR

The influential American philosopher Martha Nussbaum (born in 1947) is affiliated to the University of Chicago as professor in the philosophy of law and ethics. Many of her publications deal with the question of what is just.¹⁰⁸ She has an unprecedented output level: on average she publishes a new book every two years. In 2012 she published *The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age*,¹⁰⁹ which once again focuses on the question of justice.

Completely in line with the subtitle of her book, Nussbaum begins with the assertion that the current intolerance with regard to religion is a product of fear of the unknown. But fear in itself is not a bad emotion, Nussbaum claims. It can even be a valuable mechanism, because fear is often a sign of imminent risk or danger. Thus fear can protect us from actual threats. At the same time, Nussbaum observes that we are prone to make mistakes: we perceive dangers that do not actually exist. History has shown that politicians do not shy away from using this easily manipulated emotion to pit groups in society against each other. As a result, fear itself can even become a threat.

The risk of the emotion of fear is intrinsic to the emotion itself, because fear 'is always relentlessly focused on the self and the safety of the self'.¹¹⁰ In other words: fear turns our outlook inwards and makes us blind to the world and to other people around us. Seen in this light, fear is a narcissistic emotion, and to substantiate this Nussbaum refers to the philosopher and writer Iris Murdoch. In her work Murdoch demonstrates that people have great difficulty

108 For example *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

109 I refer to M. C. Nussbaum, *The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age* (Cambridge, MA/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012).

110 *Ibid.*, 56.

regarding other people as beings who are real and worthy of care and attention. We are often so busy with ourselves that we only see others through ‘the obscuring haze’ of our own plans, needs and beliefs.¹¹¹ And in this way, fear threatens love.

The consequences of this are reflected in the political and social debate on the place religion has in our Western society. In the introductory chapter Nussbaum refers to the Swiss referendum (2009), which heralded a ban on minarets.¹¹² She then reminds us of the act of terror committed by Anders Breivik, who murdered 76 people by bombing government buildings in Oslo and shooting young members of the Norwegian Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) who had gathered on the island of Utøya. While the attacker was being led by his fear of Islam, the media immediately—though they were soon proved wrong—established a link with Islamic terrorism. These events are examples of occasions where the other person is no longer seen as a human being, but as a danger. Fear prevents us from seeing that other people are human beings too.

It is our duty as human beings to overcome our fears, Nussbaum argues. A combination of three things are necessary for this: sound principles which respect and encourage human equality, arguments that do not merely benefit our own interests and do not blame a minority group for mistakes that are ubiquitous in the majority culture, and a curious and compassionate mind.¹¹³ In her book Nussbaum goes on to carefully elaborate on these three requirements.

Sound principles

According to Nussbaum, the first principle necessary for a tolerant society where fear does not have the upper hand is that ‘all humans have *equal dignity*’.¹¹⁴ The second principle is that public authorities should not violate this equality, but should show respect for human equality and dignity: ‘to violate conscience is to conduct an assault on human dignity’.¹¹⁵

How can public authorities avoid violating a person’s conscience? Nussbaum proposes that it is the task of public authorities to accommodate those who have different opinions and customs, even if these are based on religious convictions. The majority society should raise itself up to become the standard to which all others must adhere. It should state: ‘I respect you as an equal, and I know that my own religious pursuits are not the only ones around. Even if I am more numerous and hence more powerful, I will try to make the world comfortable for you’.¹¹⁶

111 Ibid., 57.

112 In 2009 a large majority of the Swiss population voted in a referendum for a ban on the construction of minarets. The ban has been incorporated into the Swiss Constitution.

113 Ibid., 21.

114 Ibid., 65.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid., 97.

No unfounded accusations

The second requirement to be able to control our fears is that we should refrain from accusing others of things of which we ourselves are (also) guilty. Nussbaum is inspired in this regard by Immanuel Kant, who based the cornerstone of his ethical philosophy on the human character trait of accusing other people of behaviour which we exhibit ourselves. Kant reasoned that people have a tendency to label themselves as an exception, so that they can declare that generally applicable rules and principles, which they deem very important for others, do not apply to themselves. Nussbaum argues that proposals for banning the burka are a very good example of this. She claims that five arguments are invariably given for a ban on wearing the burka, of which ‘all five are made inconsistently, in ways that tacitly favour majority practices and burden minority practices. . . . [A]ll are cases of seeing the mote in your brother’s eye while failing to appreciate the large plank that is in your own eye: for all target situations alleged to be present in Muslim communities while failing to note their ubiquity in the majority culture’.¹¹⁷

In this chapter I will limit myself to the first three arguments. The first two used against the wearing of the burka in public are security and transparency. Here Nussbaum refers to the Dutch former minister Rita Verdonk, who supported the call for a ban on burkas for ‘reasons of public order, security and protection of citizens’¹¹⁸. According to Verdonk, if people are unable to see each other’s faces, this forms an obstruction to daily social contact. We are applying double standards here, Nussbaum says, because when the weather is cold we walk around outside wearing hats that cover our ears and with scarves wrapped tightly round our noses and mouths without this being considered a problem of security or transparency. And thus we must conclude that a covered face in itself does not incite fear and distrust, but that it is a covered Muslim face that provokes fear and distrust.

The third argument against the burka is that it is a garment that symbolises male domination and makes women mere objects. But which law—Nussbaum asks—opposes pornography, magazines displaying images of naked women, video clips where women drape themselves submissively around a singer who has labelled himself a star, and advertisements where women are urged to wear certain clothes or to use certain make-up products to make themselves more attractive? ‘What cannot be defended’, the American philosopher says, ‘is to object to objectification only when (as we suppose) it turns up in someone else’s culture.’¹¹⁹

The inconsistencies referred to above are not just illogical or exposing a rhetorical omission. No: ‘It is the inconsistency of narcissism, of people who take others to task while making an exception for themselves. The person who argues this way is putting herself up above others and failing to respect them as equals.’¹²⁰

117 Ibid., 105.

118 M. Corder, ‘Dutch Government Proposes a Ban on Wearing Burqas in Public’, *The Independent*, 18 November 2006.

119 Nussbaum, *The New Religious Intolerance*, 115.

120 Ibid., 131.

Empathy

The third and final requirement to be able to banish unreasonable fears from society is a curious and compassionate mind. Or in other words, the curiosity to want to find out what is going on with the other person. Nussbaum sees empathy as the opposite of fear: ‘In fear, a person’s attention contracts, focusing intently on her own safety, and (perhaps) that of a small circle of loved ones. In empathy the mind moves outward, occupying many different positions outside the self.’¹²¹

But it is not self-evident that people are able to trigger empathy. After all, we humans are inclined to view the whole world from our own perspective, our own objectives and interests. We then—often incorrectly—interpret the behaviour of other people as something to do with ourselves. This narcissism must be counteracted through ‘the habitual cultivation of a displacement of mind, a curious, questioning, receptive demeanour that says, in effect, “Here is another human being. I wonder what he (or she) is seeing and feeling right now.” It needs . . . a willingness to move out of the self and to enter another world’.¹²²

ROWAN WILLIAMS: AN OBJECTION TO PROGRAMMATIC SECULARISM

Rowan Williams (born in 1950) had already made a name for himself as a prominent theologian and poet when he was asked in 2002 to become the 104th Archbishop of Canterbury and thus leader of the Church of England and the global Anglican community. His book *Faith in the Public Square* is a collection of lectures delivered by Williams in the period that he was Archbishop (2002–12).¹²³ The separate chapters of Williams’ collection cannot be read as an integral and continuous appeal, as is the case with Nussbaum. For the purposes of this article, the first third of his book is particularly relevant and includes seven lectures dealing with religion in the public domain. His central argument is that religious arguments can enrich the public debate, (certainly) where economics, ethics, multicultural society and sustainability are concerned.

Whereas in *The New Religious Intolerance* Nussbaum opposes fear, Williams directs his attention towards secularism and in particular towards what he refers to as ‘programmatically secularism’. He defines secularism as a functional, instrumentalist perspective, suspicious and uncomfortable when it comes to inaccessible dimensions. In other words, secularism is blind to the mysterious, to all that cannot be clarified.

Furthermore, according to Williams, the state acts as though it—contrary to all religions—is free of values and is neutral. Thus the church has the important task of exposing the pretension

121 Ibid., 146.

122 Ibid., 140.

123 I refer to R. Williams, *Faith in the Public Square* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012).

of truth conveyed by the state and politics by providing its own version of the truth. Referring to Cavanaugh,¹²⁴ Williams proposes that ‘the Christian community must be distinguished by the telling and enacting of a story that is different from that propagated by the modern state’.¹²⁵

Williams rejects the secular misconception that listening to religious considerations in a discussion entails the unconditional adoption of religious doctrines by the secular administration. He advocates, on the contrary, ‘a willingness to promote argument about the foundations and legitimacy of various public policies in terms broader than those of instrumental reason’.¹²⁶

However, he observes a diminishing willingness to take religious stories and experiences into account in social and political debate. Programmatic secularism, which wants to remove all signs of ideological belief from the public domain, is the main culprit. This form of secularism ‘defines an exclusive public orthodoxy of a new kind, and works on the assumption that only one sort of loyalty is really possible’, with the consequence that ‘this reduces what will be for a lot of people their most intimate and decisive moral inspirations to the level of private choices, lifestyle choices as you might say’.¹²⁷

In the introduction to his collection of lectures he distinguishes programmatic secularism from the procedural variant. He describes procedural secularism as ‘a public policy which declines to give advantage or preference to any one religious body over others’.¹²⁸ The state takes on the role of ‘overseeing a variety of communities of religious conviction’ and ‘assisting them to keep the peace together, without requiring any specific public confessional allegiance from its servants or guaranteeing any single community a legally favoured position against others.’¹²⁹ Williams alleges that the Christian church has helped to shape this type of division between the state and the church. Williams associates liberalism with the programmatic secularism which he so loathes when he writes that purely instrumental liberalism represents an ‘empty public square which allows maximal private licence’ where, as a result, ‘a crowded and argumentative public square’ is obstructed.¹³⁰ As a result, programmatic secularism undermines basic trust in the idea that if ‘all voices are being heard in the process of “brokering” harmony’, all groups in society will adhere to the fundamental agreement to refrain from violence.¹³¹

124 W. Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination. Christian Practices of Space and Time* (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2003).

125 Williams, *Faith in the Public Square*, 43.

126 Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, 20.

127 Though Williams does not cite this, the standard work, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) by the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor immediately springs to mind. See *Ibid.*, 3.

128 Williams, *Faith in the Public Square*, 2.

129 *Ibid.*, 2.

130 *Ibid.*, 27.

131 *Ibid.*

This leads Williams to deliver a harsh verdict: ‘Programmatic secularism, as a shorthand for the denial of the public legitimacy of religious commitment as a partner in political conversation, will always carry the seeds, not of totalitarianism in the obvious sense, but of that “totalizing” spirit which stifles critique by silencing the other.’¹³² In addition, he sees a clear connection between this form of secularism and fundamentalism: ‘forgetful religion is itself one of the roots of secularity — just as secularity re-imports itself into religion in the form of fundamentalism.’¹³³ Williams preaches — in short — the importance of a pluralistic society in which democracy is not equal to the tyranny of the majority and the sovereign power does more than just express the will of the majority.

CONCLUSIONS: LIBERAL VERSUS CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC ARGUMENTS

Nussbaum’s argument in favour of religion in the public domain is indisputably liberal in character. She appeals to liberal–humanist values such as human dignity, equality and justice, and demonstrates the relevance of basic human capacities such as empathy and inquisitiveness. Nussbaum explicitly formulates an alternative for the ideas of politicians and political parties that call themselves liberal. Such organisations usually clutch at concepts such as freedom and equality to justify legal measures to exclude (religious) practices from the public domain that they believe do not correspond to these liberal principles. The burka ban mentioned by Nussbaum is an example of this, but we could also refer to attempts to prohibit ritual slaughter or the display of religious symbols in public buildings such as schools.

The ideas of Rowan Williams and the Anglican Church stem from a different theological and political culture but certainly include concepts that are familiar to Christian Democracy. In the first place, Williams advocates a public environment in which there is room for pluralism, for people with different cultures, religions and backgrounds. His reasoning in this regard is strongly based on the interconnectedness that exists between humans. Since we have been created in God’s image, it follows that we can only recognise ourselves in the faces of others. By understanding this, we can relate to others and pay heed to them.¹³⁴

Moreover, Williams points out that the government is also just one party in the public debate, alongside many others. It should therefore display a high level of restraint in professing a kind of moral superiority by playing judge and deciding what is correct and what is not. This is precisely why Williams emphasises that a legitimate democracy ensures that different groups are given the space to exist, while the state has the important task of upholding and protecting the existence of this free space. The choice of words is different, but the Christian Democratic concept of sovereignty is clearly discernible.

132 Ibid., 32–3.

133 Ibid., 18.

134 See also the recent encyclical, *Laudato si*, by Pope Francis, which also takes the interconnectedness of humans as its key focus. Pope Francis, *Laudato si* (Vatican: Holy See Press Office, 2015).

Where Nussbaum asserts that the required principles have to be acquired and maintained, Williams believes that people are automatically inclined to recognise themselves in others as long as we realise that we are connected to each other. This realisation should be nurtured, and that in itself is a reason to permit religious arguments in the public debate, because the global interconnectedness and interdependence of humanity is an indisputably religious concept.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The EPP must have a positive attitude towards religion and, through its politics, strengthen the role religion plays as a source of inspiration for tolerance, caring and the promotion of social cohesion.
- The EPP must support procedural secularism and strongly resist programmatic secularism.
- National political parties within the EPP that reason from the perspective of concepts such as pluralism, sovereignty and interconnectedness must take note of the liberal arguments put forward by Nussbaum. Within the EPP these can help to build bridges with the liberal parties to help them move from programmatic to procedural secularism.

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Public Expressions of Religious Faith

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Recommended by the Pro Patria Institute, Tallinn, Estonia.

Abstract In recent decades the role of religion in the public sphere has been reduced. The defenders of secularism proclaim that the only philosophy that is neutral and suitable for everybody is the one that says that religion has no place in modern thinking, or at least no place in the public sphere. The use of Christian terminology in state and municipal offices has become politically inappropriate in many EU member countries. The same development is taking place regarding religious symbols. Crosses are still acceptable in cemeteries and on churches, but their presence in classrooms or public squares is often heavily disputed. Just like freedom of speech and conscience, the freedom of religion is considered to be an inalienable right of everybody in the Western world. The public expression of religious faith is part of that freedom. These basic rights are constantly under pressure from the political left. More political debate on the topic would help to defend the freedom of religion and its public expression.

INTRODUCTION

Across Europe the place of religion in the public sphere is a matter of dispute. In many of the cases to be discussed, we see that civil servants are often discouraged from expressing their religious views, on the grounds that this may be disturbing for those who have a different opinion about God. Religious symbols in public spaces have caused disputes in many EU countries.

European countries have different cultural and religious backgrounds. Because of this, each country has a unique approach to what is lawful and acceptable in terms of the place of religion in public life. Some disputes on the place of religious symbols in the public sphere have even been resolved by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

Different interpretations of the freedom of speech, religion and conscience are often based on differing ideologies. As this freedom is restricted to the extent that it is unacceptable to insult others, the question is to what extent does it have to be restricted, and at what point does the freedom to express one's views cross over to become hate speech. Some people are offended by any disagreement or difference of opinion. However, simply stating a different opinion cannot be considered hate speech.

The battle between militant secularists and the defenders of Christian values seems to be unending. Politicians who claim that in order to be neutral one has to be secular want to shape

Europe according to their ideology, while Christians want to preserve the values that form the basis of the Western world, including its Christian culture.

In the US, state and church are clearly separated, but it is natural to end a speech with a reference to the Creator by saying ‘God bless you’. Israeli governments are not particularly religious but it is natural for them to integrate a Bible passage into their speeches, as they have also done at the UN General Assembly. These are just a few examples that could be followed by Europeans.

EU MEMBER COUNTRIES HAVE DIFFERENT BACKGROUNDS

European countries have a diverse understanding of what sort of expressions of religious faith are appropriate, suitable and lawful. The greatest differences come from the existence of three dominant religious backgrounds. These divide Europe into three general areas, with some exceptions: the Catholic south, the Orthodox east and the Protestant north. As well as the dominant religions, protest movements and military interventions have also shaped the role of religion. For example, France has become secular and a big part of Eastern Europe has lost its formerly strong connection to religion. Different approaches to religion from different member countries make it difficult for the EU to form common policies about freedoms and restrictions on the expression of religion.

French law bans religious symbols in public (i.e. government-operated) schools.¹³⁵ The ban is based on the constitutional requirement of the separation of state and religion (laïcité).

The official position of the UK is the opposite of the French situation. The monarch has the title ‘Defender of the Faith and Supreme Governor of the Church of England’. The relationship between the church and state is not only symbolic but also practical. Archbishops and bishops are appointed by the Queen and 24 of them sit in the House of Lords.¹³⁶

The Nordic countries are in the process of separating relations between church and state, but in reality the Lutheran Church has a special position in all of them. Sweden, Finland and Iceland have created greater distance between church and state than existed previously, and in these countries the Lutheran Church is now called the ‘National church’. The official relationships between church and state in Denmark and Norway are closer, but in reality many other churches have the same privileges as the state church.

135 France, ‘Loi no. 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics’ [Law no. 2004-228 of 15 March 2004, concerning, through the application of the principle of laïcité, the wearing of symbols or clothing demonstrating religious affiliation in state primary and secondary schools], Journal Officiel no. 65 (17 March 2004), 5190.

136 The Church of England, ‘Structure’.

In spite of the special relationship between church and state in the UK and in the Nordic countries, all other churches and people of other or no religion in these countries enjoy the same freedom of religion as members of the state church. At the celebration of her diamond jubilee, Queen Elizabeth II said that the church had ‘created an environment for other faith communities and indeed people of no faith to live freely’.¹³⁷

In most Eastern European countries atheism replaced religion after their annexation or domination by the totalitarian regime of the Soviet Union. Although the occupiers were not regarded very highly in these countries, the model of the relationship between state and church was often copied. This, as well as some other historical factors, has led to the Czech Republic and Estonia becoming the most secular countries in Europe. Estonia may have been especially affected because of its small size. The heavy persecution of Christians by Communist authorities forced those who wanted to preserve their nation to deny their connection with the church.

Often people who move to another EU member country do not realise that the rules are different there. The following case study from Italy illustrates this very well.

ITALY FIGHTS FOR CRUCIFIXES IN CLASSROOMS

Soile Lautsi, a Finnish woman with dual Finnish and Italian citizenship, spent years fighting against the presence of crucifixes in the classrooms in Abano Terme, Italy, where her two sons attended school. Several court cases took place from 2005 to 2011 regarding the issue, until a final decision was made by the ECHR in 2011.

Lautsi was not happy about the presence of crucifixes in the classrooms where her children studied and she requested that the School Council take them down. When the School Council refused to comply she took the case to the Veneto Administrative Court. On 17 March 2005 the court decided that the presence of crucifixes in the school did not breach the principle of secularism. She appealed to the Italian Supreme Administrative Court, which upheld the decision of the Veneto Court, reasoning that in Italy the crucifix symbolised the religious origin of values and did not have religious connotations.¹³⁸

The court cases did not end there. Lautsi did not take no for an answer and appealed to the ECHR on 27 July 2006. The decision came on 3 November 2009 that there had been a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.¹³⁹ The Chamber of the Second Section of the Court decided that the crucifix had a predominantly religious meaning. Thus the pupils were not able to remove themselves from the presence of religious symbols and therefore the state had to remove the crucifixes from the classrooms.

137 M. Ireland, ‘Queen Defends Church of England at Diamond Jubilee Event’, *Assist News Service*, 26 February 2012.

138 S. Alfano, ‘Italy Appeals Crucifix Ban in Classrooms’, *Daily News*, 30 June 2010.

139 ECHR, *European Convention on Human Rights* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2010).

The Italian government appealed to the Grand Chamber of the Court on 28 January 2010. The appeal was initially supported by the governments of Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, and later by 20 countries in total. Two motions for the resolution were proposed in the European Parliament. The Socialists & Democrats (S&D) group proposed to recognise the freedom of the member states to display religious symbols in public. The European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) and Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA) groups proposed that the state should not display religious symbols.

The decision by the Grand Chamber of the ECHR to overturn the ruling of the lower chamber was announced on 18 March 2011. The explanation given was that although the crucifix refers to Christianity, it is an essentially passive symbol and not comparable with a didactic speech or participation in religious activities.

Andrew Brown, a British journalist, commented on the decision of the Grand Chamber of the ECHR as 'obviously a victory for common sense, of which only fanatics would disapprove'.¹⁴⁰

Although the case of the crucifixes in Italian classrooms ended with victory for the state of Italy, and for the millions of Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant Christians all over Europe and beyond, it raises a question: why did the decision take so long and how could anybody even question the right of a state to have Christian symbols in public spaces? The contribution of Christian institutions to the European education system is undeniable. The culture of Europe includes so many Christian symbols that they are all around and it is impossible to walk through any historic city without seeing them almost at every step. How can a European expect to avoid them while living in Europe?

Another question the case raises is how the lower court could declare the crucifixes illegal. According to Brown, a journalist for *The Guardian*, the ban went against common sense. Brown expressed the opinion of a large section of society that crosses are a part of the culture of Catholic Italy. No court should have the authority to ban the most prominent cultural symbols of a country.

The decision by the lower court highlights that many of the documents which provide legal regulations, including the European Convention on Human Rights, are vague in content, and can thus be misinterpreted. In a broader sense, a reference to God or Christianity is absolutely necessary in many basic documents in order to avoid further arguments.

A reference to Christian values was also left out of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. This was a disappointment to the many politicians who had worked hard to get it included and who foresaw that its exclusion might result in a lack of clarity in the future.

The situation with the Italian crucifixes clearly shows that some people are fighting against the presence of Christian symbols in Europe. The scope of the case shows that this battle was

140 P. Sims, 'Compulsory Crucifixes in Italian Classrooms?', *The Guardian*, 25 March 2011.

not only between a parent and a school in a small town in Italy, but also involved the Italian Supreme Administrative Court, the European Parliament, and a lower chamber and the Grand Chamber of the ECHR.

The victory for common sense indicates that militant secularists cannot expect an easy conquest of Europe. The number of practicing Christians is still quite high. Additionally there are many others who appreciate the Christian culture and values and support them. Standing up for Christian symbols in Europe does not seem to be hopeless. The victory in this case certainly encourages others to fight.

THE VICTORY COLUMN IN TALLINN

The War of Independence Victory Column was unveiled in Freedom Square, Tallinn, Estonia on 23 June 2009. It is a memorial for those who fell during the Estonian War of Independence from 1918 to 1920. The pillar is 23.5 metres high, made of 143 illuminated glass plates and features the Cross of Liberty on the top. The winning design was selected from more than 40 entries in the summer of 2007.

The monument made many headlines in the Estonian media during the two years from the announcement of the winner to its unveiling. The greatest problem with it was the cross on the top. The Estonian papers were full of articles and radio and TV stations broadcast public debates about how inappropriate it was to have a huge cross in the central square of a European capital city. The cross represented the ‘Cross of Liberty’, Estonia’s most distinguished award, which was established in 1919. However, this did not change its opponents’ opinion of it.

The opposition to the statue was very aggressive and loud. The dissenters’ main objections were twofold. The first was that a cross is not suitable as a piece of contemporary architecture, especially if elevated to 28 metres.¹⁴¹ The second objection was that the Archbishop of the Lutheran Church was the chair of the Commission of the Column and therefore not objective and unbiased.

In spite of the aggressive media campaigns against the Column, public opinion was in favour of it. According to an opinion poll by TNS Emor, 70% of the population were in favour of erecting the statue and just 17% were against it. Even more people, 74%, supported a modified design. Among Estonian nationals support was even higher, at 84%.¹⁴² About 12,000 people donated towards the erection of the monument.

The case of the War of Independence Victory Column clearly indicates that a great majority of the people supported the erection of a memorial statue that included a clear Christian symbol—

141 The height was originally supposed to be 28 metres, but this was later reduced to 23.5 metres in an attempt to reach a compromise.

142 *Vabadusemonument.ee*, ‘Vabaduse Monument’ [The Freedom Monument], 17 December 2007.

the cross. The opponents to the statue were largely officials who knew how to campaign and had the resources to campaign. They included many left-wing politicians and civil servants, media leaders, educators, and prominent figures in art and culture. On the other hand the strong popular support for the symbol of the cross was surprising, as Estonia is one of the most secular countries in Europe.

FREEDOM OF PUBLIC SPEECH ABOUT RELIGION

Speaking about religion in many political or other civil forums is considered biased or inappropriate. Religion divides people, it is thought, and therefore it is good to keep it out of the public arena. On several occasions Christian teachers have been told not to talk about religious matters in the UK, even if they are asked to by their students. Often these rules vary, depending on the local school or community leaders. Many companies have banned religious symbols and talk in their codes of conduct. In most cases it is entirely lawful to express one's religious faith in public, but restrictions are imposed by those who feel threatened by this.

In most cases speaking about religion is justified and non-threatening if it happens in the context of tradition or patriotism. The funeral of a prominent statesman in a church is easily accepted by the media. The royal wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton was broadcast live from Westminster Abbey and was watched by an audience of more than two billion. This church service probably had one of the biggest audiences ever.

Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has now established a Faith Foundation. He has publicly said that he consults God about his decisions. As a prime minister he apparently faced restrictions: Alastair Campbell, his former spokesman, said to reporters interested in the spiritual life of the prime minister, 'We don't do God'.¹⁴³ Tony Blair has said that he avoided talking about his religious views while in office for fear of being labelled 'a nutter', but now that he is no longer in politics he has much more freedom to do so. Often the problem is not about what is lawful but about what is politically correct or acceptable to the majority.

SUPPORTING STATEMENTS BY PROMINENT LEADERS

Strong positive statements from many prominent European politicians have been made at prayer breakfast gatherings and other Christian political conferences. These statements deserve much more attention as they express the basic values of many decision-makers at the highest level.

Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council, was the main speaker at the European Prayer Breakfast in Brussels in 2012. His opening comment was: 'I do not find it difficult to talk about faith because I have written and spoken about it countless times. It was and remains unusual for a Flemish and Belgian politician.' His speech was about his personal faith in God.

143 *BBC News*, 'Tony Blair Joins Catholic Church', 22 December 2007.

Professor Dr Norbert Lammert, President of the Bundestag, opened the Berlin Prayer Breakfast in 2016 by speaking on the main topic, ‘responsibility before God and man’, a quotation from the German Constitution, and also addressing the sub-theme of the event, ‘accepting one another—bridging the gap’. His speech was clearly based on the Bible, but also expressed his own views on faith.

Urmas Reinsalu, Estonian Minister of Justice, spoke at the conference ‘Perspective of Christian Democracy in Europe’ in Tallinn in 2016 about the Christian values that we have to defend in Europe. Among other values, he emphasised the importance of traditional families, marriage between a man and a woman, freedom of speech, faith and conscience. He also opposed the common and general claim of the media that in order to be neutral and unbiased one has to be secular.

CONCLUSION

Europe is under constant pressure from militant secularists who have managed to create the impression that to be objective and unbiased one has to be secular. In the case of the crucifixes in Italian classrooms, the Italian courts and the ECHR based their decisions on the reasoning that the symbol was not only religious but cultural as well. In other words, the symbol had to be secular in order to be acceptable. The same kind of discussion took place about the Victory Column in Estonia.

In reality secularism is neither neutral nor unbiased. The secularist view ignores the reality that faith is the deepest integral part of a human being. Religious faith is a person’s greatest motivator. A denial of faith in public is a denial of one’s identity. This goes directly against basic human rights.

Denial of the public expression of religious faith creates a situation in which one can talk about and display everything else but not the thing of the greatest importance to oneself. By such denial, the younger generation will also take their values from a public arena where the lack of religious symbols renders religion unimportant and irrelevant. Having respect for these symbols would draw attention to the values they stand for and would lead to a more sustainable future for both individuals and society as a whole.

Europe certainly needs to have more confidence in Christianity. We also need to understand that religion is not only important in the private sphere but in public as well. Keeping religion out of the public arena creates the impression that it is not important. Religion, in general, therefore needs to be communicated and discussed more often in public forums, in the media, in legislative offices and among the elected representatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Public authorities should

- organise political events where different topics can be discussed from a faith-based viewpoint. Christian Democracy is a well-known concept in Europe. These events could be forums at which religion and its public expression can be discussed;
- develop and empower the prayer breakfast network that is currently one of the largest Christian political networks; and
- involve more media representatives in Christian political conferences and other similar events.

The European People's Party and its members should encourage public authorities to take the above steps.

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The European People's Party and Human Rights

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Abstract The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the debate about human rights: their role and how they should be protected. It is concerned with human rights not only as an idea, but also as a relevant political concept which has an important influence in shaping the foreign policy of European countries. These two aspects are usually set in contradiction to each other. Human rights are viewed as universal and indivisible, but there is no agreement about their philosophical origin and value. Christian Democrats emphasise the religious roots of the idea and defend the value of human dignity against secular concepts of human rights. In this chapter, we will discuss several aspects of the idea of human rights from a Christian Democratic point of view. From this starting point, we will analyse the European People's Party's human rights policy and compare it to that of the Party of European Socialists.

HUMAN RIGHTS AS A UNIVERSAL CONCEPT

The tradition of the universality of human rights is affirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. This declaration generally refers to two major historical documents: the Declaration of Independence of the United States of 1776 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. These documents were based on specific cultural and philosophical traditions of thinking about human rights. And these traditions, in turn, were inspired by ideas that had preceded them. Thus, these traditions referred to earlier and ancient Christian sources regarding the idea of human dignity. However, the French implementation of the universal rule was built on secular Enlightenment traditions and associated with rationality.¹⁴⁴

According to the Enlightenment tradition, every individual is endowed with the gift of reason, which provides for a universally recognisable catalogue of rights and freedoms which can be made binding by a formal legal confirmation that reflects the social context and cultural patterns of the society in which it is based. Thus, a concept of human rights formulated in this way also assumes the rational agreement of the members of the society with a framework that provides a legally binding, authoritative definition of individual freedom and its manifestations. The specific systemic manifestation of the ideas of civil and political rights is a project of

144 M. A. Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: Random House, 2002); S. Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Harvard University Press, 2012).

political democracy and its institutional framework. In this way the confrontation with the Nazi and Communist totalitarianisms of the twentieth century created the need for international–legal guarantees of human rights as part of a fundamental system of civil and political liberties, and their enforcement, including penalties, in European societies. This system achieved universal international–legal recognition through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the UN, mentioned above, and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950. In the Euro-American space the Helsinki Accords, signed by representatives of 35 countries in Europe and North America on 1 August 1975 in Helsinki, made a major international–legal contribution to the guaranteeing of basic human rights, namely freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief.¹⁴⁵

An international–legal dilemma, however, remains as to whether within a defined framework of guaranteed human rights it is possible to make allowances for the observation of different cultural and religious contexts in various countries around the world. This is related to the question of possible sanctions and their potential enforcement. The origin of the idea of universal human rights in terms of Western societies in a particular historical and cultural–civilisational context is seen as evidence of its universal relevance, and therefore its applicability. From this, legal codes that meet the conditions of other societies affected by different cultural–religious and philosophical traditions have been derived. An insistence on a universalist approach to the idea of human rights has, then, more concrete consequences for the foreign-policy attitudes of those countries that have signed the conventions, and whose political elites have been inspired by the idea of the universality of human rights.¹⁴⁶

In practice this means that the cooperation of countries in the international arena is conditional on respect for the framework of guaranteed human rights and political democracy. Therefore cooperation is impossible if these principles are not respected by one of the parties. Disregarding this rule and promoting solely one’s own material interests, particularly economic and commercial interests, is viewed as an unacceptable challenge to the authority and binding nature of human rights.

In the European context, the idea of the realisation of human rights through political, symbolic and material support for them in undemocratic regimes is associated primarily with the personality of former Czech President Václav Havel. In Havel’s concept, violations of human rights and freedoms become a reason not to accept the originator of these acts as a partner for representatives of democratic states in the international arena. The aim of enforcing the international political and economic isolation of these countries is to weaken the position of undemocratic rulers, ideally leading to the fall of the authoritarian regime itself.¹⁴⁷

145 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Helsinki Final Act* (Helsinki: OSCE, 1975).

146 C. Corradetti, *Relativism and Human Rights, A Theory of Pluralistic Universalism* (Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media B.V., 2009).

147 V. Havel, *The Power of the Powerless* (October 1978).

A preference for secular sources of ideas about human rights and an effort to justify their universal dimension in the absence of the influence of a particular religious tradition also creates significant noetic difficulties in terms of formulating a binding framework for human rights as part of a system of moral responsibility for welfare and the spiritual development of the whole society. The concept of human rights when referring to Judeo-Christian sources of thinking about human dignity is facing opposition. This opposition comes not only from those who refer to how such sources are allegedly not binding in other cultural and religious contexts, but also from the existential incompatibility of secular traditions of ancient and Enlightenment provenance with the mainly Christian vision of man and his reason.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHRISTIANITY

Some leading contributors to the development of the idea of human rights as the value basis for the peaceful and dignified coexistence of nations in the twentieth century have highlighted the ideological kinship between ancient and Enlightenment sources on human rights and Judeo-Christian thinking about human dignity. One such thinker is the Czech philosopher Božena Komárková. Following John Locke and John Stuart Mill and significantly influenced by the philosophies of T. G. Masaryk and Jan Patočka, Komárková defined the Christian, and especially the Protestant–Calvinist, conception of humanity as a vital source of ideas about human rights and freedoms. For Komárková the development of the concept of human rights was a practical expression of the requirement to love your neighbour as yourself, a requirement which was given to man by God.¹⁴⁸ Man is, according to Christian tradition, created in the image of God, and in the Ten Commandments God gives man the moral obligation of responsibility for himself and others. The commandment to love one's neighbour leads a man to understanding and an acceptance of human dignity as a commitment before God, and a practical expression of this is the idea of human rights. The supreme and inviolable human right is the right to life, for which God himself is the guarantor. According to Komárková, the Christian tradition of thinking about human rights contributed significantly to the creation of the concept of man as a person who is endowed with rights and obligations, and this became the basis for consideration of the legal embodiment of human rights in a secular state.¹⁴⁹ In the 1960s similar conclusions were drawn by the Roman Catholic Church, especially in the documents of the Second Vatican Council, particularly the 'Declaration on Religious Freedom, *Dignitatis Humanae*', and the encyclical of Pope John XXIII, '*Pacem in Terris*', from 1963.¹⁵⁰ These conclusions placed great importance on the work of an influential Catholic philosopher from the first half of the twentieth century, Jacques Maritain, who in his book *Man and the State*¹⁵¹ underlined the

148 B. Komárková, *Původ a význam lidských práv* [The Origin and Meaning of Human Rights] (Praha: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 1990).

149 Ibid.

150 Paul VI, 'Declaration of Religious Freedom, *Dignitatis Humanae*, on the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious', promulgated on 7 December 1965; John XXIII, '*Pacem in Terris*', papal encyclical promulgated on 11 April 1963.

151 J. Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951).

importance of human rights as the understanding of truth through human reason, which is a part of the Creation. Natural law is derived from eternal law, and man recognises its principles through natural moral judgement.

Explicit references to Christian sources of thinking about human rights significantly affected the specific thematic documents devoted to this subject produced by Christian Democratic parties in various European countries after the Second World War. The programmatic aims of these documents have since become the basis for the conceptual development and practical fulfilment of the idea of human rights within the European People's Party (EPP).

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EPP

The EPP has been the largest political group in the European Parliament since 1999 and is well represented in the Commission, the Council and other European institutions as well.

A very clear reference to the promotion of human rights can be found in the EPP's first comprehensive programme document, the *Political Programme* from 1978, which in its second chapter clearly declares the universality of human rights while saying: 'We will safeguard human rights and basic freedoms as a foundation for the development of the individual and for the establishment of a just society. We believe that these rights and freedoms must be respected throughout the world.'¹⁵²

The most basic document for the protection of human rights is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The Charter was drawn up and approved by the EU Convention in 2000 during the discussions about the European Constitution. Originally the Charter had a declarative character, but in the long term the question of its inclusion in primary law was considered. However, this idea was not accepted by all member states. After the failure to approve the European Constitution, the Charter was shrewdly annexed to the Lisbon Treaty.¹⁵³ The EPP supported the connection of the Charter to the Treaty.¹⁵⁴ The party argued that the political

152 T. Jansen and S. Van Hecke, *At Europe's Service: The Origin and Evolution of the European People's Party* (Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2011), 256.

153 The text is not directly a part of the Treaty, but the Treaty refers to the Charter in art. 6 and thus it is counted as a part of primary law. During the approval process two member states, Great Britain and Poland, negotiated exceptions (i.e. opt-outs) from the Charter. Subsequently President of the Czech Republic Václav Klaus tried to join them in 2009, when he demanded an opt-out from the Charter as a condition of signing the Lisbon Treaty. This was because of a fear that the Charter could lead to possible litigation and the questioning of the Beneš decrees. Approval of this exception, however, did not happen, despite the fact that the European Council acceded to Klaus's demand. The Czech exemption was rejected first by the Czech Senate, at that time dominated by the Social Democrat (Česká strana sociálně demokratická) opposition, and then also by the Czech government, which resigned from the negotiations in 2014.

154 J. Daul, 'EPP-ED Group celebrates the approval of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights', Press Release, EPP Group, 28 November 2007.

character of the EU should be strengthened more than its economic policy. As a result the European institutions would guarantee respect for the rights and freedoms of its people and the EU's citizens would gain more rights. Other subsequent programme documents, such as the EPP Athens Basic Programme from 1992 and the 2007 Berlin declaration 'A Union of Values', have continued to appeal for the promotion of human rights.¹⁵⁵

The *Manifesto* and its companion document, the Party Platform, were adopted at the EPP summit in 2012 in Bucharest. They are the latest in a series of basic programming documents that deal with human rights issues. The *Manifesto* underlines freedom as a key human right,¹⁵⁶ which is accompanied by responsibility. From a practical perspective then, this calls for a new strategy for promoting human rights around the world, especially in countries with undemocratic regimes. Respect for human rights is also required by the EPP as one of the conditions for new immigrants to EU countries.¹⁵⁷ In the context of the persecution of Christians in the Middle East, the EPP also determines freedom of religion as a fundamental human right.¹⁵⁸ The promotion of human rights is one of the main points of EU foreign policy with regard to Russia and African countries as well. The document also highlights that due to the EU enlargement process the promotion of human rights is being achieved, especially in the Balkans. The prospect of EU membership acts as a strong incentive for the implementation of European standards of democracy and human rights.

The latest programme document, *Protecting the Union and Promoting Our Values*,¹⁵⁹ adopted by the EPP Congress in Madrid in 2015, does not make any major changes to previous texts. It stresses the need to promote human rights in contrast to the spread of jihadism and terrorism in the world. Events in Ukraine, especially the so-called Euromaidan,¹⁶⁰ are given as examples in the fight for human rights. The issue of human rights is also reflected in the accession process of the Western Balkans countries. The programme document also focuses on respect for countries such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, where it is necessary to find a balanced approach between promoting human rights and protecting the energy interests of the European community.

155 EPP, *Basic Programme*, final text adopted by the ninth EPP Congress, Athens, 12–14 November 1992; Germany 2007 - Presidency of the European Union, 'Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties of Rome', adopted in Berlin, 25 March 2007.

156 EPP, *Manifesto*, adopted at the EPP Statutory Congress, Bucharest, 17–18 October 2012, 1.

157 *Ibid.*, 6.

158 *Ibid.*, art. 140.

159 EPP, *Protecting the Union and Promoting Our Values*, adopted at the EPP Congress, Madrid, 21–2 October 2015.

160 The Euromaidan was a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in 2013 in Ukraine which demanded Ukraine's closer integration with the EU. The protests expanded, with calls for the resignation of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich and democratic reforms.

THE ECONOMIC RELEVANCE OF AN EXTERNAL EU POLICY BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS

There is a very sensitive relationship between the human rights agenda and economic interests, both in the case of the EU's relationship with third countries and also among EU members themselves. In the EPP's *Party Platform* the human rights agenda and the economic agenda are separate. However, in the latest document, *Protecting the Union and Promoting Our Values*, there is mention of the correlation between these two issues. The EPP rejects the conventional notion of a conflict between values and interests. In fact, for the EPP, values should be defined as long-term interests.¹⁶¹ The human rights situation in different countries varies, but the EPP calls for the use of economic diplomacy to promote human rights and other core values.

Basically, the issue of human rights has been present in the EPP's key programme documents since the founding of the party in 1976, and can be clearly seen in the most recent programme document of 2015. The promotion and protection of human rights is seen as a long-term process which is carried out on a daily basis. Its concrete realisation lies mainly in promoting the fulfilment of human rights in the context of external EU policy towards third countries (as well as towards EU member states), and ultimately as a condition of accession for candidate countries. The declaration and enforcement of human rights is not a natural process; it must always be comprehensively linked to democratisation, as well as to other key EPP values such as justice, freedom and solidarity.

HUMAN RIGHTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PARTY OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS' PROGRAMME DOCUMENTS

In the following paragraphs we compare the concept of human rights in the political programme documents of the EPP with those of the Party of European Socialists (PES), which is currently the second largest group in the European Parliament. The PES thus forms a natural programmatic and ideological opponent to the EPP's politics. Socialist parties concur with the EPP on the concept of human rights as they are defined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. In contrast with the EPP, however, socialist parties are constantly trying to expand the list of rights. This leads to the dilution of the concept. In the PES's 2013 *Fundamental Programme*, human rights are mentioned as one of the values that stand out against the pursuit of the EU's stark economic interests, for instance, while negotiating economic agreements with third countries.¹⁶² The issue of human rights is also mentioned, as in the EPP's documents, in the section devoted to foreign policy. Respect for human rights is viewed as an important value for achieving democratisation in third countries and therefore should be taken into account in the enlargement process and in EU neighbourhood policy as well.¹⁶³ Human rights are also mentioned as one of the prerequisites in the fight against poverty and in the effort to maintain sustainable development.

161 EPP, *Protecting the Union and Promoting Our Values*, 3.

162 PES, *Fundamental Programme*, 22 June 2013, 11.

163 *Ibid.*, 12–13.

The PES's manifesto for the 2014 European elections mentions human rights as being a universal European value (with a clear reference to the rights of women and children) that must be globally promoted in the struggle for peace and democracy.¹⁶⁴ Women's rights and the social rights of employees are described in great detail. In the latest programme document, *Towards a Strong Progressive Global Agenda*, from the PES Congress in 2015, human rights are mentioned as a key EU value, together with gender equality and social justice. They should, according to the socialists, be at the core of foreign and neighbourhood policy, both of which are currently facing great challenges in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The document calls for the worldwide promotion of human rights and, in this context, also appeals for the implementation of stricter rules on EU member states regarding arms sales. Furthermore the EU should become a global protector of human rights, including women's rights, gender equality and the struggle for sustainable development.¹⁶⁵

CONCLUSIONS

From a historical perspective the area of human rights has always been one of the priority issues in the programme documents of the European Christian Democratic parties. These documents refer to the Christian roots of the concept of human rights and to their universal validity. Human rights issues were a key tool of Western countries during the dismantling of the Iron Curtain and the transformation of Central and Eastern European countries. The issue of human rights has become one of the crucial areas during the initial processing of EU candidate countries. Today the appeal for respect of human rights in the world is one of the so-called soft-power instruments of European foreign policy. Therefore, in the EPP's programme documents, references to human rights occur primarily in relation to third countries. Appeals for respect for human rights do not stand alone but always go hand in hand with the promotion of democracy and freedom. This is especially true in the case of authoritarian and undemocratic regimes, but it also holds for candidate countries, where the respect for human rights is an important accession criterion. The EPP's programme documents also mention the need for a balanced approach to the issue of human rights and economic interests.

The PES conceives the concept of human rights very broadly and very often connects it with the issues of gender equality, the rights of sexual minorities and the question of social justice. On the other hand, the EPP particularly stresses those values that have their basis in Christianity, such as human dignity, freedom, justice and solidarity. In contrast to the EPP, the PES strongly advocates EU activism and the solving of problems at the global level through organisations such as the UN and other international initiatives. However, both political groups primarily contextualise the human rights issue in the EU's external foreign policy and in the EU's interactions with third countries.

164 PES, *Towards a New Europe: PES Manifesto*, adopted by the PES Election Congress, Rome, 1 March 2014, 6.

165 PES, *Towards a Strong Progressive Global Agenda*, adopted by the PES Election Congress, Budapest, 13 June 2015, 5.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The EPP should maintain continuity in its approach to human rights, which have been present in its programme documents since 1978. The EPP should continue to give the human rights agenda highest priority.
- In order to remain an authentic political party, the EPP should focus specifically on those areas of human rights that are based on Christian values. The key here is an emphasis on human dignity. In contrast to the PES, the EPP should take a deep rather than broad approach and should redefine the classical approach to human rights in a modern way.
- Human rights are the one condition for achieving freedom and democracy. Therefore, the EPP should focus on that agenda in the EU enlargement process and also in the EU's relationship with third countries.
- There is a correlation between human rights and economic interests in external relationships. The EPP should link these agendas and use economic diplomacy to promote human rights and vice versa.

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Immigration and minorities

Alternatives to Multiculturalism: Why Saying It has Failed is not Enough

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Recommended by the Matej Bel Institute, Bratislava, Slovakia.

Abstract Multiculturalism is facing heavy criticism from European governments. Its failures in fostering social integration are well documented. However, it is unclear what we can do to improve the current situation. The chapter argues that whatever the problems of multiculturalism, we should understand that it cannot merely be discarded: it has to be replaced or upgraded. The terminology of ‘diversity regimes’ is used to better situate multiculturalism as an idea. The chapter presents various hybrid models that have appeared in recent decades as part of the efforts to reform multiculturalism. The argument is that, of these, interculturalism, with its focus on intercultural communication, carries the most promise, and that the European People’s Party should play a major role in helping to further develop this concept in the European policy context.

INTRODUCTION

If the prevailing mood is to be trusted, multiculturalism seems to have run its course. It is gradually disappearing from the official narratives of the European institutions. Traditionally a domain of the far right, the criticism of this diversity management strategy has now become part of mainstream European politics. Powerful mainstream European leaders as diverse as Merkel (European People’s Party, EPP), Hollande (Party of European Socialists) and Cameron (European Conservatives and Reformists), to name just a few, have announced the failure and/or the end of multiculturalism, and have called for other and better replacement strategies. However, what this replacement should be is unclear. The following chapter outlines a theoretical framework that could be deployed to navigate the debate about replacing multiculturalism, and then describes some of the existing best practices in the area. The chapter closes by outlining the political possibilities for the EPP, as dictated by the need to find better solutions for integrating our societies in the Europe of the twenty-first century.

DIVERSITY REGIMES

Multiculturalism is a particularly difficult term to define. It has many different theoretical, ideological and practical manifestations, and the literature on the subject runs to whole sections of libraries. This chapter does not aim to work through this corpus of literature, but instead focuses on what multiculturalism means from an EU policy perspective. From this

perspective, we can say that multiculturalism is *a strategic framework for managing intra-state cultural diversity*. Therefore, to properly assess the strengths and weaknesses, the qualities and challenges of multiculturalism, we have to place it in the company of other strategies used by modern countries to deal with cultural diversity. Turkish political scientist Sener Aktürk offers the terminology ‘regimes of ethnicity’ to make sense of these.¹⁶⁶ Here, the use of the term ‘regime’ is based on the understanding that although states use various laws and policies to frame the interactions between members of various groups of citizens, these usually share a general framework within which the state defines the relations between itself and these groups.¹⁶⁷ Aktürk limits his terminology to ethnic differences; however there should be no theoretical problem with expanding it to other types of diversity as well. Hence, I will use the terminology ‘diversity regimes’ to characterise the basic frameworks that states deploy to manage their diverse social groups.

Typologically, we can differentiate between only a handful of such regimes.¹⁶⁸ One such is the *monocultural regime*. It recognises the claim of one particular group—in the European context usually the nominal ethnic group—to the state, but not those of others. That group is then systematically prioritised by the legal framework of the country. Typical examples would include exclusivist definitions of nationhood in laws, laws on citizenship defined by belonging to an ethnic group, language laws, strict religious laws and various symbolic patriotic laws. Germany is a prototypical example of this regime, and the approaches of several Central and Eastern European countries to their autochthonous minorities also come to mind.

The second regime is the *anti-cultural* one. Such countries fail to recognise, or in some cases actively deny, the existence of different subgroups of citizens within the state. While anti-cultural laws can sometimes promote social inclusion through the non-discrimination commitment inherent in so-called colour-blind strategies, in the current sensitive context of identity politics these are increasingly seen as insufficient, oppressive or archaic. Typical anti-cultural spheres of legislation include social policies (such as the ones targeting the Roma of Central Eastern Europe) and electoral laws. Aktürk gives Turkey as an example of this type of regime, but French *laïcité* easily comes to mind as another implementation of this concept.

166 S. Aktürk, *Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

167 It should be noted that finding a general consistency of framework does not mean that a country cannot incorporate elements of multiple different approaches into its policies. Different groups within the same polity might also be incorporated into the state in different ways. However, a majority of policies will always be inspired by the general understanding of the relationships between groups within a state.

168 Aktürk names three main regimes: mono-ethnic, anti-ethnic and multi-ethnic. Here, the names of the regimes are slightly altered to better account for other forms of cultural diversity, and a fourth regime is introduced as an extension of the original typology.

MULTICULTURAL AND POST-MULTICULTURAL FRAMEWORKS

Multicultural frameworks react to the failures of the above-mentioned strategies. They recognise the existence of various subgroups within society, and they also recognise the right of every citizen to ‘own’ the state equally. They also make the key assumption that ‘individual freedom and prosperity depend on full and unimpeded membership in a respected and flourishing cultural group’.¹⁶⁹ In other words, members of these groups can only fully experience their citizenship if the groups themselves are meaningfully empowered to become communities. Therefore, multicultural policies afford group rights and minority institutions to segments of society, creating spheres of partial autonomy within it. Early forms of multiculturalism included the consociationalist arrangements in the Netherlands and Belgium, the cantonal arrangement in Switzerland, the Soviet Union with its policy of *korenizatsiya* (the positive discrimination of titular minorities in the local governance of autonomous units), as well as Canadian multiculturalism.

Multicultural arrangements have now entered the policy space of most Western European nations in some form. The practical manifestations of multiculturalism in Europe are manifold. Public recognition of ethnic minorities is wide ranging, affecting education and cultural policies, social services, laws, campaigns, religious accommodations, regulations for food and clothing, and the media, as well as other areas.¹⁷⁰

The EU member states and the EPP member parties have reacted to the challenge of diversity in various ways. There are three key positions that should be distinguished. The first is *official multiculturalism*, where the actor supports and creates an official strategy for diversity management according to the tenets of multiculturalism. Prototypical examples of this approach would be those of the Netherlands, Sweden or the UK, although in all of these cases the current governments seem to be back-tracking from this position. The second position is *de facto multiculturalism*, where multiculturalism is never officially acknowledged, but nevertheless on both the local and the national levels diversity management happens in accordance with multicultural policies. Germany is a prime example of this approach.

Finally, the third approach is *no multiculturalism*, where the state for some reason or other not only fails to acknowledge the need for multicultural solutions, but also actively discourages local initiatives, let alone national-level solutions. This can stem from a commitment to anti-cultural solutions (as in France), a lingering position of monoculturalism (as in Denmark or Hungary) or the relative homogeneity of the state, meaning that in general the debate is sidelined (as in the Czech Republic). At its extremes, such as strategy can lead to anti-multiculturalism, that is, to active resistance to multicultural solutions by the government.

169 J. Raz, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, in J. Raz, *Ethics in the Public Domain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 174.

170 S. Vertovec and S. Wessendorf, *The Multiculturalism Backlash. European Discourses, Policies and Practices* (London: Routledge, 2010), 3.

THE FAILURES OF MULTICULTURALISM

It is very important to emphasise that the key insight that the strategy of multiculturalism provides is about the individual's need for meaningful and strong communities. Whatever the shortcomings of multiculturalism in practice, anyone calling for its *end* (rather than just its better implementation) needs to come up with a central idea to replace it rather than just demanding that it be discarded. This is because, should we remove the multicultural project from our policies, we would be left with nothing but anti-cultural and monocultural strategies. Both of these strategies were revealed to be lacking in the late twentieth century. They will be even less usable in the complex identity landscape of the twenty-first century. There is no European country that has been able to create an effective, functioning and sustainable model of diversity management that does not include at least some elements of multiculturalism.

This is not to say that the critics of multiculturalism are wrong—quite the contrary, the problems of this strategy are well documented. The biggest problem created by multiculturalism, in its European variants, is the fragmentation of society that it can sometimes produce. By creating spheres of autonomy within the state, multiculturalism creates a hardened shell around minority groups, cutting them off from the state, the majority culture and even each other. It creates an 'archipelago of separate cultures'¹⁷¹ living next to each other but not meaningfully *with* each other. At the same time, the state often finds itself powerless—or even unwilling—to achieve changes to the internal power conditions of these empowered groups. Minority groups can be every bit as intolerant and unequal on the inside as majority groups can be to their members; overextending the autonomy of their leaders, often unelected and unreplaceable, may create unbearable conditions within them. Finally, multiculturalism also has an oversized public relations problem: just like the word 'liberal', it has been the punchbag of so many political actors for so long that it has become toxic to large segments of society. Anyone who attempts to replace or supplant multiculturalism should be aware of this factor too: it is not enough to create an effective strategy—it also has to be a marketable one.

INTERCULTURALISM AND OTHER HYBRID STRATEGIES

The basis of any kind of further thinking about the future of diversity management in Europe must take localised developments into consideration. Multiculturalism in Europe is as varied as the multiplicity of legal and cultural frameworks it has emerged to cater for. And as such, there is considerable variation in its internal workings. Many national or local multicultural arrangements have been around long enough to try and create solutions to, or at least react to, the problems cited above. More and more research is aimed at mapping these solutions. The following section points out three categories of attempts to reform or enhance multiculturalism. These measures and approaches are not mutually exclusive.

171 K. Czyżewski, 'The Culture of Coexistence in the Longue Durée. On Practicing the Ethos of the Borderland', in J. Kurczewski (ed.), *Reconciliation in Bloodlands. Assessing Actions and Outcomes in Contemporary Central-Eastern Europe* (Frankfurt am Main, 2014).

The first and perhaps most important category of solutions offers an increased focus on inter-group communication. Such solutions, often characterised by the term *interculturalism*, aim to create spaces for interactions between members of different groups. In other words, they aim to create the 'connective tissue' between the separated cultures of multicultural societies.¹⁷² Spaces for communication can be created on both the group level and at the level of individuals. The key insight of these strategies is that to foster social cohesion it is not enough to create a democratic framework where discussions about the public good are possible. Instead, people belonging to different groups need to be actively encouraged to take part in these discussions, and helped to bridge the gaps between values, styles and interests. The main aims of this strategy are to halt the fragmentation of society and to give members of minority groups channels through which to express their concerns and insights. Many successful intercultural projects have been implemented locally, and the successes of these need to inform the wider European policy debate.¹⁷³

A second aim is to strengthen the importance of the *civic principle* in the definition of strategies that deal with diversity. This means two things. The first is a partial refocusing of state efforts on individual rights instead of group rights, while at the same time not giving up group recognition. The aim is to empower individuals as citizens vis-à-vis communities, and to increase the 'shared content' of citizenship. Second, policies in this category of solutions could focus on redefining citizenship as an achievement, a goal that immigrants arriving in a country have to work for and not something that is a given. By making people 'work' for, and reflect on, the citizenship they are seeking, these strategies aim to foster a better understanding of the majority culture by members of minority groups. These multicultural citizenship hybrids are best defined by the word *integration*, which demands more of the individual than baseline multiculturalist practice, but much less than assimilation.

Finally, a third point of interest is the integration of local solutions into higher level frameworks. Since most EU member states do not have explicit multicultural policy frameworks (although most have some form of integration, diversity or equal opportunities strategy), the solutions and strategies developed by local communities, such as cities and regions, are of greater importance. In many cases, these local projects have not even been recognised or analysed, let alone integrated into the national frameworks.

The existing hybridisation tendencies are creating unexpected commonalities between the policies of various European countries. While Denmark is gradually moving away from its mono-ethnic model, neighbouring Sweden's new-found national communitarianism is bringing into question its existing multicultural policies. The result is that both countries are now debating a similar set of issues, albeit from different angles. Likewise, while France is introducing programmes of integration and equal opportunities to its citizenship-based model, since 2007 the Netherlands has been making increased use of the idea of civic integration

172 Ibid.

173 K. Czyżewski, J. Kulas and M. Golubiewski, *A Handbook of Dialogue* (Sejny: Fundacja Pogranicze, 2011).

to supplement its much-criticised institutional framework.¹⁷⁴ Again, the debates in these two countries, while originating from very different theoretical frameworks, are showing increasing commonality. Although these processes of hybridisation are neither straightforward nor necessarily convergent, the general tendency seems to be a softening of the differences between the policies of the various countries.

A SPACE FOR INTERCULTURALISM

Should we consider the above-mentioned hybrid strategies to be evolved forms of multiculturalism, reflecting on the failures of earlier models?¹⁷⁵ Or are they something else? Ideologists of multiculturalism have made strong arguments that these strategies, and interculturalism in particular, should be seen as natural extensions of, or even better implementations of multiculturalism.¹⁷⁶ The possibly long ideological argument about this issue, however, seems to be moot, as at this point the term ‘multiculturalism’ is loaded with meaning for large segments of the population. So theoretical issues notwithstanding, however far we depart from multiculturalism as it exists, it will be advisable to rebrand it as something else.

There is some institutional drive behind the term interculturalism that could be used to increase the policy space for it. The term interculturalism generated much discussion in the early 2000s, culminating in the *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* published by the Council of Europe in 2008.¹⁷⁷ However, the definition of interculturalism in this paper is broader than the above usage of the term, that is, it includes the communicational focus of the approaches mentioned above. A further problem with the White Paper is that it has failed to generate meaningful policy initiatives.¹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, the word interculturalism has some mileage in European policy literature, and in many ways seems to be the heir apparent of multiculturalism.

ACCOUNTING FOR VARIOUS FORMS OF DIVERSITY

In the previous decades, the terms ‘diversity’ and ‘multiculturalism’ in Europe have mostly come up in relation to immigration-centred problems and solutions. However, it is important to understand that Europe’s cultural diversity is multidimensional, and that the management of these multiple dimensions has to be integrated into one framework in the future.

174 Vertovec and Wessendorf, *The Multiculturalism Backlash*, 3.

175 D. McGee, *The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights* (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2008).

176 Vertovec and Wessendorf, *The Multiculturalism Backlash*, 196; C. Taylor, ‘Interculturalism or Multiculturalism?’, *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 38/4–5 (2012), 413–23.

177 Council of Europe, *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: Living Together in Dignity*, White Paper (7 May 2008).

178 V. Novotný, *Politics of Identity In Focus: What Next after Multiculturalism*, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (Brussels, 2015).

There are at least four different types of cultural groups that we should account for when talking about diversity. The first type is the autochthonous stateless minority, such as the Basque or Ruthenian ethnic groups. Some such groups have institutional arrangements within their countries, others do not. The second type is the autochthonous diaspora-type minority, whose groups have a ‘motherland’ but do not live there. Examples include the Russian minorities in the Baltics or the Hungarian communities in Central Europe. The third type encompasses the Roma and related ethnic groups, which are a *sui generis* type of minority in Europe. Finally, migrant communities form the fourth type of group, and Muslim migrants form a particularly interesting and challenging subgroup within this.

The diversity management of the various member states differs widely when it comes to these different types of groups. Immigration-related multiculturalism sometimes intersects with autochthon-related multiculturalism, as it does in Belgium. However, while Germany has *de jure* multicultural policies in place for its Danish minority, it offers migrants *de facto* multiculturalism at best. Similarly, in most countries of Central Europe the issue of Roma integration is conceptualised primarily as a social one, while other minorities are understood and managed in an ethno-cultural framework.

A PLACE FOR THE EPP: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The above sections have sought to describe the scope and character of the problem that the EU and its member states are facing. During the coming decades, the member states can only expect to become more diverse, and this problem is being exacerbated by the new wave of refugees from Syria and beyond. While multiculturalism is far from perfect, it does offer a broad framework for dealing with diversity that is not to be discarded lightly. The hybrid ‘upgrades’ of multiculturalism that have sprung up in recent decades, such as interculturalism, offer ways of keeping the core ideas of multiculturalism intact, while improving on its problematic elements.

The EPP, as a driving force in EU politics, is in a very good position to help the EU make progress on this issue. I would like to highlight some key areas where the EPP could proactively help both its member parties and the EU in general to achieve progress in this area:

- As a centre–right political grouping, the EPP is in a great position to spearhead the agenda of rethinking multiculturalism on the basis of our experiences with existing models of diversity management. The key insight of multiculturalism is the need to build strong and vibrant communities to enable the fulfilment of individual life goals. This is a centre–right message, and the EPP should work to put this key insight at the centre of diversity management politics. If the EPP places its weight behind improving our diversity management strategies through a better balancing of these concerns, an improved form of multiculturalism will gain legitimacy. One key area where such a careful recalibration is necessary is the question of community rights *vis-à-vis* individual rights. A second key area is the strengthening of the concept of citizenship with a focus on new immigrants.
- The EPP should help its member parties to navigate the triple challenge of diversity management: migrants, Roma and autochthonous minorities. These issues should be understood

as three very different and very demanding facets of the same overarching issue. The EPP should work with its member parties to develop solutions to integrate sub-strategies on these topics into consistent national frameworks. As a goal, the EPP could formulate the creation of both national- and European-level diversity management strategies by its member parties.

- The EPP has a vast network of members and partners in Europe. It could use this asset to carry out research into best practices in terms of models of integration in the EU, on both the national and local levels. There is a great need to understand the developments in Europe during recent decades; however, a survey of viable local solutions has not yet been carried out. Performing this research would enable the EPP to provide a blueprint of possible solutions to both its members and the EU in general.
- The EPP should commit itself to the concept of interculturalism, and strive to reinforce and support it in the European policy context. We have to acknowledge that it is impossible to abandon multiculturalism without naming its successor, lest we fall back onto the solutions of the past. In general, the EPP should encourage and help its members to commit to making inter-group communication a key component of their diversity management schemes.
- The EPP should commit itself to a vision of a Europe where strong communities and meaningful citizenship are balanced. This could be achieved through infusing the existing models of multiculturalism with the best practices described above, most importantly those of integration and interculturalism.

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New Migration and the European Dilemma of Unity and Diversity

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Abstract Cultural diversity has always been a characteristic of the EU, but recent changes in migration patterns have led to new challenges and dilemmas. The questions then arising for the EU in the twenty-first century are these: does diversity threaten unity in the EU? How do expressions of differences relate to new forms of exclusion and inclusion within member states? Can we develop a language to address these differences in ways that minimise exclusions and increase inclusions? These questions are the points of departure for this chapter, which seeks to make a contribution to delineating the dilemma of unity and diversity currently faced by the European People's Party and the EU more generally. Cyprus is discussed as a particular instance of the European dilemma of 'safeguarding' unity and diversity.

INTRODUCTION

Cultural diversity has always been a characteristic of the EU. However, changes in immigration patterns and increased immigration in recent decades have changed the demographics of many parts of the EU, by transforming them into increasingly linguistically, ethnically and culturally diverse societies. This situation creates both challenges and opportunities for the EU and its member states.

Triandafyllidou and Gropas¹⁷⁹ proposed a typology of migration experiences among EU countries based on four key factors: the relationship, such as colonialism, between sending and receiving countries; earlier experiences of migration, including conversion from sender to host; the immigrant population's size in relation to the host country's population; and other dimensions that have triggered flows of migrants, for example, geographical, political or economic changes. Based on this typology, they classified EU countries as 'old host countries' (such as France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK, which have a long history of migration associated with their colonial past as well as labour shortages after the Second World War), 'recent host countries' (e.g. Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Finland, which have transformed from countries of emigration to destination countries), 'emigration countries'

179 A. Triandafyllidou and R. Gropas, 'Concluding Remarks', in A. Triandafyllidou and R. Gropas (eds.), *European Immigration: A Sourcebook*, 2nd edn. (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 389–92.

(e.g. Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria, which have experienced considerable emigration to other EU states) and ‘small island countries’ (that is, Malta and Cyprus, which have experienced increased immigration since the 1990s).

It is obvious that there are a variety of migration experiences in different EU countries. Nevertheless, Triandafyllidou et al.¹⁸⁰ highlight some common trends:

- Increased inflows of people from around the world have been witnessed by EU member states.
- Intra-EU migration has been on the increase, with Europeans moving from east to west and from south to north.
- New migration systems have emerged in relation to countries of origin and destination.
- Population movements (into or out of EU countries, or both) have affected all member states.

Inevitably, then, immigration has become a core political concern and a sensitive topic for the EU and a growing number of its member states. On the one hand, there are arguments in favour of migration, emphasising the contribution of migrants to national economies. On the other hand, there are concerns in relation to national identity, social cohesion and security.¹⁸¹

Homogeneity in terms of language, culture and religion is the rationale behind the construction of the modern state and the basis of nationalism. As modern societies are confronted with immigration and become multi-ethnic, the idea of homogeneity becomes the basis of nationalist and anti-immigrant political discourses. These discourses argue in favour of preserving the ‘identity’ of a nation. They also argue in favour of protecting it from the cultural and religious practices of immigrants, which are supposedly incompatible with the host country’s national culture and values, and which are deemed to threaten the homogeneity of the nation. The economic crisis and consequent anxiety have worsened the situation, as they have reinforced scepticism of the European model and opposition to immigration.¹⁸²

But does immigration really threaten ‘unity’ in the EU? How do nationalist and anti-immigrant political expressions emphasise differences in ways that result in new forms of exclusion? Can we develop a language to address these differences in ways that minimise exclusions and increase inclusions? These questions are the points of departure for this chapter, which seeks to make a contribution to delineating the dilemma of unity and diversity. Using the experience of Cyprus¹⁸³ as a backdrop and delving into how the dilemma of unity and diversity has been

180 A. Triandafyllidou et al., ‘Introduction’, in A. Triandafyllidou and R. Gropas (eds.), *European Immigration: A Sourcebook*, 2nd edn. (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 1.

181 Ibid.

182 M. Ambrosini and E. Caneva, ‘Local Policies of Exclusion: The Italian Case’, in F. Burchianti et al. (eds.), *Challenges to Tolerance in Political Life: A Comparative Overview of 15 European Countries, Accept Pluralism Report—Work Package 4: Political Challenges* (San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy: European University Institute, 2012), 29, 34.

183 This chapter focuses on the area controlled by the Republic of Cyprus, namely the island’s south.

addressed in this context, we hope to offer insights that may be relevant to other EU countries and could potentially help to address the aforementioned dilemma. Cyprus can serve as an educative case study for the EU, and the European People's Party (EPP) more particularly, because of its multicultural background and the longstanding efforts there to 'safeguard national unity' in response to ongoing political challenges.

THE CASE OF CYPRUS: 'SAFEGUARDING' 'US' VERSUS 'THE OTHER'

Historical overview of a divided island

In 1960 the island of Cyprus attained its autonomy from British colonial rule¹⁸⁴ and became an independent state. During this time its population consisted largely of two ethnic communities: approximately 80% were Greek Cypriots and 16% were Turkish Cypriots. Traditionally, the Greek Cypriots were for the most part Orthodox Christians, spoke a variant of the Greek language and considered Greece as the 'mother nation'. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots were Sunni Muslims, spoke a variant of Turkish and looked to Turkey as their 'mother nation'. In addition, three smaller communities were living on the island of Cyprus: the Maronites, the Latins and the Armenians, who together constituted about 3% of the population. Nevertheless, according to the 1960 Constitution, only the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were 'communities' with power-sharing rights; the Maronites, Latins and Armenians were 'religious groups' with religious rights.¹⁸⁵

However, since the mid-1960s, the situation has changed dramatically. During the period 1963–7, intercommunal conflict between the two major ethnic communities living in Cyprus severed communication and collaboration on all levels. In 1974 an invasion by Turkey rendered the division of the two communities even more absolute, as it split the island into two geographical regions with Greek Cypriots moving to the south part of the island and Turkish Cypriots to the north part.¹⁸⁶

New migration

In the same way as other EU countries, in recent decades Cyprus has experienced a change in migration patterns, with more rapid and greater migration than before. More specifically, the change in immigration policy in the 1990s to meet labour shortages due to the dramatic

184 Cyprus was a British colony from 1887 to 1959. Before that it was under Ottoman rule (1571–1878).

185 N. Trimikliniotis and C. Demetriou, *Active Participation of Immigrants in Cyprus* (Oldenburg: Interdisciplinary Centre for Education and Communication in Migration Processes, 2005), 7, 36–8; X. Hadjioannou, 'Linguistic Variation in Greek Cypriot Elementary Education', in W. Wiater and G. Videscott (eds.), *School Systems in Multilingual Regions of Europe* (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2006), 395–7.

186 M. Zembylas, 'Multiculturalism in a Deeply Divided Society: The Case of Cyprus', in Z. Bekerman and T. Geisen (eds.), *International Handbook of Migration, Minorities and Education* (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 608–9; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, *Active Participation of Immigrants*.

economic development, together with accession to the EU in 2004, has brought a considerable number of migrant workers to Cyprus. Additionally, there are international factors that have influenced the influx of immigrants into the Greek Cypriot community: the collapse of the Eastern European Communist regimes, the collapse of Beirut as the central hub of the Middle East centre and the consequences of the Gulf War.¹⁸⁷

Immigrants in Cyprus are primarily workers on provisional visas with temporary work permits, working in low-paid, low-skilled and low-status jobs. They originate from Eastern and Central Europe, as well as from Asia.¹⁸⁸ In addition, an inflow of workers without the required permits has been witnessed.¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, in the early 1990s there was an influx of Greek Pontians, who are descendants of a Greek ethnic group historically living in the area of the Black Sea.¹⁹⁰ This category of migrant workers differs from the aforementioned temporary workers. Greek Pontians, as Greek citizens, do not require a work permit, but instead are entitled to permanent residence and an employment permit.¹⁹¹

Thus the proportion of immigrants in the Greek Cypriot community has suddenly risen over a short duration. According to the 2011 census,¹⁹² there were around 151,000 migrants in the Greek Cypriot community, a number that corresponded to 21% of the total population. Of those, 108,000 were economically active, which represented about 26% of the working population.¹⁹³

To sum up, the change in immigration policy in the 1990s to meet labour shortages due to increasing economic development, together with the accession to the EU in 2004, has turned Cyprus into the host of an increasing number of migrant workers, mainly from South Asia and Eastern Europe. The ethnic division in Cyprus, with its still unresolved political problem, complicates the challenges for Cypriots in their efforts to respond to the dilemma of unity or diversity (this is discussed in the next section). Other European countries face similar dilemmas, yet framed in different ways—for instance, France and Germany both have long experience of

187 N. Trimikliniotis, 'Racism and New Migration to Cyprus: The Racialisation of Migrant Workers', in F. Anthias and G. Lazaridis (eds.), *Into the Margins: Exclusion and Migration in Southern Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 1999).

188 Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, *Active Participation of Immigrants*; N. Trimikliniotis and C. Demetriou, 'Cyprus', in A. Triandafyllidou and R. Gropas (eds.), *European Immigration: A Sourcebook* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); N. Trimikliniotis and P. Pantelides, 'Workpackage 1: Mapping Discriminatory Landscapes?? Cyprus: Ethnic Discrimination in the Labour Market and Education', in *The European Dilemma: Institutional Patterns and the Politics of 'Racial' Discrimination, Research Project Xenophobia, EU Fifth Framework Programme 2002–2005* (2005).

189 Trimikliniotis, 'Racism and New Migration'; Trimikliniotis and Pantelides, *Workpackage 1*.

190 Hadjoannou, 'Linguistic Variation', 400–1.

191 Trimikliniotis and Pantelides, *Workpackage 1*.

192 Republic of Cyprus, Statistical Service, *Population Census* (2011 edn.).

193 I. Charalambous, 'Greek as an Additional Language (GAL) School Students in Cyprus in Late Modernity: An Ethnographic Study of Three Parallel Intensive Greek Language Classes in Two Greek Cypriot State Primary Schools', Ph.D. thesis, King's College London, 2015, 34.

migration because of their colonial pasts as well as labour shortages, and more recently, they have been facing challenges with the arrival of refugees from the Middle East. Spain, Italy and Greece in the south of Europe have been the entry points for thousands of refugees and migrants in recent years.

Greek Cypriot politics of immigration

Inevitably, immigration is a ‘hot’ topic in local politics, just as it is in the European political arena. As Trimikliniotis¹⁹⁴ remarked, ‘Whilst it can be safely assumed that those forces on the traditional political right generally tend to be more xenophobic, racist and anti-immigrant, on closer examination this general observation is not necessarily accurate in all cases.’ Generally speaking, centre–left and left-wing parties have been more ‘sensitive’ and ‘responsive’ to the rights of migrants, whereas centre–right and right-wing parties tend to be hostile on grounds of so-called ‘national purity’.¹⁹⁵ Interestingly, though, the leftist working-class political movement in Cyprus appears to be divided regarding the impact of migrant workers on the employment of Greek Cypriots. In contrast, the more liberal conservative political right, representing the stance of the employers, considers them an economic necessity. In general, there are significant differences within political parties regarding their positions on the issue of immigration and migrants.¹⁹⁶

To show the complexity of the dilemma regarding unity and diversity, we present the anti- and pro-immigration arguments commonly expressed in the context of the Greek Cypriot community. These arguments are formulated around the long-running oppositional relationship with the ‘Turks/the Other’ vis-à-vis jobs and criminality. As will become clearer, similar arguments have long been expressed in the context of the EU.

Threat to ‘national purity’

In the Greek Cypriot national(ist) discourse, the primary ‘other’ has generally been the ‘Turks’. However, in recent years the category ‘other’ has been broadened beyond the Turks to include other ‘others’, namely, foreign workers and immigrants. Immigration and immigrants are thus considered a threat to the ethnic–national homogeneity of the Greek Cypriot community.¹⁹⁷

194 N. Trimikliniotis, ‘WP5: Socio-Political Developments and Impacts – Cyprus Report’, in *The European Dilemma: Institutional Patterns and the Politics of ‘Racial’ Discrimination, Research Project Xenophobia, EU Fifth Framework Programme 2002–2005* (2005), 6.

195 Trimikliniotis, ‘Socio-Political Developments and Impacts’.

196 Ibid.

197 S. Spyrou, ‘Between Intimacy and Intolerance: Greek Cypriot Children’s Encounters with Asian Domestic Workers’, *Childhood* 16 (2009), 155–73; Trimikliniotis, ‘Socio-Political Developments and Impacts’; and V. Argyrou, ‘How Greeks Think: About Turks, for Example’, *South European Society & Politics* 11/1 (2006).

Within this framework, a commonly expressed argument against migrants is that their ‘huge’ percentage in relation to the small Greek Cypriot population threatens the ‘purity of the nation’, which is ethnically based.¹⁹⁸ Of course, as Trimikliniotis¹⁹⁹ has suggested, there is a counter-argument that highlights the traditional multi-ethnic and multicultural nature of Cypriot society before the division of the island into north and south in 1974. In the context of a potentially forthcoming solution to the ‘Cyprus problem’, this counter-argument could assist in the creation of better societal relationships among Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, other minorities and migrants.

Job ‘stealers’

Another commonly expressed anti-immigrant argument is that migrants ‘steal’ jobs from Greek Cypriots, and that the national economy should be based on national workers. The ‘job stealing’ argument has long been used by the right-wing trade union the Cyprus Workers Federation to support its position that immigration threatens Greek Cypriot national identity, security and cohesiveness; a similar argument has been made by the left-wing Progressive Party of Working People (Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú), but using ‘softer’ language.²⁰⁰ The counter-argument maintains that migrant workers take the jobs Greek Cypriots do not want, and thus contribute to the economy.

Increase in criminality

Moreover, several politicians, especially from the centre and the right, have argued that criminality has increased in recent decades as a result of the presence of migrants in the Greek Cypriot community. On the other hand, there have been politicians who have strongly resisted the perception that there is a link between immigration and criminality.

To conclude, the abovementioned anti-immigrant and xenophobic ideologies have most often been expressed by individual politicians rather than parties as a whole. Nevertheless, these attitudes were criticised by the *Second Report on Cyprus* of the European Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI):

[W] hile sentiments of rejection and hostility vis-à-vis immigrants and foreigners cannot be said to be generalised in Cypriot society as a whole, there appears to be a growing tendency towards the perception of the immigrant and the foreigner as a potential threat to the Cypriot standard of living. In this respect, ECRI deplores instances of racially-inflammatory speeches by public figures targeting these groups. ECRI strongly encourages the Cypriot authorities to take all possible measures to prevent such a trend from evolving into more overt and generalised manifestations of hostility vis-à-vis members of minority groups.²⁰¹

198 Trimikliniotis, ‘Socio-Political Developments and Impacts’.

199 Ibid.

200 Ibid.

201 ECRI, *Second Report on Cyprus: Adopted on 15 December 2000* (CRI(2001)35) (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001), 15.

The third ECRI report on Cyprus²⁰² stated that xenophobic attitudes have not decreased since the second report, but on the contrary, have increased. This report also emphasised that a predominantly negative climate of opinion towards migrants still exists.

Similar anti-immigration arguments have also been expressed in the context of EU politics. Huysmans²⁰³ explains that Muslim immigrants have tended to be framed as a cultural threat; that is, 'they are interpreted as representatives of a competing civilisation whose values and everyday manners risk undermining Western civilisation'. For example, speaking during the EPP's Congress on 22 October 2015 in Madrid, Viktor Orbán²⁰⁴ argued that immigrants fleeing war and poverty in the Middle East and Asia are a threat to European civilisation as well as to Europe's Christian and democratic way of life.²⁰⁵

Moreover, Golder²⁰⁶ describes the supposed link between immigration and a rise in unemployment among EU nationals, which appears in the language of extreme-right parties in Western Europe. In the politics of the EU, there has also been a link expressed between immigrants and an increase in crime.²⁰⁷

CONCLUSIONS

The categories of 'us' (Europeans) versus 'them' (immigrants) entail an over-simplification and generalisation of these groups, seeing them as homogeneous entities with distinct boundaries. Gilroy,²⁰⁸ with his notion of 'ethnic absolutism', warns against generating ethnic boundaries between groups by operating using an absolute sense of this phenomenon. Indeed, just a quick look at the history of Cyprus shows that ethnically absolute labels were used to emphasise 'difference' and understate 'sameness' in culture, language and religion. This has resulted in violent intercommunal conflicts, the war in 1974 and the consequential division of the island.

Managing migration-related diversity in ways that promote inclusion while at the same time 'safeguarding national unity' is today a highly contested political topic. Although it is

202 ECRI, *Third Report on Cyprus: Adopted on 16 December 2005* (CRI(2006)17) (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2006), 33.

203 J. Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU* (London: Routledge, 2006), 20.

204 Viktor Orbán is the prime minister of Hungary. From 2002 to 2012, he was a vice-president of the EPP.

205 M. Dunai, 'Hungary's Orban Urges EU Migration Debate, Sees Threat to Democracy', *Reuters*, 22 October 2015; E. Maurice, 'Centre-Right Leaders Close Ranks on Migration', *EUobserver*, 22 October 2015.

206 M. Golder, 'Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe', *Comparative Political Studies* 36/4 (2003).

207 Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*.

208 P. Gilroy, *Small Acts: Thoughts on the Politics of Black Cultures* (London: Serpent's Tail, 1993).

recognised that migrants contribute to the welfare of European economies, fear is expressed that they threaten European civilisation. The case of Cyprus shows that operating under an absolute understanding of ethnicity generates boundaries between people living together, which by extension can lead to violence, conflict, war and separation.

In this super-diverse world characterised by growing levels of immigration, European societies will inevitably continue to grow more diverse. This is the reason why old categories such as ethnicity need to be reconsidered, not in the sense of abolishing them altogether but rather in terms of engaging with them politically. This implies that such categories need to be understood not as homogeneous entities closed to others, but rather as groups more open to including people living and working within a society, and contributing to the welfare of the economy and the cultural enrichment of the society.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The EPP—as the largest political party in the EU—should take a clear position against the nationalist rhetoric of some of its politicians and national parties that view immigrants as a threat or a menace to Europe. The EPP should take a clear and unambiguous political stance that migration enriches (rather than threatens) unity in Europe—culturally, socially, economically and politically—as long as it is viewed and treated as an asset for Europe’s growth and development.
- Instead of using ethnically absolute labels, such as ‘Europeans’ versus ‘foreigners’, which generate boundaries between people living and working together in the EU, the EPP should start considering how to embrace migrants as an inherent and dynamic part of life and the economy, while being aware of the risks to social cohesion posed by uncontrolled mass migration. To this end, the use of categories based on civic identities and participation rather than absolutist cultural ones might ease the tensions and transform the discussion at the level of political participation in (diverse) EU communities.
- The EPP should engage politically with the notion of participatory parity,²⁰⁹ that is, the ability of all people to participate on a par with one another, as equals in social interaction, as the central norm—the ideal—against which to evaluate social justice claims and address injustice in EU communities. There should be clearly defined policies from the EPP on how to promote participatory parity at the level of national parties as well as transnationally.

209 The concept of participatory parity originates in Nancy Fraser’s social justice theory. According to her, ‘[J]ustice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers. For participatory parity to be possible . . . at least two conditions must be satisfied. First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants’ independence and “voice.” . . . [T]he second condition requires that institutional patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social parity.’ See N. Fraser and A. Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political–Philosophical Exchange* (London: Verso, 2003), 36.

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Public Policy, the Integration of New Minorities and Party Competition

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Abstract The future cohesion of European societies depends on the integration of minorities²¹⁰ and ensuring that both the majority and minorities benefit from living alongside each other. Integration represents one of the major challenges the EU faces today. Should it fail, extreme-right nationalists could emerge on an even greater scale than we are seeing today. This chapter examines the integration policies of certain EU member states. It focuses on a few typical examples of the differences between the old and the new EU member states. It also highlights the most widespread shortcomings of integration policies and analyses the political consequences of these failings. The chapter recommends that the integration of various minority communities should be based on the civic (not ethnic or confessional) principle, abiding by the values framework of a liberal–democratic society. Member parties of the European People’s Party and other moderate European political forces should aim to prevent the radicalisation of the political mainstream that is occurring in response to immigration to Europe.

INTRODUCTION

Migration is one of those phenomena that mirror many other social issues, having a huge effect on the economy, but also on culture. Migration changes identities, multiplies diversity and is a source of manifold benefits, but it is also challenging. For those migrants who decide to remain in their receiving country, migration becomes integration. Both migration and integration are determined by many factors, with each country creating its own systems and other policies for the inclusion of immigrants. There is no doubt that the cohesion of European societies and of the EU itself is therefore dependent on the success of integration. The decisive challenge is to ensure that societies are able to integrate minorities and to establish mutual benefits for the majority and minorities. If integration fails, extreme-right nationalists could emerge on an even greater scale than today.

210 While this refers to all kinds of minorities, in this chapter the focus is on immigrants from third countries.

In this chapter we skip the theoretical debate about concepts of integration²¹¹ and focus on concrete integration policies as they are analysed and compared by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). The index offers an objective and tangible basis for evaluation, both across countries and in a longitudinal comparison of public policies. Moreover, we will deal with the political consequences of migration and look closely at how the political parties thematise and capitalise on the issue of migrants. In addition to a general overview, we will concentrate on the Central European countries known as the Visegrád Four (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, hereafter the V4), and some prominent cases from Western Europe.

Migration to most of Western Europe has long been a continual process. In this region of Europe migration and the integration agenda have become a standard part of public policy. On the other hand, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the issue of foreign migration is a relatively new challenge. The populations in these countries have very little first-hand experience of living alongside members of non-European ethnic–religious communities. These gaps between perceptions of the new minorities and migrants and the migration agenda have been laid bare as a result of the refugee crisis which started in 2015.

INTEGRATION PUBLIC POLICIES

But how should we ‘measure’ integration? There are no objective criteria or measures that can be used for this, but we can measure and evaluate integration policies. The Brussels-based think tank Migration Policy Group and the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs have developed a unique and complex tool—the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX).²¹² It is based on an evaluation of policies in eight different policy areas relevant to migrant integration: access to the labour market, family reunion, education, health care, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination. These dimensions are further divided into sub-areas which are then measured with concrete indicators, reflecting migrants’ opportunities in the receiving societies. In all, 167 indicators were evaluated for the fourth edition of MIPEX, which was released in 2015.

211 There are many experts and theoreticians who have contributed to this debate, but here we will mention just three authors and their seminal studies: R. Bauböck, *The Integration of Immigrants*, Sonderdruck/Reprint no. 15, Council of Europe (Strasbourg, 1994); R. Brubaker, ‘The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24/4 (2001), 531–48; and B. Parekh, *Unity and Diversity in Multicultural Societies*, International Institute for Labour Studies (Geneva, March 2005).

212 The project ‘Integration Policies: Who Benefits? The Development and Use of Indicators in Integration Debates’ is led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and the Migration Policy Group. The project conducts a complete review of integration outcomes, policies and beneficiaries in all EU member states, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the US. The main output of the project is the website of the Migrant Integration Policy Index: www.mipex.eu.

MIPEX is a useful tool to evaluate and compare what individual governments are doing to promote the integration of migrants. Obviously, the links between integration policies and outcomes are not always clear; MIPEX measures linear policies, not the level and intensity of integration reached in the respective societies. However, better integration, or at least better efforts made through integration policies, can benefit everyone in society. Furthermore, '[i]nclusive policies may also help us trust immigrants and see the benefits of immigration to our society, while restrictive policies harden distrust and xenophobic attitudes among the public'.²¹³ Of course, as we will show later, the correlation between integration policies and the political impact of the migration agenda is in no way immediate or one-dimensional. A drop in a country's MIPEX score might signal a rise in anti-immigrant attitudes and higher potential gains for nationalist and far-right parties, but this is not a hard rule,²¹⁴ or rather it takes more time for the relationship between the two to materialise and to become evident.

Central Europe

All the countries that are members of the V4 have, until recently, been countries of emigration rather than immigration. In particular, the Slovaks and the Poles have witnessed high levels of labour migration to West Europe. The V4 countries are not traditional destination countries.

When it comes to migration and integration policies, Central European countries do have commonalities, such as poor enforceability of the law, as well as a relatively high degree of arbitrariness in public administration. Local and regional authorities' integration policies are not sufficient and not sufficiently decentralised. The naturalisation process is slow. MIPEX evaluates Slovakia as the most critical case with the lowest and most inequitable naturalisation rates in Europe, meaning that most non-EU citizens remain relatively insecure in terms of their status, which has a potentially negative effect on their integration outcomes.

In the overall evaluation, the integration policies of the V4 lag behind the top countries covered by the index, including the Nordic states, the Netherlands and Portugal. MIPEX evaluates 38 countries: the Czech Republic and Hungary ranked equal 23rd, Poland ranked 32nd and Slovakia ranked 34th.²¹⁵ From this we can say that promoting immigrant integration is not a priority for the governments in the V4, partially due to low immigrant numbers, but also due to the higher priorities of social and economic transformation. In spite of this general trend, the latest MIPEX praises the Czech Republic and to some extent Poland too for major improvements following international reform trends.

In the V4 countries there is space to improve integration policies. An enormous challenge is the 'state of mind'—how migrants and other cultures are perceived by the general public. This was

213 *MIPEX.eu*, 'Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015'.

214 For example, Sweden, the country with the best results in the index, witnessed the electoral rise of the Swedish Democrats in 2014, yet its standing in the index remained the same. As noted, the correlations between integration policies and politics are not linear and may be asynchronous.

215 *MIPEX.eu*, 'Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015'.

clearly revealed during the refugee crisis in 2015²¹⁶—the hostility and lack of solidarity and empathy for the refugees was striking. Most non-EU citizens are allowed to vote in local and regional elections, as well as in elections to the European Parliament, but are excluded from democratic life and participation in politics, despite the benefits that immigrant leaders and volunteering can bring to the receiving society.

Migrant integration: the cases of France and Germany

France is one of Europe's oldest countries of immigration, with around a quarter of the population having an immigrant background. In 2006 France closed its borders to economic migrants; however, it remained opened to asylum applications, and it was the third highest receiver of asylum seekers in the EU in 2014.

According to the MIPEX study, France restricts and delays labour market integration more than most countries, with an estimated 5.3 million jobs 'closed' to non-EU immigrants and few accessing education or training in France. France also severely restricts and delays family reunion, with non-EU citizens less likely to reunite with their families in France than in most European countries. These delays put newcomers on an unequal footing, with potentially negative long-term effects on many integration outcomes. Non-EU residents are often insecure in their status. Permanent residency is increasingly the exception rather than the rule for immigrants, even after spending five years settled in the country.²¹⁷ From a democratic participation perspective, an estimated 2.2 million non-EU-citizen adults are disenfranchised in elections.

Due to its *Wirtschaftswunder* after the Second World War, Germany has been one of Europe's major destination countries since the 1960s, traditionally attracting migrant families and former guest-workers (*Gastarbeiter*). According to the MIPEX context data, immigrants contribute to the positive state of the German labour market, which has one of the highest and growing over-employment rates, reaching nearly 78% in 2014. Moreover, since 2008 there have been a growing numbers of newcomers (EU and non-EU citizens), and the number of asylum-seekers was on the rise even before 2015. Germany is one of the few societies in the EU with improving attitudes towards immigrants. This would not be possible without the positive stances of the democratic political elites, who oppose populist and anti-immigrant forces such as Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD).

According to MIPEX, Germany has the right political, economic and social conditions to experiment with, evaluate and expand ambitious new integration policies. Germany's integration policies have benefited and arguably contributed to its rising employment rates

216 The edition of MIPEX which is discussed in this paper does not yet reflect the impact of the 2015 refugee crisis. As a consequence of the crisis, Hungary, for example, has adopted a series of measures concerning migration and integration policies which will probably result in it receiving a lower score.

217 *MIPEX.eu*, 'Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015'.

and positive public attitudes towards immigrants. Increasingly, other destination countries in Europe and further afield are looking to Germany for inspiration.²¹⁸

Party politics and the migration agenda

The impact of migration from different cultural environments (compared to Europe's) on receiving societies can be assessed on several levels. One way to do this is by measuring shifts within the party system that affect the overall configuration of the political scene, political competition and the positions of individual parties.

The following factors play an important role in these changes: the share of migrants in the overall population, the ethno-confessional composition of migrant communities, the time frames of the waves of migration, the models of integration preferred by the migrants, the state's (national) migration policies, and the attitudes of the relevant political forces on the issue.

It is often claimed that the rise of political forces associated with radical nationalism, xenophobia, populism and extremism can be linked to migration. In some EU countries these anti-immigrant parties are getting into parliament and other representative bodies (regional and local) and becoming important elements in the party system. Although in many cases the radical-nationalist and anti-immigrant parties have not become part of governmental coalitions, their very presence in national parliaments affects the balance of power between the main political forces, as well as the approaches taken to policy strategies.

New challenges ahead for Central Europeans

Prior to 1989, migration, new minorities, and coexistence with other cultures and/or religions were mostly unknown issues for the closed Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC).²¹⁹ Following the change of regimes, the situation was transformed, in particular with regard to the overall social order (the political and socio-economic situation, foreign policy and the defence-security orientation). After accession to the EU in 2004 the openness of these countries to the outside world increased dramatically. Larger numbers of non-European citizens started to come to these countries, some of them with the intention of staying for a long time (for work, study or permanent residence). The experience of the population of coexisting with migrants from Asia and Africa was growing; however, in comparison with Western Europe there was still a relatively small number of migrants, so this issue did not become one of the cornerstones of either state (national) policy or party politics. The vast majority of migrants considered

218 Ibid.

219 The exception to this was the Vietnamese workers who came to the CEEC in accordance with agreements between the Communist governments (however, it was not migration in *sensu stricto*, but rather a regulated rotation of agreed numbers of the labour force).

the CEEC to be transit countries.²²⁰ Before 2015 the topic of foreign migration in its various contexts was somewhat marginal in terms of public interest and its impact on the political and ideological preferences of the population.

However, since the summer of 2015, when Europe was hit by a massive wave of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa, the issue has become a mainstream political topic. It has also become a subject for political competition, with new elements competing in terms of voter appeal and the interaction between various political actors. The issue of migration has also affected the relationship between the CEEC and the EU institutions.

In the context of the current migration flow we are beginning to see two interrelated trends in the domestic politics of European countries, particularly in Central Europe—both at the level of party politics and at the level of public debate/discourse: the radicalisation of the political mainstream, where moderate politicians are beginning to use more radical rhetoric, and the increasing efforts of radical and extremist forces to penetrate mainstream politics.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia (as well as Romania) voted against an EU proposal to introduce a quota system for the relocation of refugees in September 2015.

In Slovakia the refugee issue was employed by the ruling party, Direction–Social Democracy (Smer–sociálna demokracia, Smer-SD), as one of the main campaign topics before the parliamentary elections in March 2016. Presenting himself as the country's main protector against external threats, Smer-SD's chair, Prime Minister Robert Fico, even sued the EU at the European Court in Luxembourg for its decision on the relocation of refugees. Speaking about migrants from the Middle East and North Africa as the source of a terrorist threat, Fico provoked xenophobia among the population, de facto competing not only with nationalists from the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana), but even with right-wing extremists from the People's Party–Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana–Naše Slovensko). The centre–right opposition parties failed to present a plausible policy alternative on the migration issue. In the end, Fico's party was not a beneficiary of the anti-immigrant xenophobic discourse it provoked. In the elections Smer-SD gained 28.3% of the vote, in comparison with 44.4% in 2012, whilst the right-wing nationalists and extreme-right nationalists increased their shares of the vote.

In the second half of 2015 the refugee issue played a significant role in the domestic politics and foreign policy of Hungary. The culmination of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's policies on the refugee issue was the 2 October 2016 referendum (albeit invalid from a legal point of view). Joining Slovakia in its opposition to the EU's relocation scheme, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said that the redistribution of migrants constituted a threat to all European

220 However, at the same time, the Slovak government used this as an excuse to not accept any migrants, which caused justifiable criticism: 'So the hypocritical excuse that Slovakia is a transit country for asylum seekers does not hold firm ground. It is because Slovakia does not offer them realistic and fair prospects of a decent life and creates obstacles for them in every sphere starting with work, healthcare and education, so much so that most leave our country' (A. Malangone, 'Slovak Migration Policy Poisoned by Hypocrisy', *Višegrád Revue*, 15 June 2015).

countries, and especially the Hungarian nation. The Hungarian Parliament passed a law stating that the Council of the EU had not taken into account the principle of subsidiarity and had not provided the opportunity for national parliaments to present their views. In some policy steps, the government was supported by the opposition right-wing radical party Jobbik.

In the Czech Republic, President Miloš Zeman positioned himself as the main protector of society against the Islamist terrorists arriving in Europe with the migrants. While Social Democratic Prime Minister Sobotka has said that the threat comes from the terrorists, not from the refugees who need help, Zeman considers this attitude to be ‘dangerous’ for the Czech Republic. In his view, Islamic State jihadists infiltrate migrant groups.

The wave of migration came to Europe shortly before the parliamentary elections in Poland, where opinion polls showed that the majority of the population was against the acceptance of refugees in accordance with the quota system. The acceptance of the EU’s relocation quotas by Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) several days before the parliamentary election in October 2015 was exploited by its main rival—Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). The party’s leader Jarosław Kaczyński took a tough position on quotas, rejecting the ‘external diktat’ and warning about the damage caused to European countries by the presence of Muslim communities. This hard line on the refugee crisis substantially contributed to Civic Platform’s defeat and Law and Justice’s victory in Poland’s parliamentary elections.

The migration agenda in Western European politics: France and Germany

Western European countries became the main destination for refugees from the Middle East in the second half of 2015. The vast majority of refugees travelled through the Balkans to Germany; a lower number of migrants came to France, and subsequently some of them have tried to get into Great Britain across the English Channel.

The internal political aspect of the migration issue in Germany and France is particularly relevant to the overall situation in the EU, given the role these countries play in decisions about the EU’s common procedures and policies.

In France the refugee situation developed on the back of tragic events that were marked by connotations of migration, migrant integration in French society, terrorism, the Islamist element and so on, and this had a tremendous social resonance. The reaction of the population to the terrorist attacks in the context of the migration crisis became a clear test in terms of the impact on party politics and political competition. In the regional elections in December 2015, the National Front (Front National) led by Marine Le Pen did not win in any region but, due to its share of the vote, it became the third major actor in French regional politics. The dynamism of the electoral support for the National Front shows that the strong position of this xenophobic anti-immigrant party is creating fertile ground for political competition with other parties, especially the Republicans (Les Républicains), which takes a stricter attitude towards migration.

Through both its stance on the refugee crisis and the activities of its government, and especially of Chancellor Angela Merkel, it was Germany that determined the overall situation in Europe in 2015. For decades the country's democratic political elite has been scrupulous in its attempts to eliminate the impact of radical groups in order to prevent any relapse into its totalitarian past. However, in recent years there have been attempts by certain political forces to violate this consensus. Since 2014 these efforts have been symbolised by the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, PEGIDA) movement, which launched its activities in Dresden (part of the former German Democratic Republic) and has expanded them gradually into other German regions. Individual representatives of the AfD, a Eurosceptic party founded in 2013, have legitimised the views of PEGIDA. Although the AfD is not a radical or extremist political organisation, its ideological preferences and critical attitude to immigration have created the necessary conditions for it to be profiled as an active participant in party competition. In the regional elections in 2016 the AfD showed relatively good results in some areas, taking a share of the vote from the mainstream established parties.

CONCLUSIONS

As regards the integration of migrants, the situation in Europe is creating a serious challenge for the centre-right democratic parties, which today are the main political force in the EU. Migration is becoming one of the most salient issues in political competition in Europe, both in the east and in the west. It is obvious that xenophobic, nationalist and Eurosceptic parties are trying to use this subject as their main tool for political and electoral mobilisation. Any weakening of the mainstream parties, including the centre-right, in this competition could lead to a reduction in the cohesion of the EU and to the loss of the foundational values of the project of European integration.

The EU's success in handling the migration issue and preserving the necessary level of social cohesion and political stability, in both the short and the long term, will depend on how effectively the centre-right parties respond to this challenge.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The centre-right should set minimum standards for integration policies. These standards would be common to all EU countries and serve as a decisive guide for implementing specific practical steps. Member parties of the European People's Party (EPP) should insist that these standards be complied with. The integration of minorities brings benefits not only to minority communities themselves, but to the whole society. EPP member parties should promote knowledge of MIPEX in their respective countries.
- EPP member parties should seek to ensure that the integration of the various minority communities takes place on the basis of the civic (not ethnic or confessional) principle, abiding by the values framework of our liberal-democratic society. However, they should respect the characteristics of the various minority communities. This is necessary to prevent situations in which inaction or ineffectiveness in the integration policies aimed at one commu-

nity (such as the indigenous ethnic minority or Roma) serves as a justification for neglecting integration policies aimed at other communities (such as migrants).

- The EPP member parties should attempt to prevent the radicalisation of the political mainstream, including their own membership, in response to the rhetoric of the radical right. In the debate on migration, the centre–right parties should try to work towards neutralising the malicious ideological activities of extremist forces in the public sphere.
- Preserving the integrity of the EPP is of crucial importance. It is on this basis that its member parties are able to strengthen the framework for democratic politics and improve the conditions for cooperation with other moderate democratic forces in their fight against radicals and extremists.
- It is also important to promote solidarity within the EU. Here the EPP parties can play important roles as facilitators and mediators between the individual EU member states, especially between the CEEC and the countries of Western Europe.

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The Solidarity Principle and the Current Migration Emergency

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Abstract The management of the current migrant emergency is revealing deep divisions among the EU member states. Fundamental EU texts refer to European solidarity, opening the door both to inter-state solidarity and to a role for the member states and the Union itself in promoting social rights. The dramatic consequences of the current migration crisis call for a new understanding of the nature of European solidarity and for its establishment as a point of reference in the current European narrative. This chapter argues that the current absence of solidarity between the member states makes it difficult to justify the transformation of Frontex, the external borders agency, into a new agency. Instead, the European Asylum Support Office should be transformed into an EU asylum agency. Such a measure would relieve the burden on those member states that receive the greatest numbers of refugees.

SOLIDARITY AND THE EU: ORIGINS

Solidarity is a concept at the heart of the European institutional project. In Robert Schuman's famous declaration of 9 May 1950—at a time when the project of establishing European institutions had yet to be realised—he said, 'Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a *de facto* solidarity.'²²¹ Schuman went on to explain in clear terms what this concrete solidarity consisted of:

The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.

The solidarity referred to here was a pragmatic idea leading to the clear and sudden unification of the management of natural resources between France and Germany for a particular goal, the maintenance of peace. All the subsequent events of unification tell a story of solidarity and cooperation among the member states in pursuit of various economic and political goals (more

221 *Europa.eu*, 'The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950', last updated 4 January 2017.

or less successfully: the UK referendum decision of 23 June 2016 to exit the Union heralds the need to reflect on these issues). After the season of enlarging the solidarity of European cooperation geographically (eastward, from 2004 on), and the season of enlarging the scope of the EU into new areas with the approval of the 2007 institutional framework, what is the status of this concept today, when the EU is facing new challenges and new (potential) divisions among its member states? In what concrete forms does it exist? An analysis of the management of the current migration emergency offers a good litmus test to assess the content and relevance of this principle.

THE MANY CONCEPTS OF SOLIDARITY IN THE EU

The concept of solidarity has been one of the core values of both the EU (art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union, TEU)²²² and of the European People's Party (EPP) since their establishment. As early as 1992, the EPP *Basic Programme* stated: 'Our social policy is based on the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. This means helping others to help themselves and implies a duty to ensure that social justice is maintained'.²²³ More than 30 years later, the 2012 party platform of the EPP still places solidarity as one of its core values, in dialogue with the principle of subsidiarity:

Our actions are based on the principles of justice and aim to pursue the common good . . . This is only possible in a society marked by social cohesion and solidarity . . . Solidarity is a joint responsibility: the strong should help those in need, who in turn have to make an effort themselves to improve their situation according to their abilities . . . The principle of subsidiarity requires that solidarity is always balanced with the concepts of individual responsibility and self-realisation.²²⁴

The principle appears in several fundamental documents of the current EU. The 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, after mentioning solidarity in the prologue, has a whole chapter dedicated to it.²²⁵ However, Chapter IV does not express the idea of solidarity that Schuman had in mind, but rather the dimension of social rights. That is, it deals with matters related to welfare: for example, workers' rights and the right to health care. Schuman, on the

222 A. Levade, *Le valeur constitutionnelle du principe de solidarité*, in C. Boutayeb (ed.), *La solidarité dans l'Union Européenne* (Paris: Dalloz, 2011), 41–52.

223 EPP, *Basic Programme*, final text adopted by the ninth EPP Congress, Athens, 12–14 November 1992, 6.

224 EPP, *Manifesto of the EPP Statutory Congress*, Bucharest, 17–18 October 2012, 2.

225 The first part of the Preamble to the 2000 Charter states: 'Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity'.

other hand, was concerned with cooperation between states.²²⁶ The language of the Charter closely reflects the specific meaning of ‘solidarity’ used in eighteenth-century France (the first appearance of the word as we know it today), where it was used to indicate the unity of the political body of equal citizens under *la République*.²²⁷

The 2007 Lisbon Treaty also embraces the other political dimension of solidarity, the inter-state cooperative spirit that inspired Schuman. In the Preamble to the TEU, the Sixth Provision recalls the member states’ intention ‘to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions’. Further provisions contain similar statements, both in the TEU²²⁸ and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).²²⁹ According to Article 3 of the TEU, the EU aims to promote ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States’. Here, solidarity sounds like a synonym for integration, or the intertwining of societies once divided.²³⁰

Moreover, this inter-state solidarity in cooperation can entail, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, the achievement of goals that are too large for a single state to fulfil alone. The current management of the huge wave of migration, the defence of the external European borders and the fight against international terrorism are just a few examples of this other type of solidarity.

226 The complete list of Chapter IV of the Nice Charter: workers’ rights (art. 27), right of collective bargaining and action (art. 28), right of access to placement services (art. 29), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (art. 30), fair and just working conditions (art. 31), prohibition of child labour (art. 32), protection of family and professional life (art. 33), social security and social assistance (art. 34), right to health care (art. 35), access to services of general economic interest (art. 36), environmental protection (art. 37) and consumer protection (art. 38).

227 The word ‘solidarity’ is rooted in Latin and French. ‘*Solidum*’ in Latin meant hard, strong and solid, and also whole and full, and it was used in law in the expression ‘*in solidum obligari*’ to indicate the obligation in which all common debtors committed themselves to pay to the creditor the whole debt (L. Parenti, *In solidum obligari* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2012)). In France, as early as the seventeenth century, ‘*solidité*’ and then ‘*solidarité*’ were used to describe the common responsibility of a group of debtors: in old modern French ‘*solidarité*’ has its origins as a legal term. It was during the French Revolution that the term appears to have been used in a more general, not specifically legal way, and by the first half of the nineteenth century the more general meaning of *solidarité* appears to have been established to the point that, in 1848, it was used to describe a political party: Solidarité républicaine. Then, with Émile Durkheim at the end of the eighteenth century, the term became part of sociological theory. See P. Carozza and L. Crema, *On Solidarity in International Law*, Charitas in Veritate Foundation Working Paper (Chambésy, 2014), 3–4.

228 According to Article 2 of the TEU, solidarity is a foundational value of the EU. According to Article 3(III) of the TEU, the EU aims to promote ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States’.

229 Arts. 67, 80, 122, 194 and 222 of the TFEU.

230 I. Domurath, ‘The Three Dimensions of Solidarity in the EU Legal Order: Limits of the Judicial and Legal Approach’, *European Integration* 35/4 (2013), 459–75.

In addition to these dimensions, the principle of solidarity, in a meaning more familiar today, also points towards an obligation to help, providing unilateral aid as opposed to mutual cooperation. This applies primarily to member states in need, for example, Article 222 of the TFEU establishes a duty for member states to act ‘in a spirit of solidarity’ when another member state is the victim of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster. The treaty makes provision for the EU Council to determine the concrete operation of the principle through a majority vote, and requests the unanimity of the member states only in cases that amount to a question of defence.

Second, solidarity applies to every individual, not only the residents protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, but also to every human being who knocks on the Union’s doors. The dimension of solidarity as an obligation to help is highlighted by the waves of people approaching the EU from different parts of the world and for a wide variety of reasons. In this context the principle of solidarity does not only concern people already inside the EU, but those outside it. Does (or should) the EU care about those who, because of the unprecedented circumstances, are pushing at its borders? The EU treaties do not specifically address such an eventuality, but European concern for circumstances such as these is in line with the foundational value of the equal human dignity of every individual, and is supported by the openness the EU countries have shown towards migrants, especially since 1945.²³¹

SOLIDARITY TODAY: THE TEST OF THE MIGRANT CRISIS

Migration today is a complex phenomenon, reflecting many different causes and taking many forms; it would be foolish to try to limit it to a single category.²³² However, the urgency of the current challenge, triggered by instability in the Middle East and North and Sub-Saharan Africa, demands some sort of answer. All the dimensions of solidarity described above are being put to the test by the current migrant situation. Since the 2011 explosion of what were once called Arab Springs, solidarity in integration (i.e. Schengen), the solidarity of the institutions helping states (i.e. the control of external borders, Frontex), solidarity among equal member states (i.e. the system of quotas for asylum-seekers), and solidarity as expressed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (in terms of the standards of human rights in the EU–Turkey Agreement of 2016) have all been questioned.

231 S. Castles and M. Miller, *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World* (4th edn., Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009); K. J. Bade et al. (eds.), *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa. Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007).

232 People from Syria, Ukraine, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, China and South-East Asia are moving towards Europe, and they are doing so for very different reasons: they are economic migrants aiming to settle in Europe, people escaping wars, asylum seekers and displaced persons intending to return to their country of origin once the disruption there is over. The data provided by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs clearly shows a phenomenon which is not limited to specific groups, or particular areas, but is very intricate and far from having just one explanation; see UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘International Migrant Stock 2015’, 2015; P. Collier, *Exodus: How Migration is Changing Our World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); P. Kingsley, *The New Odyssey: The Story of Europe’s Refugee Crisis* (London: Guardian Faber, 2016).

Illegal immigration to the EU increased by 138% in 2014 alone.²³³ After four years of civil wars around the Mediterranean Sea, at the peak of migration, almost 1,800,000 illegal crossings of the EU's external borders were reported in 2015.²³⁴ The existing EU approach to refugees hit a crisis point: some states barricaded their borders; police checks were instigated at once-open border crossings; train stations in European capitals became refugee camps and served as *casus belli* between states refusing to host migrants and those wishing to offload them elsewhere. It was clear that the rules, as they were, were putting an overly heavy burden on the countries which received asylum seekers first, in particular Greece, Italy and the Balkans. In the words of the first vice-president of the Commission, Frans Timmermans:

The refugee crisis has shown the weaknesses in our Common European Asylum System. . . . Different national approaches have fuelled asylum shopping and irregular migration, while we have seen in the ongoing crisis that the Dublin rules have placed too much responsibility on just a few Member States. . . . [W]e need a sustainable system for the future, based on common rules, a fairer sharing of responsibility, and safe legal channels for those who need protection to get it in the EU.²³⁵

In 2016, the Commission proposed a series of reforms and an agreement with Turkey to tackle the issue, which was signed on 18 March 2016 and welcomed by the EPP.²³⁶ The reforms have catapulted the principle of solidarity into the limelight, making it one of the cornerstones of the EU action. The reforms attempt to embrace both solidarity as a bond among member states, and solidarity with regard to the refugees.²³⁷ Solidarity appears as the principle that gives a foundation to the 'common rules', the common redistribution of migrants within the EU member states (quotas) and the 'sharing of financial responsibilities', as well as the reason not to close the borders with weapons and walls.

These are the intentions of the reforms. Yet many obstacles to implementation threaten to overwhelm the project. The task of establishing and implementing the system of quotas continues to meet with heavy opposition from certain member states. The agreement with Turkey on the resettlement of refugees has had the positive effect of limiting the arrival of migrants from Turkey to Greece, but it is under threat. Many critics,²³⁸ including the Council of Europe, of

233 These data are available on the Eurostat website, in the section on asylum and managed migration. For a short and up-to-date overview see Eurostat, 'News Release', 120/2016, 16 June 2016.

234 There were 1,822,337 illegal border crossings from January to December 2015; Frontex, *Frontex Risk Analysis Quarterly Report, Quarter 4, October–December 2015* (Warsaw, 2016), 8.

235 European Commission, 'Towards a Sustainable and Fair Common European Asylum System', Press Release, 4 May 2016.

236 EPP, 'EPP Stands United on the EU–Turkey Agreement', Press Release, 17 March 2016.

237 European Commission, *Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe*, Communication, COM (2016) 197 final (6 April 2016).

238 E. Collett, *The Paradox of the EU–Turkey Refugee Deal*, Commentary, Migration Policy Institute (March 2016); F. Vassallo, 'I respingimenti collettivi dalla Grecia alla Turchia vanno contro la Convenzione di Ginevra', *Vita*, 4 April 2016.

which both Turkey and EU countries are members, are claiming that it is incompatible with the EU's and Strasbourg's human rights standards.²³⁹ Part of the problem comes, paradoxically, from the generous package that a refugee on EU soil is entitled to, and in the definition of a safe third country which the Commission gave in 2005, a definition which excludes Turkey from the countries that are considered safe for refugees.²⁴⁰ Greece is proceeding slowly in the evaluation of asylum applications,²⁴¹ and accepting most of them.²⁴² Some have calculated that at the current pace it will take more than forty years to allocate just the refugees already on EU soil.²⁴³ On the other hand, Frontex has taken additional steps to protect the Mediterranean Sea, finally showing true EU common concern for its external borders,²⁴⁴ and the Commission has proposed the establishment of a European Coast Guard to manage the southern external borders.²⁴⁵

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Solidarity is at the heart of the European project. Together with subsidiarity, it forms a value upon which both the EU and the EPP are founded. But recent years have revealed fragility in its concrete application. It is understandable that EU institutions, heavily absorbed in facing the financial crisis, have not been able to push resistant member states to accept reforms on migration and the EU's external borders. The current volume of migrants, however, makes this delay no longer tolerable. Rather, it provides an occasion for the member states to finally say yes to EU-level reform.

239 Council of Europe, *The Situation of Refugees and Migrants Under the EU–Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016*, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2109 (2016). As of 15 December 2016, the treaty is under the scrutiny of both the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights for different reasons.

240 European Parliament and Council, Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) OJ L180 (29 June 2013), 60.

241 See the discouraging figures in European Commission, 'Fact Sheet: Implementing the EU–Turkey Statement—Questions and Answers', 15 June 2016.

242 N. Stamouli, 'Greece Struggles to Return Migrants Under EU–Turkey Deal', *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 May 2016.

243 Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado, 'CEAR denuncia que al ritmo actual la UE tardaría 43 años en cumplir su compromiso de reubicación', 17 July 2016.

244 After widespread criticism of the poor budget allocated to the 2014–15 EU Frontex Operation Triton, which was intended to patrol the Mediterranean Sea, and which merged with and replaced the Italian mission Mare Nostrum (which, paradoxically, even if financed and run by a single country, was many times larger than Triton), the EU's border agency Frontex had a higher budget for 2016 to protect the external borders of the EU: €238 million up from €143 million. Figures from European Commission, 'European Agenda on Migration: Securing Europe's External Borders', Press Release, 15 December 2015.

245 European Parliament and Council, 'Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard', COM (2015) 671 final (15 December 2015).

This chapter is about solidarity and how it is a relevant principle in many ways to the current EU narrative of migration. Principles perform a foundational function, and can be clarified and taken as inspiration separately from discussions on specifically how they should be concretely implemented. The application of the principle of solidarity may take many forms.

To deal with the current migration crisis from the Middle East and North Africa, member states in the EU should abandon an immigration paradigm and adopt an emergency paradigm. This should be done in recognition of not only the unprecedented numbers of migrants, the tremendous difficulties they are fleeing and the concomitant urgent need for aid, but also the fact that they are likely to wish to return home in peacetime. This makes temporary solutions that meet their needs more important at this juncture than the establishment of comprehensive plans to integrate them into European society. The model already exists in the form of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. However, there is no European agency to deal with these problems, and the burden is being placed on member states, and disproportionately so on those receiving migrants.

The years 2015 and 2016 saw an increased European effort behind Frontex and the protection of the external borders. This should not be an occasional effort, but a consistent and stable one, both in the direction of the Mediterranean Sea and the Eastern borders. It is surprising to see a proposal to establish a European Coast Guard after so many years of the EU not taking the implementation of Frontex seriously. In this situation, it would be more practical and more respectful of the principle of subsidiarity to strengthen the existing mechanisms of cooperation before establishing new ones. It is hard to see how, in the absence of solidarity between the member states, a new agency is going to help protect the EU's external border.

- The first practical step for the EU is to create an agency for migratory issues. In part this idea has been considered, although only in outline, by the Commission.²⁴⁶ The European Asylum Support Office should be transformed from an advisory agency to a full-scale asylum agency. If the migration paradigm was to be replaced by a refugee paradigm, creating a European authority, a Europe-wide solution would be possible, including the creation of adequate facilities that could temporarily house a higher number of migrants and displaced people.
- Such an agency should be entrusted with processing asylum requests, rather than leaving this to the states where refugees first arrive. This would facilitate the functionality of a quota system and would avoid resistance by internal judiciaries based on precedent case-law by turning the process into an administrative matter for the EU.
- The quota system needs to be streamlined and made more efficient. This can be done by eliminating the 'first country' rule and moving refugee applicants prior to processing.
- The EU should consider redefining the requirements for 'third states' that are considered safe for relocating immigrants. These rules need to be adapted and cannot be so strict that only European states qualify. The existing definitions have been shown to be too restrictive and unable to cope with the huge humanitarian crisis around the Mediterranean Sea.

246 European Commission, *Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe*, Communication, COM (2016) 197 final (6 April 2016), 12–13.

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Explaining Immigration to the European Public

Lucie Tungul

Recommended by TOPAZ, Prague, Czech Republic.

Abstract The attitude of the public towards immigrants represents one of the key factors in their successful integration. The current debate and perspectives have been greatly affected by selective, negative media coverage. The rise of the various anti-immigration groups and parties has shown the limited ability of traditional political parties to address the issue effectively. The revelation of the weakness of traditional parties has provided the former with leverage to affect public opinion, especially through the (social) media. Successful immigration and integration policies require a public discourse encompassing many citizens, including the immigrants. The shortage of reliable information on immigration is the greatest challenge today. Moreover, EU citizens need to be able to discuss their concerns about immigration openly. This chapter proposes an information and communication policy that could provide the basis for a more balanced political discussion about immigration and integration.

INTRODUCTION

Europe has a very long tradition of internal and external migration. Some European countries have attracted more migrants than others, but everywhere the public has voiced strong feelings. While citizens of some EU member states have expressed the belief that migration bears economic and cultural benefits, the majority's reactions have been mostly negative, based both on well-founded concerns and on prejudices. Kessler and Freeman showed that between 1988 and 2000 the opinion that there were too many immigrants fluctuated for the European Community/EU, rising from 37.4% in 1988 to 51.6% in 1993, and then decreasing to 39.9% in 2000. According to the authors, the rise in the early 1990s could be explained by the poor economic situation and the higher number of migrants and asylum seekers. They found a clear link between immigration flows, economic conditions and anti-immigrant public opinion.²⁴⁷ The EU has recently been through a financial crisis followed by an economic recession, during which the number of people seeking asylum in the EU has spiralled. The current attitudes are even more negative than they were in the early 1990s. In autumn 2015 the EU Barometer found that 59% EU citizens had a negative attitude to immigration from outside of the EU.²⁴⁸

247 A. Kessler and G. Freeman, 'Public Opinion in the EU on Immigration from Outside the Community', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 43/4 (2005), 825–50.

248 On the other hand, the support for intra-EU migration has increased (from 51% in spring 2015 to 55% in autumn 2015). European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 84. Autumn 2015*, 2015.

While the economy is recovering, it is unlikely that the migration flows to Europe will cease in the future. As ‘immigration will almost assuredly become permanent . . . reactions to it must be managed’.²⁴⁹ If the public concerns are not addressed, they will not vanish but rather be picked up by various populist groups and parties, which will capitalise on the public’s fears and may undermine the political stability of the democratic regimes. We have recently seen the rise of the extreme right in Europe—in recent elections they have won enough seats to join the parliaments in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and Switzerland. In Italy, the Northern League (Lega Nord) is getting an increasing level of support, rising from 4% in 2013 to 17%–20% in the 2016 opinion polls.²⁵⁰

This chapter proposes an information and communication policy that could provide the mainstream political parties and the EU with the basis for a more balanced political discussion about immigration and integration to offset the arguments of the European populists.

EU PUBLIC OPINION


Eurostat data shows that 1.2 million people asked for international protection in the EU in 2015, more than double the previous year. Most applications came from citizens of Syria, followed by Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and Albania.²⁵¹ The fast and high influx of refugees started in 2014 but accelerated in 2015, especially during the summer months. It created a lot of tension in the EU societies. In autumn 2015, the European Parliament published a survey that indicated how the perceptions of EU citizens regarding the main EU challenges had changed, with immigration becoming the second most salient issue after unemployment. Also, terrorism became a far more important concern (see Figure 1).

249 R. Hansen, ‘Migration to Europe Since 1945: Its History and Its Lessons’, *Political Quarterly* 74/1 (2004), 31–2.

250 G. Paravicini, ‘Italy’s Far Right Jolts Back From Dead’, *Politico*, 2 March 2016.

251 Eurostat, ‘Record Number of Over 1.2 Million First Time Asylum Seekers Registered in 2015’, Press Release 44/2016, 4 March 2016.

Figure 1 Challenges for the EU in June 2013 and September 2015, in per cent



Source: Data from European Parliament, *Parlemeter – Part I: The Main Challenges for the EU, Migration, and the Economic and Social Situation*, EB/EP 84.1, 14 October 2015.

While citizens across the EU member states shared increased concern about migration, their views about the appropriate EU action differed. Most EU citizens preferred an EU approach to migration (66%) and a fairer distribution of migrants among the EU member states (78%), but support for European-level decision-making on migration differed greatly, from around 80% in Cyprus, Germany, Spain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to 40% in Finland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Slovakia. While 62% of EU citizens supported more financial support for countries facing the most migratory flows, the Italians, Czechs and Slovaks were least likely to support it (47%, 44% and 44% respectively). A fairer distribution of migrants among EU member states was considered a good thing by almost all German, Swedish, Greek, Belgian and Dutch citizens (97%–90%), but considerably lower support was seen in countries such as the Czech Republic (33%) and Slovakia (31%).²⁵²

The data indicates that there were significant differences in how the citizens of the EU member states wished to approach the migration crisis. While some countries were generally very receptive, others were generally dissenting. Examining the groups of generally receptive and

²⁵² All data in this paragraph comes from the survey European Parliament, *Parlemeter – Part I: The Main Challenges for the EU, Migration, and the Economic and Social Situation*, EB/EP 84.1, 14 October 2015.

generally dissenting countries reveals that the countries that have been the major recipients of immigrants and asylum seekers²⁵³ seem, in the long run, to be more in favour of migration, to more often see the benefits of immigration and to be more likely to support an EU-level action. The result is more mixed for countries that have historically been the sources of migration. It can be seen that, given the diversity of population structures in the EU member states, the immigration challenges differ from country to country.

INTEGRATION OF NON-EU MIGRANTS

The EU asylum system creates a situation by which the most resourceful make it to Europe, but these are not necessarily the most deserving persons, who often remain in the refugee centres in Africa and the Middle East. In many cases one member of the family sets out on the dangerous and expensive journey, hoping that the rest of the family will be able to join later under the family reunification policies.²⁵⁴ The debate about asylum seekers often depicts them as ‘bogus’,²⁵⁵ claiming that while some are escaping political persecution and war, others are ‘liars’ who are using the situation to claim material benefits. Yet, the distinction is not and cannot be that clear, as those looking for political freedom or physical safety also seek material well-being.²⁵⁶

As the migration wave of the 2010s is from predominantly Muslim countries and regions, these attitudes are closely linked with perceptions of Islamic and/or Middle Eastern cultures. Research²⁵⁷ has shown that people have limited knowledge of immigration realities. It is not surprising that the most negative attitudes are found in countries/regions with limited knowledge and/or experience of immigration and/or Muslims. Lahav mentions that the lack of support can stem from the fear that migrants could possibly destabilise the ‘national and cultural identity’.²⁵⁸ For instance, the Eastern European member states have a complicated history of national sovereignty and feel threatened by transnationalism related to the postmodern migration flows. Their public and academic debates have been controlled by methodological nationalism, which considers the nation-state a natural unit and equates society with it.²⁵⁹

253 For data about immigrant populations in EU member states, please see Eurostat, ‘Non-National Population by Group of Citizenship’.

254 Wilton Park, *The Migration Challenge: Tackling Root Causes*, Report, 14 October 2015.

255 Hansen, ‘Migration to Europe’, 36.

256 Ibid.

257 G. Lahav, ‘Public Opinion Toward Immigration in the European Union. Does It Matter?’ *Comparative Political Studies* 37/10 (2004), 1151–83; P. Burns and J. G. Gimpel, ‘Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy’, *Political Science Quarterly* 115/2 (2000), 201–25; and M. Hjerm, ‘Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Cross-Municipal Variation in the Proportion of Immigrants’, *Acta Sociologica* 52/1 (2009), 47–62.

258 Lahav, ‘Public Opinion’, 1162.

259 For more, see, for instance, A. Wimmer and N. Glick Schiller, ‘Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration, and the Social Sciences’, *Global Networks* 2/4 (2002), 301–34.

Yet, we find negative attitudes towards immigration in all EU member states. The 2011 Migrant Integration Eurobarometer showed that among EU citizens there was a strong positive correlation between the fear of an economic threat and a negative view of non-EU migrants (taking jobs and pushing down wages, abusing social welfare systems). Research has shown that immigration has not had a significant effect on wages,²⁶⁰ but that it has favoured immigrants over the majority population in terms of welfare policy distribution.²⁶¹ Some countries' citizens also associate immigration with crime.²⁶² Thus some analysts argue that to reduce anti-immigration electoral support it is essential to counter the criminalisation of immigrants.

On the other hand, the 2011 Eurobarometer also showed a general agreement that migration brings cultural enrichment, even though citizens of many EU member states declared that migrants reject their new culture. It also examined the views of both the majority population and the migrants towards their integration. While the former were afraid of economic—and sometimes cultural—challenges, the immigrants mentioned the negative attitude of the general public as the greatest obstacle to their integration.²⁶³ Both the migrants and the majority population identified the media as responsible for creating and reinforcing negative images about immigrants and immigration and demanded a 'more accurate, unbiased and realistic portrayal of migrants'.²⁶⁴

MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION

One of the main findings of the 2011 Migrant Integration Eurobarometer was that the public understood the negative portrayal of immigrants as a media issue but that both the general public and the migrants saw a 'potential to reverse the trend and create a more positive view of migrants and their contribution to society through a more accurate, unbiased and realistic portrayal of migrants'.²⁶⁵ Knowledge is a key factor—the less people know about immigration and the migrants, the more likely they are to believe overtly positive or negative statements.

260 See, for instance M. Manacorda, A. Manning and J. Wadsworth, 'The Impact of Immigration on the Structure of Wages: Theory and Evidence from Britain', *Journal of the European Economic Association* 10/1 (2012), 120–51.

261 See, for instance, P. Nannestad, 'Immigration and Welfare States: A Survey of 15 Years of Research', *European Journal of Political Economy* 23/2 (2007), 512–32.

262 To see how the media connect immigration with rising crime levels, see, for instance, H.-J. Albrecht, 'Immigration, Crime and Unsafety', in A. Crawford (ed.), *Crime and Insecurity* (London: Routledge, 2002), 159–85.

263 The 2011 Migrant Integration Eurobarometer did not provide a definition of integration. It also did not specify what was needed for integration but focused on the perceptions of the public and the migrants.

264 European Commission, *Eurobarometer: Migrant Integration, Aggregate Report*, May 2011.

265 Ibid.

The main problem of communication regarding immigration and asylum is the generally low maturity of the discussion in the EU member states and its heavy politicisation. Politicisation creates an effect by which the parties competing for votes conduct the debate according to what they believe the voters want to hear. What is being said is only a small share of what could be said.²⁶⁶ The mainstream parties need to expand the discourse to cover topics relevant in their member states, including, and to this moment largely unnoticed, topics such as immigrants' contributions to the economy, the setting up of migration impact funds and a review of national legislation, which might lead to investigations into social welfare fraud, fighting child labour and trafficking, improved civic education for the migrants and so forth. The mainstream parties face the difficult task of modifying the discourse to shift the balance of the discussion in favour of more facts and academic findings while maintaining comprehensibility and addressing the concerns of the public. If the elite's modus operandi is only reactive and does not lead public opinion, if they only react to the claims of the far right and the populists, or even adopt an anti-immigration attitude, the possibility of altering public opinion is limited. Nevertheless, as the examples of Cologne in 2015 (sexual attacks) and Rotherham between 1997 and 2013 (child sexual exploitation) have demonstrated, over-inclusive bias in the media language is not helpful and benefits the populists as well.

A good communication policy relies on feedback from and contact with citizens, and enables a flexible response to their needs and demands. The goal of political communication is to provide information, increase understanding of the information given, and provide platforms for public political discourse and for advocacy of different or even opposing political views.²⁶⁷ The acceptance and integration of immigrants depends on how the issue is communicated throughout the society and how people internalise the immigration discourse.

Research has clearly shown that people rely most on data that reaches them easily, and that they do not engage much in actively searching for information. People select news that confirms their existing views and ignore that which opposes them.²⁶⁸ The dissemination of the information depends on the stories that people hear and how they 'translate' them for themselves. The content of a communication policy is therefore crucial, as people do not decipher one-sided, biased news, and do not look for a balanced attitude.

The role of the media is key in this process. The media in some countries have provided one-sided views of the immigration issue and most often a negative one. The tendency towards sensationalism and the lack of interest in representing a Europe-wide perspective has led to an

266 R. Evans, 'Talking About Money: Public Participation and Expert Knowledge in the Euro Referendum', *British Journal of Sociology* 55/1 (2004), 35–53.

267 MacNair, quoted in S. Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 'The Missing European Public Sphere and the Absence of Imagined European Citizenship', *European Societies* 9/5 (2007), 689.

268 V. P. Plaza, 'The Euro as a Political Communication Process: Quality Requirements', *Journal of Consumer Policy* 22 (1999), 135–47; and C. De Vreese, 'Primed by the Euro: The Impact of a Referendum Campaign on Public Opinion and Evaluations of Government and Political Leaders', *Scandinavian Political Studies* 27/1 (2004), 45–64.

‘us’ against ‘them’ approach. In other countries, problems related to cultural differences and especially Islamism seem conspicuously absent in public media, indicating an overly positive bias in reporting about immigration.

We should not forget the importance of social media. People use them to find information, to share and comment, and to find people with similar opinions. Social media are an excellent forum for promoting stories and getting feedback. The leaders of the European far right are very eager for publicity and rely heavily on social media as a powerful communication tool of our society.²⁶⁹ We do not propose adopting the rhetoric of Europe’s populists, but rather meeting them on their popular media sites. Trying to ‘steal’ the votes of the far right by adopting some of their positions will not lead to a pacification of the situation; it is more likely to reassert the extremists’ position. On the other hand, failing to address popular fears strengthens the extremists as well.

‘Copying’ the far right would confirm the validity of some of the extreme arguments. Hansen mentions the case of the UK, where support for the anti-immigration rhetoric by prominent politicians, together with the anti-immigration campaign in the tabloids, has transformed ‘public suspicion . . . into loud, ugly opposition if a politician or party lends [immigration] its support’.²⁷⁰ The case of the Czech Republic, where the anti-immigration sentiment received support from the first directly elected president, Miloš Zeman, and also from the media, confirms Hansen’s observations. The democratic parties should work with facts rather than emotions. The Brexit ‘Leave’ campaign in 2016 showed that people were quick to believe lies; facts and hard data could have revealed the weak foundation on which these arguments stood. Presenting the favourable and unfavourable evidence in a balanced way could reinstate the credibility of the discourse.

Populism based on false data and mis- or disinformation can only be tackled by addressing all the concerns of the public and revealing all, including the challenging, facts of immigration, using the maximum possible number of media outlets. If the public feels that political elites take their concerns seriously and that they have access to relevant and balanced information, the effect of populism can be decreased or controlled. By implementing a balanced information and communication policy, the elites reduce the opportunities for the populists to twist the information and create panic. Using a multitude of sources would increase the positive impact of the campaign, as it would reach more people.

269 For instance, the leader of the Italian Northern League published a selfie with Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders during a meeting of the far right in Milan in spring 2016, with the caption, ‘We will not surrender to the clandestine invasion’, quoted in Paravicini, ‘Italy’s Far Right’.

270 Hansen, ‘Migration to Europe’, 32.

CONCLUSION

Immigration has become an issue of national and European politics in all EU member states. People are right to be afraid about their safety, the immigrants' economic involvement in the economy, the possible consequences of a mass influx of people to Europe, and the potential clash of different cultural values and norms. A dignified reception of immigrants would generally lead to a greater inclination on their part to integrate into the society. Treating them as unwanted or even as criminals increases the anxiety of the immigrants, and decreases their willingness and ability to integrate. Determined integration strategies based on the central values of our constitutions, however, will contribute to successful integration.

As the phenomenon of immigration to EU countries has become permanent, 'politicians need to recognise and address public fears. If they give the impression . . . that all fears of immigration are founded in racism, then the ground for argument will only be vacated to the benefit of the far right'.²⁷¹ What are needed are persuasion, explanation and the presentation of valid arguments. This issue deserves our utmost attention and the utilisation of all available resources. We cannot expect that negative public opinion will be easily turned around, but immigration should at least be given the benefit of the doubt.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Public discourse needs to encompass a large number of citizens, including immigrants.
- Politicians should recognise and address public fears and lead public opinion by addressing all the topics for the public immigration discourse.
- The mainstream parties need to refrain from promises that they cannot keep. They should realistically address the demands to control migration and outline topics that present immigration in a balanced way, evaluating both its benefits and costs.
- Focus should be placed on presenting the EU immigration and asylum policies as being of wide social interest and on striving to buttress this dimension of immigration.
- The public should be addressed through a policy that comprises communication rather than simply information.
- The policy should present simple, clear facts about the current situation, and possible national and European solutions.
- The communication policy must reflect the European context but within the national frameworks. In societies where only a small immigrant community exists, the policy should help the public to get used to the idea and lower the intensity with which they perceive integration as a threat.
- Mainstream parties interested in altering the negative image of immigrants should cooperate with all sectors of society that support the positive integration of immigrants against those who display signs of xenophobia and racism.

²⁷¹ Hansen, 'Migration to Europe', 32.

- Securing the cooperation of the media is a must. An overly positive as well as overly negative bias in reporting about immigration should be avoided.
- Information should be easy to find.
- Social media should be utilised because they ‘turn communication into interactive dialogue’.²⁷² A wide range of forms should be used: Internet forums, blogs, photographs, videos, wikis and so on, with the most common social media being Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.

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²⁷² European Commission, Eurobarometer, *Journalists and Social Media, Aggregate Report*, January 2012.

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The Protection of Autochthonous Minorities in Europe: Developments and Challenges

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Abstract The development of the current system of protection for autochthonous minorities in Europe started at the end of the Cold War, in parallel with the process of the democratisation and European integration of the former Communist states. In the early 1990s, the Council of Europe adopted the first legally binding instruments in this field, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe established an inter-ethnic conflict prevention mechanism, and the EU included the protection of minorities within the accession criteria, thus making EU membership conditional on the respect of minority rights. The interplay among these international actors continues to shape the relevant norms and policies in this field. The European system of minority protection has certain limits, however. Most of these concern the effectiveness of minority standards, the functioning of monitoring mechanisms, and the gap between the internal and external dimensions of the EU's minority protection. EU institutions and the European People's Party should contribute to bridging this gap by increasing the protection for minorities in the EU. National governments should strive to implement the existing international obligations and domestic laws.

INTRODUCTION

Looking at the protection of human rights and minority rights from a historical perspective, it is worth noting that two paradigmatic shifts have occurred in the twentieth century. First, at the end of the Second World War, the focus on the 'special' rights of ethnic/linguistic/religious groups was abandoned in favour of an approach centred on the idea of 'general' individual human rights. Second, the fall of the Iron Curtain triggered a return to the fundamental logic of minority rights that aims to ensure the full and effective equality of persons belonging to autochthonous minorities in political, socio-economic and cultural life, and allows them to express, preserve and develop their distinct ethnic, linguistic and religious identities.²⁷³ A fully fledged system of minority protection is based on two pillars: first, the prohibition of discrimination (i.e. rules that not only guarantee formal equality but also contribute to achieving substantive equality), and second, the adoption of a set of measures designed to protect and

273 J. Marko, 'Ethnopolitics. The Challenge for Human and Minority Rights Protection', in C. Corradetti (ed.), *Philosophical Dimensions of Human Rights. Some Contemporary Views* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 265–91.

promote the distinct identity of minority groups (i.e. the granting of minority-specific rights). The first pillar is a necessary condition for the existence of the second one.²⁷⁴ The current European system of minority protection was built around these two pillars through the interplay among the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the EU. It is worth noting that all EU member states are also members of the CoE and the OSCE. While there are obvious overlaps and synergies in their approaches to minority issues, one may argue that since the end of the Cold War, these actors have complemented each other by focusing on three specific dimensions: democratisation (CoE), security (OSCE) and European integration (EU).

THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF MINORITY PROTECTION

The CoE

The CoE is a regional intergovernmental organisation established in 1949 with the aim of promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law.²⁷⁵ Until the early 1990s, the CoE followed a human-rights-based approach, similar to that of the UN. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not contain any specific provision on minority rights. The adoption of an additional protocol to the ECHR, dealing with minority protection, has not been possible due to the lack of consensus among the CoE's member states. This means that individuals belonging to minority groups have no direct way to claim minority rights before the European Court of Human Rights. The only reference to minorities in the ECHR is in Article 14, which forbids discrimination on the grounds of *inter alia*, language, religion, national origin and association with a national minority. However, it is not just equal treatment and non-discrimination which are relevant to minorities, but also several other human rights guaranteed by the ECHR, such as freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of religion. Therefore, several applications for redress under the ECHR have resulted in significant legally binding judgments for minority protection.²⁷⁶

274 K. Henrard, *Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000), 8.

275 The CoE has three main bodies: the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Court of Human Rights. The Committee of Ministers is the decision-making body and is made up of the ministers of foreign affairs of all member states, or their permanent diplomatic representatives in Strasbourg. The Parliamentary Assembly is the deliberative body and it is composed of members of parliament from all member states, who discuss and make recommendations upon any matter within the scope of the organisation. The European Court of Human Rights is the judicial body, which guarantees the rights safeguarded by the European Convention on Human Rights.

276 Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, *Cultural Rights in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights* (January 2011).

The CoE became the main standard-setter in the field of minority protection in Europe by adopting the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML)²⁷⁷ and the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). The latter remains to this day the main legally binding minority rights instrument in Europe. The term ‘framework’ in the title highlights the scope for state parties to translate its provisions to their specific situation through appropriate domestic norms and policies. The FCNM covers a broad range of issues relevant to minority protection (e.g. equality, identity, freedom of assembly, association, expression, thought, conscience, religion, use of mother tongue in private and public, education and effective participation), but it does not provide a definition of ‘national minority’. Both the FCNM and the ECRML have established monitoring mechanisms. Each state party has to submit periodical state reports giving full information on the legal measures and policies taken to give effect to the instruments’ provisions.²⁷⁸

The OSCE

The OSCE has no legally binding instrument on minority rights. The ‘Copenhagen Document’, adopted during the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, laid down a detailed list of political commitments for safeguarding minority rights. In 1992, the OSCE established the institution of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) as a conflict-prevention mechanism that aims to contain and de-escalate tensions involving national minorities in the OSCE area. In addition to country-specific recommendations, between 1996 and 2012 the HCNM elaborated seven sets of thematic recommendations, which provide guidance to the states on how to implement political commitments regarding minorities in the fields of education, linguistic rights, effective participation, media, policing in multi-ethnic societies, inter-state relations and the integration of diverse societies.²⁷⁹

The EU

Until the 1990s, EU initiatives regarding minorities were scarce. In the period 1981–94, the EU body most interested in minority issues was the European Parliament (EP). It adopted four general resolutions regarding linguistic and cultural minorities, and several resolutions regarding the situation of specific minorities in Europe.²⁸⁰ From the mid-1990s, minority

277 The ECRML focuses on languages and their use in various fields (e.g. education, administration, justice, media, and social and economic life). Although it does not grant rights to persons belonging to minority groups, the ECRML also deals indirectly with minority protection.

278 Independent expert bodies have the task of examining the state reports and assessing the measures taken by the states’ parties. These monitoring procedures have been criticised as weak and ineffective.

279 The activity of the HCNM has been criticised on three main points: its mandate (i.e. it has had no involvement in cases where violence has occurred), its alleged geographical bias (i.e. the focus on Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, even though similar issues exist in the West) and the effectiveness of the results it achieves (i.e. the follow-up to the HCNM’s involvement and lasting resolution of the conflicts).

280 G. Toggenburg, ‘The European Union *vis-à-vis* Minorities: A Play in Three Parts and an Open End’, in C. Tabajdi (ed.), *Pro Minoritate Europae—Minorities of Europe Unite* (2009), 162–205.

protection gained a more central role in the activities of the EU Commission due to the accession process for the Central and Eastern European countries.

According to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These core values have both an internal and an external dimension: while Article 7 of the TEU allows the EU to take action against a member state that commits a serious breach of the common values, Article 49 states that a country wishing to join the Union needs to respect and promote them.

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights reinforces these values and sets out the whole range of civil, political, economic and social rights of European citizens and all persons resident in the EU. Although the Charter does not provide for the rights of minorities as such, it prohibits any discrimination based on, *inter alia*, membership of a national minority, and it states that the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.²⁸¹ Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union enables the Council to take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on, *inter alia*, racial or ethnic origin and religion or belief. Thus, the Council acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the EP may take appropriate action to protect ethnic and religious minorities against discrimination. The same Article 19 is the legal basis for two Council directives²⁸² which provide a comprehensive legal framework for fighting direct and indirect discrimination in the public and private sectors in several areas including access to employment, working conditions, social protection, education, and access to goods and services. Under this legal framework, the European Court of Justice has addressed issues of minority concern in several cases.²⁸³

In addition to the internal dimension of minority protection based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination, the EU has developed an external approach through the enlargement process by endorsing the CoE and OSCE standards. Any state seeking EU membership must conform to a set of conditions (i.e. the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ of 1993) that include respect for and protection of minorities.

281 Moreover, the EU Charter contains provisions regarding respect for a private life, freedom of religion, freedom of expression and freedom of association, which are also relevant for persons belonging to minority groups.

282 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L180 (19 July 2000), 22; and Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L303 (2 December 2000), 16.

283 E.g. *Bickel and Franz*, Case C-274/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:56; *Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA*, Case C-281/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296; *Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn*, Case C-391/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:291; *Grauel Rütffer v. Pokorná*, Case C-322/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:189; and *Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV*, Case C-54/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:397.

THE CHALLENGES OF MINORITY PROTECTION IN EUROPE

Notwithstanding the positive developments outlined above, an in-depth examination of minority-related issues in Europe raises a number of questions and concerns regarding the effectiveness and limits of the existing minority protection system. The position of some EU member states towards the FCNM is particularly remarkable. France has not signed the convention, whilst Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg signed it many years ago²⁸⁴ but have not ratified it. Obviously, the ratification of the FCNM is not a guarantee per se of comprehensive and effective minority protection. This is supported by the fact that Denmark ratified the FCNM but, through a declaration attached to the ratification instrument, stated that the convention applies exclusively to the German minority in South Jutland. This selective and narrow approach has left other minority groups with a historical presence in the country, such as the Faeroese and the Greenlanders, outside the scope of application of the convention.²⁸⁵ In another example, Lithuania ratified the convention, but its implementation is problematic since the country follows a restrictive interpretation of the FCNM. In 2009 the Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court held that the FCNM is a document of a political and policymaking character and not a normative document.²⁸⁶ It is rather astonishing that a national high court can challenge the legally binding character of an international convention.

The ECRML enjoys even less support among the European states despite its à la carte structure.²⁸⁷ Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Portugal have not even signed the charter. In addition, while France and Italy signed the ECRML in 1999 and 2000 respectively, neither country has yet ratified it.²⁸⁸

Finally, in some of the countries that have ratified the ECRML there is no effective or coherent implementation. In these cases, the ratification of the charter remains little more than a window-dressing exercise. We should consider, for instance, the case of Romania, which was due to submit its second periodical report on the implementation of the ECRML in May 2012.

284 Luxembourg signed the FCNM in 1995, Greece in 1997 and Belgium in 2001.

285 T. Hoch Jovanovic and K. Lynggaard, 'Selective Europeanization: A Path Dependency Perspective on Danish Minority Policy', *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 13/3 (2014), 63–4.

286 Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania, 'Decision in Case no. A-756-152/2009', 30 January 2009. The court reiterated this position in 2011 and 2013 decisions upholding restrictive measures on the use of minority languages in the public sphere.

287 The à la carte structure of the ECRML gives the state parties the option to choose a specific set of obligations for each of the languages listed in their ratification law. While this system allows flexibility, it also offers significant discretion to the states when choosing between 'stronger' or 'weaker' standards for the protection of minority or regional languages spoken in their territory.

288 The French Constitutional Council blocked the ratification of the ECRML, arguing *inter alia* that by recognising the right to use a language other than French in public life, the charter challenges the status of French as the official language. In the case of Italy, the ratification is blocked because there is no agreement on whether some languages, such as Friulan and Sardinian, should be protected or not, and because of concerns regarding the cost of implementation.

However the government failed to meet the deadline. The CoE's Secretary General only received Romania's report in March 2016, thus the country missed an entire monitoring cycle. Moreover, the Romanian government submitted the country's fourth report on the implementation of the FCNM two years after the due date (1 February 2014). This state of affairs speaks volumes, not only about the failure of the Romanian government to fulfil its basic obligations assumed under these international instruments, but also about the big gap between law and practice. Romania has no single, unitary framework law on national minorities, but in the last two decades it has developed an impressive body of regulations dealing with minority rights. Currently, almost 200 normative acts deal with various aspects of minority protection. This fragmented legal framework is both complex and confusing, and lacks a clear-cut set of methodological norms. Moreover, bureaucracy, a lack of political will and limited financial resources further hinder the consistent application of minority-related regulations.

These are problems common to most of the new EU member states. While in Central and Eastern Europe mainstream parties across the political spectrum shared the goal of EU accession, most of them lacked a coherent and proactive long-term strategy on minority issues. Thus, the EU conditionality on minority protection led to a pattern of piecemeal developments in this field. As a result, after accession, it has become challenging to sustain, let alone improve, the existing norms and policies dealing with autochthonous minorities, or to develop them further. In fact, one could argue that in the last decade the protection of autochthonous minorities has shifted from being a central issue for many countries, to a topic of marginal interest.

In the current geopolitical context, governments all over Europe are focusing more and more on the integration of the 'new minorities' stemming from migration while ignoring the needs and expectations of autochthonous minorities. This is a short-sighted approach which, first of all, does not take into consideration potential synergies and, second, does not offer a real solution to the European diversity conundrum: how can we create a political community that is both cohesive and stable and satisfies the legitimate aspirations of minorities?

What is quite certain is that European states need to concentrate and coordinate their efforts to establish long-term strategies that aim to reconcile cultural diversity and social cohesion. In this context, the EU can and must play a more active role regarding the respect for and protection of minorities.

A first step in this sense is the joint responsibility of EU institutions and every EU country regarding the Roma minority.²⁸⁹ Although member states have the primary responsibility for and the competences to take the necessary measures to improve the situation of the Roma communities in their territory, the EU provides a set of legal, policy and financial instruments

289 The Roma are Europe's largest and most marginalised minority. The term 'Roma' does not define a homogenous ethnic group sharing a common culture and language across Europe. It is an all-encompassing term for various groups (e.g. Ashkali, Boyash, Kladerash, Lovari, Manouches, Sinti and Travellers) with distinct identities. The status of Roma in Europe varies from country to country — that is, in a given country Roma can be an autochthonous minority, a new minority stemming from migration or both.

that aims to help the countries to more effectively address the challenges of Roma inclusion. In 2011, the European Commission adopted an EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020. Within this framework, each EU member state produced a national Roma strategy or a corresponding set of policies, which include monitoring mechanisms to assess the impact of the implemented measures. However few will dispute the claim that so far the EU framework and these national strategies have not succeeded in achieving a sustainable improvement in conditions for Roma. According to the European Roma Rights Centre, '[f]ive years on, the EU Framework has hit "a mid-life crisis". The [national strategies] have yet to deliver in terms of concrete change to the lives of millions of Europe's Romani citizens; the implementation gap is more pronounced than ever; discrimination and segregation remain pervasive and human rights abuses against Roma are all too frequent'.²⁹⁰ It is hard to imagine that a mainly top-down approach could ever work. It is submitted that these policy measures at the EU and national level have a better chance of succeeding if the Roma themselves are increasingly involved in their design and application. Finally, let us remember that the discrimination and marginalisation of Roma is not a problem confined to Central and Eastern Europe. Western countries such as Denmark and Italy do not even recognise Roma as an autochthonous minority. A few years ago, France came under strong criticism for its discriminatory treatment of Roma, including the collective expulsions of EU citizens.²⁹¹ This brings us to the question of whether the Union has the necessary instruments to deal with such violations of minority rights by a member state.

The first thing that needs to be said is that there is a clear gap between the internal and the external dimensions of the EU's minority protection. While the internal contribution of the EU in the field of minority protection remains rather limited and confined to non-discrimination measures, the Union has the external capacity to promote respect for minority rights in candidate countries. It seems that for the EU, 'concern for minorities is primarily an export product and not one for domestic consumption'.²⁹² The weakness of the EU's minority protection approach comes from Treaty provisions, with their self-imposed limitations on competences in an area perceived as sensitive by some states. The EU countries keen to promote minority rights 'end up being hostages of those member states which are hostile to the idea, such as Greece and France'.²⁹³

290 B. Rorke, 'No Justice: The EU Roma Framework and its Discontents', *European Roma Rights Centre*, 29 February 2016.

291 In 2013, the EP condemned any attempts to unlawfully limit the right to free movement of Roma and called on the member states to stop such illegal expulsions. See European Parliament, Resolution on the progress made in the implementation of the National Roma Integration Strategies, 2013/2924(RSP), 12 December 2013, para. 3.

292 B. de Witte, *Politics versus Law in the EU's Approach to Ethnic Minorities*, EUI Working Papers, RSC no. 2000/4 (Florence, 2000), 3.

293 D. Kochenov, 'European Union's Troublesome Minority Protection: A Bird's-Eye View' in J. Boulden and W. Kymlicka (eds.), *International Approaches to Governing Ethnic Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 88.

Consequently, the EU does not have a complete toolbox to handle minority-related issues within its borders. The EP acknowledged ‘the inconsistency’ of this approach,²⁹⁴ which has left the Union exposed to continuous allegations of double standards in the field of minority protection. As Schweltnus rightly argues, ‘the setting of double standards is not consistent with the idea of a values- or rights-based Union’, and the focus of the EU on the external dimension of minority protection to the detriment of the internal one ‘seems to follow an instrumental problem-solving rationale not a principled concern for minority rights themselves.’²⁹⁵ Including the minority rights toolbox in the *acquis communautaire* would solve this problem of double standards. Moreover, such a development would be necessary to consolidate the reforms made by the new member states in this field and to counteract post-accession dynamics that could potentially reverse the progress achieved so far. Currently, the new member states have no incentive to continue the implementation of the various minority-related regulations that have been adopted because of EU conditionality during the accession process.

The large and politically mobilised autochthonous minorities of Europe rightly point out the limits of the existing system and call for further developments at the EU level to prevent backsliding on minority rights protection, especially in the present context of rising nationalism, populism and right-wing extremism in various member states. In February 2011, the EP and the Council of the European Union adopted the rules and procedures governing the European Citizens’ Initiative.²⁹⁶ This new political participation instrument gives EU citizens the possibility of directly approaching the European Commission with a request to propose legislation on matters where the EU has the competence to legislate. In 2013, a group of non-governmental organisations and parties representing minority interests²⁹⁷ submitted to the European Commission one such citizens’ initiative under the suggestive name ‘Minority SafePack’.²⁹⁸ The document covers a large number of topics and the authors asked the EU Commission to assess each proposal on its own merit so that ‘if one of the proposals is deemed to be inadmissible, this should have no effect on the other proposals made.’²⁹⁹ However, the Commission has rejected this citizens’ initiative, arguing that it falls manifestly outside the

294 See European Parliament, Resolution on the protection of minorities and anti-discrimination policies in an enlarged Europe, 2005/2008(INI), 8 June 2005, para. 7.

295 G. Schweltnus, ‘Double Standards? Minority Protection as a Condition for Membership’, in H. Sjursen (ed.), *Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity* (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), 197.

296 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) no. 211/2011 on the citizens’ initiative, OJ 2011 L65 (11 March 2011), 1.

297 These were the Federal Union of European Nationalities, the Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians in Romania, the South Tyrolean People’s Party and the Youth of European Nationalities.

298 The main objective of the Minority SafePack is to improve the protection of persons belonging to national minorities and strengthen cultural and linguistic diversity in the Union. The proposed measures and norms require policy action in the areas of regional and minority languages, education and culture, regional policy, participation, equality, media and regional (state) support.

299 *Fuen.org*, ‘Minority SafePack Initiative—One Million Signatures for Diversity in Europe’, 15 July 2013, 14.

framework of its powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union. The Commission did not provide arguments to support its position. It simply pointed out that, although ‘some of the acts requested . . . might individually fall within the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act’, EU Regulation no. 211/2011 on the citizens’ initiative ‘does not provide for the registration of part or parts of a proposed initiative.’³⁰⁰ In November 2013 the members of the citizens’ committee who submitted the Minority SafePack brought an action for annulment before the European General Court in Luxembourg.³⁰¹ Arguably, the development of minority protection norms and policies at the EU level depends on the outcome of the ongoing legal battle over the Minority SafePack. The crux of the matter is how much room the EU has for manoeuvre in the field of minority rights. In February 2017, the General Court annulled the Commission decision refusing registration of the Minority SafePack. According to the judgement, the Commission did not indicate which of the measures in the proposed European citizens’ initiative did not come within its competence, and it did not give the reasons for rejection.³⁰² Besides illustrating the limits of the European Citizens’ Initiative as an instrument of direct democracy, the initial rejection of the Minority SafePack emphasises the paradoxical nature of the EU’s approach towards minorities—that is, minority protection being, at the same time, both a fundamental value of the Union and an area perceived as not lying within the scope of its competences. On 3 April 2017, the European Commission reversed its previous stance and decided to register the Minority SafePack initiative.

CONCLUSIONS

Europe built its current system of minority protection on two pillars: non-discrimination and minority rights. While the former principle goes beyond a mere guarantee of formal equality, the latter provides for a set of measures especially designed to protect and promote the distinct identity of minority groups. The post–Cold War positive developments in this field have resulted from the interplay between the CoE, the OSCE and the EU. In the final analysis, there is room for improvement of the current system of minority protection in Europe. The most important concerns regard the effectiveness of minority standards, the functioning and impact of monitoring mechanisms, and the gap between the internal and external dimensions of the EU’s minority protection.

By including minority rights within the *acquis communautaire*, the EU would improve the existing European system of minority protection and would be better equipped to tackle societal challenges in an ever more complex social, political and economic context. In the final analysis, giving normative meaning to the ‘minority rights value’ laid down in Article 2 of the TEU could help the Union to achieve the goal of building and strengthening a political community that, on the one hand, is socially cohesive and, on the other hand, is responsive to the specific needs and expectations of autochthonous minorities.

300 European Commission, Decision C(2013)5969 final, Brussels (13 September 2013), 2.

301 *Minority SafePack: One Million Signatures for Diversity in Europe and Others v. Commission*, Case T-646/13 (2014), OJ C112 (14 April 2014), 34.

302 Judgment of 3 February 2017, *Minority SafePack v. Commission*, T-646/13, ECLI:EU:T:2017:59.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

For the EPP and the EU institutions

- Bring minority-related issues to the forefront of the EU agenda and take a proactive approach with the aim of closing the gap between the external and internal dimensions of the EU's minority protection.
- Ensure the effective participation of persons belonging to autochthonous minorities at the EU level through a legal–institutional framework that not only provides for the representation of and consultation with autochthonous minorities but also ensures the influence of minorities in the decision-making process on issues that concern them.
- Support and promote research in the area of the social sciences and humanities both at the EU and member state level. This is essential to understanding and solving the societal challenges that the EU is currently facing.

For national/regional EPP parties and national/regional governments

- Take a proactive approach to the implementation of international obligations and domestic regulations concerning the rights of autochthonous minorities, and identify the gaps in the existing legal–institutional framework and take the necessary measures to reduce them.
- Ensure the representation of persons belonging to autochthonous minorities in party structures and their effective participation in elected and consultative bodies at the national/regional level so that they can influence the decision-making process on issues that concern them.
- Engage with Roma communities, civil society and other national/regional stakeholders; ensure that the resources allocated for the national Roma integration strategies are sufficient; assess their implementation through transparent monitoring mechanisms and reliable data collection; and share best practices.

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Minority Representation in the New EU Member States

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Abstract Effective participation in political decision-making is one of the essential rights of the members of national minorities. This has been underlined in most of the important European documents on minority protection. In this paper we provide an overview of the electoral rules that facilitate or impede the political representation of minorities in the new EU member states. We also discuss the most important issues linked to and shortcomings of those arrangements that are considered to facilitate the representation of minorities. While our focus is primarily at the level of national legislatures, we also briefly address the local government and EU levels. Our recommendations pertain, on the one hand, to ensuring fair conditions for the political participation of all autochthonous minorities living in a specific country, as well as for intra-minority political competition; and on the other hand, to paying more attention to the Roma and to minority representation in the European Parliament.

INTRODUCTION

Effective participation in political decision-making—especially in matters that concern them directly—is one of the essential rights of members of national minorities. This has been underlined in most of the important European documents on minority protection. These documents comprise Article 15 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) as well as a number of documents issued by the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), including the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (1999) and the Ljubljana Recommendations on Integration of Diverse Societies (2012).

Despite this awareness from international organisations, a survey of European electoral arrangements reveals a rather mixed picture. In this chapter we provide an overview of the existing special electoral arrangements that target minorities in the new member states of the EU. We limit our enquiry to a formal-legal analysis of electoral rules, based on the relevant legislation and secondary literature, addressing only the most important features of the arrangements. Although some of the above-mentioned documents cover all minorities, this chapter focuses exclusively on ‘historical’, ‘old’ or ‘autochthonous’ minorities, and not

the ‘new’ minorities which have come about as the result of more recent migration.³⁰³ When we speak about the political participation and representation of minorities, we do not have in mind the individual political rights of their members enjoyed by all citizens, but the collective political rights that they exercise as members of ethnoculturally distinctive groups.

ELECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES

The prospects of political participation for members of minority groups depend primarily on the electoral system in place. However, due to their low numbers, territorial dispersion and low level of political mobilisation, or a combination of these factors, some minorities may not be able to secure collective representation under the ‘general’ electoral rules that apply to other competitors (primarily the political parties). Thus the representation of their respective groups may require the adoption of minority-friendly rules. Indeed, a number of countries have introduced such provisions.

Special electoral arrangements for minorities may refer to reserved special seats in the legislature, exemptions from the electoral threshold or the existence of a (lower) alternative threshold, or a delimitation of electoral districts that is clearly advantageous for minorities.³⁰⁴ In this chapter we will regard any deviations from the rules that apply to all competitors as special arrangements.

If no arrangements framed with reference to ethnicity are in place, the prospects of representation depend on the general features of the electoral system, most importantly the thresholds, the electoral formula and the nature of districting. Naturally, the situation of minorities is only one of the aspects taken into consideration by lawmakers. However, it seems clear that certain rules that might appear to be neutral have actually been adopted with minorities in view—whether the intention is to facilitate their representation or to make it more difficult.

Unfortunately, electoral rules can be manipulated not only to facilitate minority representation, but also to keep minorities out of decision-making processes. This can be accomplished both through rules that make overt references to ethnicity and through rules, which appear to be neutral but may be difficult for minorities to comply with.

303 Although some authors consider that any such differentiation is arbitrary, we subscribe to the view of Kymlicka, who argued that a differentiation between the rights of autochthonous and immigrant minorities is normatively justifiable. See W. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

304 M. Htun, ‘Is Gender Like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups’, *Perspectives on Politics* 2/3 (2004), 439–58; A. Reynolds, ‘Reserved Seats in National Legislatures: A Research Note’, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30/2 (2005), 301–10; P. Meier, ‘Defining Groups Entitled to Reserved Seats in National Legislatures: A Comparative Approach’, paper presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, Toronto, 3–6 September 2009; K. Bird, ‘Ethnic Quotas and Ethnic Representation Worldwide’, *International Political Science Review* 35/1 (2014), 12–26.

As well as the electoral system in *stricto sensu*, other rules may also influence the representation of minorities, such as bans on ethnic parties, the conditions for registering political organisations and contesting elections, or self-exclusion by the minorities themselves.

In our discussion of the impact of electoral rules on minority representation, we also assess whether the regulations apply uniformly to all minorities and whether or not equal opportunities are provided to all organisations of a specific minority.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FACILITATED MINORITY REPRESENTATION

Special electoral rules meant to facilitate the representation of specific groups (primarily women, but increasingly ethnic minorities too) can be considered one of the critical political reforms of the last two decades. Gender quotas are now applied in more than 100 states worldwide (of which about 40 are European).³⁰⁵ The number of countries facilitating minority representation is lower, but it is also increasing. Over 30 countries provide such arrangements, which is a significant number, yet clearly inferior to that of gender quotas. Apart from the European cases discussed below, better-known cases of facilitated minority representation worldwide include the special seats for the Māori in New Zealand and for scheduled castes in India.³⁰⁶

Scholarly opinion remains rather mixed concerning the effects of facilitated representation. For instance, Hodžić and Mraović find an overall positive, if modest, effect of reserved seats on the political voice of minorities in decision-making at the local level in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁰⁷ Kroeber also reports generally positive effects in the case of the indigenous peoples in Latin America.³⁰⁸ Yet, other studies do not confirm that minorities are better off with facilitated representation.³⁰⁹ Criticism of special measures includes allegations of ‘paternalism and tokenism’,³¹⁰ the propensity of minority representatives elected in this way to be co-opted by government or the clientele networks of ruling parties, the reinforcement of cleavage lines between minorities and the majority, and the possibility that non-minority representatives will feel no responsibility to address the issues of minorities if the latter have received help to gain representation.³¹¹

305 See M. L. Krook, *Quotas for Women in Politics* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). It should be pointed out that the majority of these quotas are not of a legal nature, but imposed internally by the political parties.

306 Scheduled castes and tribes are various groups of historically disadvantaged indigenous people recognised by the Constitution of India.

307 E. Hodžić and B. Mraović, ‘Political Representation of Minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Reserved Seats Affect Minority Representatives’ Influence on Decision-Making and Perceived Substantive Representation’, *Ethnopolitics* 14/4 (2015), 418–34.

308 C. Kroeber, ‘Exploring the Impact of Reserved Seat Design on the Quality of Minority Representation’, *Ethnopolitics* (2015), 1–21.

309 F. R. Jensenius, ‘Power, Performance and Bias: Evaluating the Electoral Quotas for Scheduled Castes in India’, Ph.D. thesis, University of California, 2013.


310 A. Reynolds, *Electoral Systems and the Protection and Participation of Minorities* (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2006), 4.

311 Bird, ‘Ethnic Quotas’, 19.

Although some argue that the mere presence of minority representatives has a positive effect in that it sensitises the public and fellow members of parliament from other ethnic groups, the dominant opinion in the literature is that not only group membership, but also electoral incentives and accountability are important to ensuring the quality of representation. Reynolds writes that ‘adequate minority representation goes beyond minority members being included in legislatures’, as the empowerment of minorities also depends on how legitimate these members of parliament are as representatives of minority communities and ‘whether they have power and influence beyond their (often) small presence and numbers’.³¹² Kroeber considers that ‘voters control the behaviour of representatives less carefully, if they are group members anyway’, and concludes that representatives should represent the group substantively ‘despite their group membership’.³¹³ In contrast, Bird argues that the effectiveness of reserved seats depends on the openness of (intra-ethnic) party competition, as well as on the level of development of minority civil society and media.³¹⁴ Yet, other authors argue that the representation of ethnic interests will unequivocally be most effective through ethnic parties as, as in the case of other types of parties, minority and party constituencies can apply cross-pressure to each other.³¹⁵ All these diverging opinions point to the fact that the careful design of the arrangements is critical for a positive impact.

MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

Map 1 Minority representation—special rules



Source: Map based on own data.

312 Reynolds, ‘Electoral Systems’, 4.

313 Kroeber, ‘Exploring the Impact’, 16–17.

314 Bird, ‘Ethnic Quotas’, 19, 23.

315 C. I. Zuber, ‘Reserved Seats, Political Parties, and Minority Representation’, *Ethnopolitics* 14/4 (2015).

Map 1 shows the occurrence of special electoral solutions targeting minorities throughout the new member states. Rules that facilitate group representation fall into two broad types: threshold waivers or alternative thresholds, and reserved seats for ethnic groups.

Of the countries listed in our sample, Poland is the only one that waives the electoral threshold for the parties of national minorities. However, only the German minority has been able to obtain seats on the basis of this rule. The Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities have not.

In Hungary, minority lists do not have to reach the 5% threshold in order to accede to parliament (since 2011). It is sufficient that they meet an alternative threshold: the number of votes equal to two-thirds of the votes necessary on average for one compensatory seat. However, this number is still too high relative to the size of the ethnic groups, and no minority was able to take advantage in the 2014 elections (the Roma and the German minority may have had realistic chances of obtaining a seat). However, even if they fail to reach the alternative threshold, minorities may send a spokesperson without voting rights to attend parliament.

Romania's special arrangement, which practically guarantees the representation of minorities in the lower chamber, is reminiscent of reserved seats, yet it is better classified as a very generous alternative threshold, as it allows minorities to obtain a single seat with the number of votes equal to 10% of the average number of votes necessary to elect a deputy at the national level. Additionally, minority organisations—as opposed to mainstream parties—may field the same candidate in each constituency. While this allows even very small communities to be represented, the drawback is that only one member of parliament can be elected this way, which is advantageous for small minorities numbering a few thousands, but not for larger communities such as the Roma, which would arguably be better off with the waiving of the national electoral threshold. The main organisation of the largest minority, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, RMDSZ) has not needed this special rule so far, as it has been able to pass the 5% threshold. However, since 2008 other alternative electoral thresholds have been designed to ensure RMDSZ's presence in parliament (due to the emergence of Hungarian challenger parties). Since 2015, parties that receive less than 5% of support at the national level may still accede to parliament if they obtain 20% of the votes in 4 (out of the 43) multi-member constituencies. While this rule was framed without any reference to ethnicity, obviously the only party able to take advantage of it was RMDSZ (as it is the only small party with a territorially concentrated electorate).

Lithuania also used to apply an alternative electoral threshold for its minorities, but the special rule which allowed minority parties to accede to parliament with 2% instead of 4% of the votes in the proportional representation component of the mixed-member system was abolished after the 1992 elections. This prevented the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija, LLRA) from obtaining list seats between 1992 and 2012 (they were still able to be elected in single-member districts). Russian ethnic parties were also unable to achieve representation, except when they ran in coalition with mainstream parties in 2000.³¹⁶

316 D. Lublin, *Minority Rules: Electoral Systems, Decentralization, and Ethnoregional Party Success* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 158–9.

While the waiving of thresholds only *facilitates* minority representation, countries falling into a second category of special arrangements employ reserved seats in order to *guarantee* the presence of minorities in the parliament. In Slovenia there is one reserved seat each for the Hungarian and the Italian autochthonous communities. Moreover, rather controversially, minority voters have two votes: one for their own representative and one for the rest of the parliament. In Croatia eight seats are reserved, elected in special constituencies parallel to the regular ones, and minority members have to choose whether they wish to vote in these constituencies or the regular ones. Serbs have three seats, Hungarians and Italians one each, Czechs and Slovaks one together, and the post-Yugoslav minorities share one seat, as do the rest of the small minorities. Finally, in Cyprus—which is, by the way, one of the few non-post-Communist European countries to provide special electoral solutions that facilitate the representation of ethnic groups—24 seats out of the 80 are reserved for the Turkish community. However, the arrangement is not operational, as Cypriot Turks have boycotted the system since 1964.

Although most cases discussed above can be considered positive examples concerning the representation of minorities, almost all of them suffer from problems of varying seriousness from the perspective of democratic ideals, such as the fair treatment of minorities or of (some of) their organisations.

In Romania, despite the apparently generous arrangements, legislation unfairly differentiates between parliamentary and other minority organisations, as the registration of new minority organisations is bound by very restrictive conditions (a very high number of signatures and a demanding geographical scheme for the Hungarians and the Roma, and three years in operation before elections for all minorities). Hungary's arrangement is also worrying in this respect, as—in a somewhat corporatist fashion—it is not minority organisations that are entitled to field candidates for parliament, but the elected self-governments of the nationalities; thus, the rules reinforce the authority of the organisations that control the nationality councils.

The Croatian system has been criticised because while the numerically small Italian minority has a reserved seat of its own, the much more numerous post-Yugoslav minorities have to share a seat.³¹⁷ Slovenia restricts electoral affirmative action to the *autochthonous* communities, while the Roma and the so-called *recently appeared* minorities (that is, ethnic minority groups from the other post-Yugoslav states, which are much more numerous than the autochthonous communities) are denied these rights. In Poland the threshold exemption applies only to *national* minorities (groups that have a kin-state) and not to *ethnic* ones (which do not). This has been criticised as unfair. However, given their low numbers, Poland's ethnic minorities would not be able to take advantage of this exemption in any case.

Of the new member states, Bulgaria is the only one to apply a restrictive regulation concerning minority representation: the constitution bans the formation of parties organised 'on ethnic,

317 K. Auerbach, *Political Participation of National Minorities*, Analitika – Center for Social Research (Sarajevo, 2011), 27. Another problematic aspect in Croatia is the very low turnout in the special minority constituencies, as more and more minority members are opting to vote for the general seats, as minority representation is guaranteed regardless of the number of votes.

racial or religious lines'. However, this ban has been applied selectively: while the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi, DPS)—which de facto represents the Turkish minority—eventually succeeded in being registered despite persistent attacks by Bulgarian nationalists, the ethnic organisations of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkish challenger parties have been denied registration.

FACILITATED REPRESENTATION AT OTHER LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE

Arrangements meant to facilitate the representation of minorities in local governments are less common than similar measures applied to national parliaments.

Croatia and Slovenia apply very similar systems of reserved seats to the ones in force in their national parliaments, depending on the local ethnic demography. Since 2010, Hungary has allowed the election of a minority candidate with two-thirds of the votes necessary on average for the election of a 'regular' member of the local government, but only if at least 50% (or 25% in localities larger than 10,000 voters) of the voters in the locality are registered on the special electoral roll for the respective minority.³¹⁸ In Romania there is an even weaker rule, which besides being ineffective is also very unfair, as it does not apply to the Hungarian minority. Its essence is that minority organisations are granted priority in the second phase of seat allocation. However, in most cases they would obtain seats anyway, while there may be cases where it is precisely this special rule that prevents the election of more minority organisations instead of a single one.³¹⁹

The other level of governance that deserves attention is that of the EU. Approximately every seventh citizen of Europe belongs to a historical minority; their overall number exceeds 100 million.³²⁰ In the EU28, the proportion of historical minorities is approximately 8.6%–8.8%.³²¹ Yet, a rough count of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) elected through ethnic or ethno-regionalist parties active in culturally distinct regions only yields a figure of about 30 out of the 751 representatives. Adding those minority representatives who are members of mainstream parties³²² to the count would certainly increase this proportion to some extent, yet the

318 A somewhat more generous system of preferential minority mandates in local municipalities was in force between 1994 and 2006.

319 I. G. Székely, *The Representation of National Minorities in the Local Councils*, Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, Working Paper no. 11 (Cluj, 2008).

320 C. Pan and B. S. Pfeil, *Minderheitenrechte in Europa. Handbuch der europäischen Volksgruppen* (Vienna: Braumüller, 2002).

321 E. Szalayné Sándor, 'Kisebbségvédelem az Európai Unióban' [Minority Protection in the European Union], presentation delivered at Piliscsaba, Hungary, 11 July 2013.

322 We would like to emphasise that in this respect we agree with Zuber that such MEPs are less focused on furthering minority interests due to the cross-pressures that arise from their party membership. See Zuber, 'Reserved Seats'.

main point remains: the decision-making body in which minorities are most underrepresented is the European Parliament. Furthermore, the number of Roma MEPs that has ever served in the Parliament is very low (according to our estimate, six), and currently there are only three Roma MEPs, even though the estimated number of Roma in the EU is about six million (about 1.2% of the population). Yet, in none of the new member states do we find arrangements in place that would facilitate the representation of minorities in the European Parliament.³²³

CONCLUSIONS

The summary analysis of electoral arrangements carried out in this chapter has revealed that only a few new member states facilitate the political participation of members of national minorities (in their capacity as group members). An analysis covering the entire EU would yield an even lower rate of incidence.³²⁴ Moreover, most of the existing arrangements (some of which are quite generous) can be criticised on several grounds, most importantly the unjustifiable differentiation between or within minorities.

Unfair differentiation between minorities seems to be a consequence of the idiosyncrasies of historical majority–minority relations. The inability or unwillingness to remedy such unequal treatment of the various groups is indicative of the highly path-dependent nature of developments in ethnopolitics. Even if electoral rules facilitate representation, bias in favour of or against various ethnic groups or minority organisations creates a democratic deficit, and often implies that the minority rights regime is built on the idea of selective co-optation rather than true inclusion, let alone power-sharing.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the shortcomings revealed by our analysis, we believe that the needs of minorities can be met in a differentiated manner, with arrangements adjusted to the characteristics of the specific ethnic groups. Even some of the arrangements reviewed here provide examples of good practice. For instance, alternative thresholds or threshold exemptions may be provided for larger minorities, while smaller ones may be accommodated with reserved seats or even the institution of minority spokespersons. We have identified three particularly salient points, where European actors could exert more influence:

323 In fact, out of all the member states we only find a reserved seat in Belgium, for the German minority.

324 Among the old member states we find threshold waivers or alternative thresholds for minorities in Germany, Denmark and Italy, and reserved seats for ethnoculturally distinct geographical areas in Finland, Denmark and Italy. Furthermore, Scotland was overrepresented in Westminster until 2005. Conversely, special electoral arrangements are more frequent in candidate countries. For details, see I. G. Székely and I. Horváth, 'Diversity Recognition and Minority Representation in Central and Southeast Europe: A Comparative Analysis', *Nationalities Papers* 42/3 (2014).

- European institutions and parties should exert pressure in order to prevent the adoption of arrangements falling short of the fair treatment of the various autochthonous minority groups and to procure the amendment of existing arrangements that are discriminative or unfair. Primarily arrangements that differentiate between minorities arbitrarily or which fail to ensure fair competition between rival organisations of the same minority should be scrutinised and reviewed. Supporting the elaboration of a European definition for national minorities could greatly facilitate such an endeavour.
- Even though this might be very difficult to obtain (especially in small countries that have only a few seats), member states should facilitate the representation of national minorities in the European Parliament, paying special attention to the Roma. With regard to the latter, political parties should be encouraged to include candidates on their lists that belong to this minority.
- Despite the equal weight attributed to the various levels of governance in the documents of international organisations, the local level remains rather neglected. Once again, the Roma would be one of the main (but not sole) beneficiaries of the adoption of facilitating measures.
- In general, special attention should be paid to the Roma in the new member states, focusing on the incentives for establishing their own political parties and political participation in the broadest sense.

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Autochthonous Minorities and the Structuring of National Education Systems

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Abstract The EU as a whole and most of its member states are multi-ethnic and multicultural entities, with histories of national, ethnic and religious conflicts. These histories are reflected in the ways in which the member states have created their education systems. The differences in education systems can be seen in the various education policies for settled, autochthonous minorities, as well as for those minorities whose needs have come to the attention of the wider public more recently, such as the Roma minority and immigrants from outside the EU. The lack of integrated education policies for minorities may threaten social cohesion and jeopardise the economic competitiveness of the EU: education is a precondition for employment and a better life. The member states, with support from the EU, should develop inclusive policies and allocate substantial resources for the integration of minorities (autochthonous and migrant, paying special attention to the Roma minority). This should be done in such a way that minorities preserve their identity and members of these minorities are empowered to participate in the development and implementation of the respective policies.

INTRODUCTION

In 2004, the Reflection Group on the Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe³²⁵ published its conclusions regarding the openness of the EU. According to these conclusions, the EU is open because it already comprises, by definition and by statute, a variety of peoples, cultures, languages and religions (with a long history of disputes and conflicts). It can further be considered open because the enlargement process brings in new peoples, cultures and languages, some of them very different from those of the 'old' member states. In this context, education should complement the national dimension that exists in each member state with a European one. It should focus more on interactions than on conflicts, and more on common trends than on individual paths.

This issue is addressed within the specific framework defined by the development of the EU: while it began as a trade and economic entity, over time, Europeans have become aware that

325 K. Biedenkopf, B. Geremek and K. Michalski, *The Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe. Concluding Remarks* (Vienna/Brussels: European Communities/Institute for Human Sciences, 2004).

‘economic integration simply does not, of itself, lead to political integration because markets cannot produce a politically resilient solidarity’.³²⁶ For this reason, the EU includes a political dimension expressed in the Treaty on European Union. But even political cohesion is no longer sufficient: ‘The older forces [economic and political] that animated European unification are no longer sufficiently powerful to provide genuine political cohesion, and, therefore, new sources of energy must be looked for and found in Europe’s common culture.’³²⁷

Putting aside historical quarrels and arguments, and linguistic, ethnic, historical and religious differences, all European cultures have common roots, and Europe’s history is a history of interactions and reciprocal influences. Because of this, ‘[t]he common European cultural space cannot be firmly defined and delimited; its borders are necessarily open, not because of our ignorance, but in principle—because European culture, indeed Europe itself, is not a “fact”. It is a task and a process’,³²⁸ a possible destination, but also the road itself.

Education is a matter of subsidiarity, ruled exclusively by the internal regulations of the member states, and discussions on every educational topic reflect the same dilemmas and concerns. For instance, every country asks the same question: ‘how much of the education provision should be dedicated to preserving cultural, spiritual and linguistic identity, and how much should be spent on this overarching EU dimension?’ The answer to this question is not a simple one, but we can observe the ways in which the member states have approached the aim of ensuring their own, internal cultural, spiritual and linguistic diversity.

Most of the EU member states are multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual entities: some of them have been built, as such, over a long period of history, while others have only recently become states. From this perspective, we can establish a distinction between autochthonous minorities, historically defined as such (for instance, those in the Baltic states, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Spain and Romania), and ‘new minorities’, arising from recent (mostly in the past 50 years) immigration (for instance in France, Germany or the Netherlands).

There is another very important dimension to this diversity: there are ‘old’ autochthonous minorities, historically (and often politically) and educationally recognised as such, and ‘new’ ones, including (to some extent) the Roma minority, which is not integrated, is in some places marginalised and is struggling for recognition. The Roma community in Europe is not a ‘new’ one from a historical point of view: its roots can be traced almost 800 years into the past all over Europe, and thus it can be described as an autochthonous minority.

On the other hand, in terms of social, political and cultural awareness, the discussion about Roma as a community in its own right—including in terms of education and culture—is only decades old. For this reason, we consider the Roma community as autochthonous—at the national and European levels—but as needing different treatment, as it has a lot in common with the minorities produced by migration.

326 *Ibid.*, 6.

327 *Ibid.*, 8.

328 *Ibid.*

It is obvious that discrimination (of all kinds) and the marginalisation of minorities (autochthonous or otherwise) may jeopardise the inclusive character of European society and may affect European unity by creating social and political tensions within and among member states. For instance, the recent wave of migration from the new EU member states (e.g. Romania and Bulgaria) has been one of the causes of the advance of extreme-right and Eurosceptic parties in recent national elections (for instance, in Britain, France and Hungary), and in the European Parliament as well. For this reason, tackling the issues related to these marginalised communities (migrants and Roma alike) is crucial for the well-being of Europe's citizens and for the inclusiveness of our societies. Learning from different experiences regarding education for minorities may be useful when designing better EU policies.

In this respect, it could be useful to bear in mind the *Hague Recommendations* of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities.³²⁹ Although this document was published in 1996, most of the provisions are still valid in the present context. We should mention, in this respect, the need for balance between maintaining the minorities' identity (by proper acknowledgement of their mother tongue, traditions and culture during the education process) and responsibility for integrating them into the wider national (and, we add, European) society. The use of minorities' mother tongues in education, at all levels, and the allocation of consistent resources (individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical) must also be ensured. The national minorities in question should be enabled and empowered to participate, in meaningful ways, in the development and implementation of policies related to minority education, and regional and local authorities should be endowed with appropriate competences concerning minority education. Finally, parents' involvement and participation should be ensured, and minorities should have the right to establish and manage their own private educational institutions and raise funds for them. Moreover, in order to avoid stereotyping, we need to be aware that the minorities might not be homogenous: different subgroups with different histories, religions and positions within society may exist.

In this paper we will briefly describe how the education of autochthonous minorities is approached in various EU countries and then discuss the specific issues surrounding the education of the Roma minority, irrespective of whether or not the minority is recognised as such.

THE EDUCATION OF AUTOCHTHONOUS MINORITIES

Minority- (autochthonous and migrant) related concerns and issues are not new at the EU level and, with regard to education, it is widely recognised that 'some national autochthonous minority groups are faced with high rates of underachievement, which in many ways limits their future

329 OSCE, Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, *The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities & Explanatory Note* (The Hague: OSCE, 1996).

employment opportunities and negatively impacts their livelihood'.³³⁰ For instance, on the basis of the existing evidence (which may be insufficient), it is known that migrant and minority pupils more often tend to enrol in secondary education that is less academically challenging, of shorter duration and often more vocationally oriented than pupils of the dominant culture.³³¹

The results from the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) evaluation confirm the under-achievement of pupils from a different cultural background—in this case, a migrant background (11% of the pupils assessed by PISA in 2012). These pupils tend to be socio-economically disadvantaged in comparison to non-immigrant students, and they score an average of 34 points lower in the PISA mathematics assessment than non-immigrant students, and an average of 21 points lower after accounting for socio-economic differences: immigrant students are therefore 1.7 times more likely than non-immigrant students to be in the bottom quarter in terms of performance distribution.³³²

On the other hand, policies developed to address these issues have been put in place: new curricula in order to meet the needs of a more diverse student body (i.e. second language and native language programmes, intercultural education and multicultural curricula), special teacher training programmes and/or a more diverse teaching body.³³³

A comparative view on this issue is even more difficult to establish, because there are differences regarding how member states collect data and consider different subgroups. Official documents denominate minorities (autochthonous or otherwise) in different ways: 'foreign citizens', 'ethnic minorities', 'immigrant subgroups', 'immigrants and descendants', 'non-native ethnic background', 'foreign background', 'cultural groups', 'nationalities subgroups' and 'first other language subgroups'.³³⁴ Moreover, there is a broad-ranging debate on definitions. For instance, different member states take different views on the Roma identity in terms of race, ethnicity and nationality.³³⁵

For this reason, cross-national, quantitative, comparative statistics are difficult to collect and a qualitative approach (based on case studies) may be more suitable. The situation of these minorities becomes even more complex when trying to describe the ways in which the different member states approach this issue.

330 M. Luciak, *Migrants, Minorities and Education. Documenting Discrimination and Integration in 15 Member States of the European Union* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004), v.

331 *Ibid.*, 22.

332 OECD, *PISA 2012 Results: Excellence Through Equity: Giving Every Student the Chance to Succeed (Volume II)* (Paris: OECD, 2013), 71–87.

333 M. Luciak, *Migrants, Minorities and Education*, vi.

334 *Ibid.*, 8.

335 A. L. Pap, 'Racial, Ethnic, or National Minority? Legal Discourses and Policy Frameworks on the Roma in Hungary and Beyond', *Social Inclusion* 3/5 (2015), 32–47.

Some member states recognise the existence of ethnic/national autochthonous minorities and offer a specifically adapted education provision—such as education in the mother tongue, teaching of the traditions and culture of the minority, and intercultural education—mainly for the minorities in question, but also for the majority population. This is the situation in, for instance, Austria, Germany, Hungary, Romania and Sweden.

Other member states do not legally recognise such minorities but guarantee *de facto* special education rights for groups with different ethnic or linguistic backgrounds (as is the case in Denmark, Finland and Italy), providing teaching on specific education topics and/or subjects.

Finally, yet other members states do not recognise the existence of such minorities, while granting individual rights in education (regarding mother tongue provision and culture). This is the situation in, for example, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. We should add, regarding the case of Belgium, the ‘community’-specific governance structures (of the three communities—German-speaking, French-speaking and Flemish), which are in addition to the national, regional and local ones. Each of the three communities is almost totally independent in terms of educational (and cultural) issues.

The achievement of educational rights for autochthonous ‘old’ minorities has not been easy. For instance, in Italy, the autonomy and rights of the German and Ladin minorities in the South Tyrol were subject to a long dispute, arbitrated by the UN and only officially resolved in 1992, when both minorities achieved cultural and linguistic, as well as territorial autonomy. In the field of education, every individual from South Tyrol has the right to education in his/her native language (in nursery and school), with parents having free choice of the school their children attend. The South Tyrol schools (and, thus, society as well) have become multilingual and multicultural as a result of teaching Italian in the German-speaking schools and German in the Italian-speaking schools, with this character being preserved in the public administration, as well.

There is a similar situation in Romania: all officially recognised minorities have the right to education in their mother tongue (at all levels, from nursery to higher education), with the learning of Romanian being a compulsory part of basic education. The minority languages are used in public administration too when the respective minorities comprise more than 20% of the total population.

In Finland, the situation of the Swedish minority is regulated by taking into consideration not the ethnic background, but the linguistic one: the individual right of the person to speak, to learn and to communicate (including with the public administration) in his/her own mother tongue. To this end, Finland is constitutionally bilingual, while the communities may be monolingual (Finnish or Swedish) or bilingual. This situation is present in the education system as well, with Swedish schools enjoying considerable autonomy and serving about 5.5% of the total population. Moreover, in both types of schools (those using exclusively Swedish or exclusively Finnish), pupils have to learn the other official language.

As can be seen, there is a wide range of different approaches and solutions to minority education in the member states, resulting from the presence of different cultures, histories and policies. The number and diversity of these experiences make it clear that a ‘one size fits all’ solution is not possible. For this reason, the policy recommendations we offer combine these successful policies and practices, which have been gathered together from policy documents from various international institutions (see below). However, these policies do not apply or should be applied in different ways when dealing with the Roma minority.

THE ROMA MINORITY: SPECIFIC ISSUES IN EDUCATION

The issues of the Roma minority which have emerged in the last decade have a European and therefore supranational character, as a result of the accession to the EU of the Central and Eastern Europe countries, which have large Roma minorities. The Roma minority³³⁶ is recognised as such in a lot of EU countries, but the policies developed internally by each member state to deal with the specific issues of this community have been overshadowed by the migration of the Roma population in the last decade and by the definition of Roma used by the group itself: ‘unified non-territorial transnational nation’.³³⁷ Being numerically probably the most significant European minority (with a total population of 5.4–6.7 million³³⁸) and, definitely the largest without a national state (even if the majority of Roma do not migrate), specific overarching policies and programmes are needed.

For this reason, as well as national solutions, the Roma issue must be approached at the supranational level too. One attempt to achieve this was the Decade for Roma Inclusion (2005–15)—a multi-donor and supranational initiative³³⁹—whose results are now being scrutinised: important resources were allocated to Roma issues and some progress was made, but the situation is still far from the desired one. For instance, the Roma Inclusion Index 2025,³⁴⁰ which summarises data from across the Decade region for education, indicates that the gaps between the Roma community and the rest of the population regarding preschool, primary and secondary education and literacy have been reduced but are far from being eliminated. The gap in tertiary education has possibly increased, the overrepresentation of Roma in special schools has possibly worsened and the segregation of Roma in education may also have increased during the Decade.³⁴¹

336 We should mention that this chapter does not give us room to discuss the Roma’s minority status in terms of race, ethnicity and nationality—only in terms of being a disadvantaged European minority.

337 S. Lipott, ‘The Roma as a Protected Minority? Policies and Best Practices in the EU’, *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* 12/4 (December 2012), 78–97.

338 *Ibid.*, 80–81.

339 See *RomaDecade.org*, ‘Decade of Roma Inclusion’, 2012.

340 The countries involved in the Decade for Roma Inclusion from the beginning in 2005 were Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia. In 2008, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Spain joined the initiative.

341 Decade of Roma Inclusion Secretariat Foundation, *Roma Inclusion Index 2015* (Budapest, September 2015), 16.

The same message was given by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues:³⁴² despite the obvious progress regarding the attendance and completion of primary school, most Roma children still do not obtain either a vocational certificate or a secondary qualification. Moreover, in South-Eastern Europe, the participation of Roma in education beyond primary school is dramatically lower than that of the majority population: only 18% of Roma attend secondary education (compared to 75% of the majority populations), and less than 1% of Roma are enrolled in higher education.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In many EU member states the differences regarding participation in education and educational achievement between the majority of the population and the autochthonous minorities remain high. Because of this, the need to continue developing national policies in this area is beyond doubt, and should especially target communities and individuals with a Roma background. Beyond the imperative of social justice, engraved in the foundation of the EU, improved participation in education and educational achievement for all minorities (autochthonous or otherwise) is needed to ensure better social cohesion. Otherwise, as the recent terrorist attacks in France and Belgium demonstrate, the exclusion or marginalisation of groups and individuals can occur, increasing the danger of radical discourse and even of terror attacks.

Moreover, there are economic benefits to having specific policies in this area. For instance, the World Bank³⁴³ estimates that equal opportunities on the labour market for the Roma population would generate lower government payments for social assistance (such as those for guaranteed minimum income programmes), and increased revenue from income taxes. The economic gain for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania and Serbia would be at least €5.5 billion annually, with taxation benefits of at least €1.8 billion annually for the four countries, taking into consideration demographic trends (one in five new entrants to the labour market being Roma). However, because of the intense internal migration issues at the EU level (involving more than one minority) and the ‘unified non-territorial transnational nation’ character of the Roma minority, even if education is a national competence, there is a need to continue policy support at the EU level alongside national policies.

There is an increased awareness of minority issues at the EU level and, consequently, several ongoing initiatives need to be continued and followed up. In this respect we mention the Commission’s Communication on multilingualism (considered an asset for Europe and a

342 UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues, Rita Izsák. Comprehensive Study of the Human Rights Situation of Roma Worldwide, with a Particular Focus on the Phenomenon of Anti-Gypsyism*, 29th session of the Human Rights Council (11 May 2015), 9.

343 World Bank, Europe and Central Asia, *Roma Inclusion: An Economic Opportunity for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania and Serbia*, Human Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region (2010), 4.

shared commitment)³⁴⁴ as a way to strengthen social cohesion, intercultural dialogue, lifelong learning, the European economy's competitiveness, and people's mobility and employability.

The same is true of the integration of the Roma minority.³⁴⁵ The European Commission has called on and supports member states in the adoption or further development of a comprehensive approach to Roma integration and endorses a number of common goals covering four main areas—education, employment, health and housing—with the aim of speeding up the integration of Roma.

Finally, it is important to emphasise that sectoral or individual policies (on housing, health, employment and education, among others) often do not succeed because of the multiple disadvantages of the Roma minority. For instance, policies regarding minorities' access to better education and professional qualifications might not be effective without complementary employment or housing policies.

For this reason, policies and programmes regarding minorities should work together. A recent report produced for the European Commission stated: 'Schools cannot work alone to disrupt intergenerational cycles of deprivation and tackle educational disadvantage. A combination of factors beyond schools limits educational opportunities and life chances. This means that cross-sector strategies are required, to link what schools can do with what other sectors such as employment, health, finance, justice, housing, youth and welfare can offer.'³⁴⁶

The importance of integrated strategies is highlighted in other European documents. For instance the OSCE Status Report from 2013 mentions that

the key priority is, therefore, to ensure effective policy implementation to produce tangible outcomes. Analysis of the participating States' replies indicates that there is more funding now available for the implementation of various Roma policy measures and projects. How these funds are used to achieve the intended outcomes is crucial. Robust mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation, along with the use of data and indicators, are necessary.³⁴⁷

344 European Commission, *Multilingualism: An Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment*, Communication, COM (2008) 566 final (18 September 2008).

345 European Commission, *An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020*, Communication, COM (2011) 173 final (5 April 2011); see also European Commission, *Steps Forward in Implementing National Roma Integration Strategies*, Communication, COM (2013) 454 final (26 June 2013); and European Commission, *Report on the Implementation of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies 2015*, Communication, COM (2015) 299 final (17 June 2015).

346 A. Edwards and P. Downes, *Alliances for Inclusion. Cross-Sector Policy Synergies and Interprofessional Collaboration in and Around Schools. An Independent Report Authored for the European Commission*, NESET (2013), 9.

347 OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, *Implementation of the Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti Within the OSCE Area. Renewed Commitments, Continued Challenges. Status Report 2013* (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR 2013), 23.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The most important recommendation for the European People's Party and the EU institutions is to ensure long-term and coherent policymaking and steering processes at the EU level, in order to approach the issue of the integration of (old and new) autochthonous minorities following the directions mentioned above.

The national, regional and community educational authorities are the only ones entitled to develop policies in education. Therefore, the recommendations that follow are addressed mainly to the national/regional parties that belong to the European People's Party and to national/regional governments. It is up to them to put in place policies that aim to increase social justice, cohesion and economic competitiveness. To achieve these goals, it is necessary

- to ensure the right balance between maintaining the minorities' identities and taking responsibility for integrating minorities into the wider national and European society;
- to ensure the use of mother tongues in education, at all levels, and promote multilingualism;
- to allocate consistent resources (individually and through international assistance and cooperation) to integration policies;
- to enable and empower the members of the minorities in question to participate in the development and implementation of the respective policies;
- to consider the integration of the Roma minority as a specific policy issue, with different needs from other similar minorities in this respect. There is a stronger need to protect and to promote (through financial and technical assistance) the Roma identity, not only by avoiding forced assimilation, but by adopting positive measures highlighting the distinctive characteristics of Roma culture, including language, history and traditions; and
- to favour integrated measures, addressing the multiple disadvantages of the minorities in question. Cross-sector strategies are required, to link educational interventions with employment, health, finance, justice, housing and welfare policies, especially for young people.

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Local Solutions to Immigrant and Roma Integration

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Abstract Many integration policies can be applied to both Roma and immigrants. Immigrants move from one country to another in search of a better life. In contrast, the Roma do not migrate. However, they often live in segregated communities, outside of villages and towns. Thus, we can say that, like migrants, the Roma live in poverty and social exclusion, without the secure basic living conditions of infrastructure, community facilities and financial sufficiency. Apart from problems with housing, employment and education, the most difficult challenge faced by minorities is the fear held by the majority about coexisting with them. Good relations and the ability to communicate on the local level may significantly improve social inclusion and create the right conditions for minorities to access various resources, mostly linked to work, education and housing. The chapter recommends establishing both special mechanisms to facilitate the exchange of know-how on local integration solutions and small EU grants to support integration workers at the local level.

INTRODUCTION

Most European countries have adopted policies and laws for the integration of autochthonous and new minorities. Hundreds of analyses have been undertaken and recommendations have been made at all levels of government in cooperation with non-governmental institutions and research centres. These range from studies of European significance to national frameworks and local concepts of integration. This chapter defines the most important problems in the integration process at the local level from the viewpoint of local authorities, and outlines the main challenges and opportunities in this area.

In July 2011, the European Commission proposed (and the Council and Parliament later adopted) a European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. The Agenda emphasises the EU's positive attitude towards diversity and strong guarantees for fundamental rights and equal treatment, building on mutual respect for different cultures and traditions.³⁴⁸

348 European Commission, *European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals*, Communication, COM (2011) 455 final, 20 July 2011.

As a result of the European Parliament's resolution of January 2008 on a European strategy regarding the Roma, consideration of the Roma agenda has become part of the European policy-planning process, with the aims of improving the legislative framework and creating an active Roma policy. In accordance with the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020, national governments have been tasked with developing their own strategies for implementing specific interventions in favour of the Roma population at the national and local level.³⁴⁹

We can see a difference in the application of these concepts in Western and Eastern Europe. Western countries are more focused on the migration question. The reason for this is that in eastern countries the number of migrants from third countries is relatively low. Immigrants see these countries as an interim solution, and avoid making unnecessary investments such as learning the language or looking for housing.³⁵⁰

The lack of experience and lesser focus on the integration of migrants in Eastern Europe is reflected in the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) rating (an index that assesses and ranks countries' integration policies). In 2014 the Visegrád Four were all ranked towards the bottom of the index of the 38 countries monitored worldwide. Hungary, with 45 points, ranked 23rd; the Czech Republic, also with 45 points, tied for 23rd; Poland, with 41 points, ranked 32nd; and Slovakia, with 37 points, ranked 34th.³⁵¹ The main focus of Central and Eastern European countries is on Roma integration. The Roma are not foreigners as they are a permanently resident minority.

THE POWER OF LOCAL SOLUTIONS

In recent years, governments have realised that although migration and integration strategies are defined centrally (or at the national level), the integration process itself takes place on the local level.³⁵²

Local and Regional Authorities (LRAs) are considered to be more effective and reliable than national governments when it comes to creating and implementing integration strategies.³⁵³ Empirical studies show that social integration is realised at the local level, in the cities and their municipalities. The structure and characteristics of minority communities differ from city to city and the regional needs of employers also vary. Municipalities should fulfil the role of an information manager and facilitate communication with public institutions in relation to

349 European Commission, *Report on the Implementation of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies*, Communication, COM (2014) 209 final, 2 April 2014.

350 Committee of the Regions, *Study on Practices of Integration of Third-Country Nationals at Local and Regional Level in the European Union* (Brussels, 2013), 21.

351 *MIPEX.eu*, 'Migration Integration Policy Index 2015'.


352 V. Ramalingam, *Integration: What Works?*, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2013).

353 *Ibid.*

minorities. This role is indispensable, particularly at the implementation stage, because the programmes are carried out in the immediate environment where minorities live. At the same time, municipalities have the potential to strengthen civic engagement in their area, as civic activities are an important part of the integration process.³⁵⁴

As the study by the Committee of the Regions has shown, the main challenges that local governments face are a lack of resources (66.7%), a lack of specialist know-how (43.8%) and insufficient political support (33.3%).³⁵⁵

Figure 1 The main challenges faced by cities or regions when dealing with the integration of newly arrived migrants from third countries.



Source: Graph created by the authors based on data from Committee of the Regions, *Study on Practices of Integration of Third-Country Nationals*.

It is necessary to add that there are also other important institutions that help with the integration process. Besides governmental institutions (migration offices, ministerial offices, etc.), non-governmental institutions, research centres, unions and committees help to bring migrants from the same countries together, support them, and promote their language, heritage and culture.


³⁵⁴ Centrum pre výskum etnicity a kultúry, *Migranti v meste* [Migrants in the City] (Bratislava, 2014), 13.

³⁵⁵ Committee of the Regions, *Study on Practices of Integration of Third-Country Nationals*, 40.

EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE MIGRANT CONTEXT

From the research by the Committee of the Regions we can establish the main challenge to integration faced by third-country nationals in the cities and regions—the language barrier. This is a problem for 72.9% of newly arrived migrants; for long-term residents this figure drops to 25%. The second biggest problem is finding a job (64.6%).³⁵⁶

Figure 2 The main challenges to integration faced by third-country nationals



Source: Graph created by the authors based on data from Committee of the Regions, *Study on Practices of Integration of Third-Country Nationals*.

356 Ibid., 38.

From the opposite point of view, the three main challenges that LRAs face are overcoming the language barrier (and joining the education process in the case of children), recognising the equivalency of educational certificates and diplomas from other countries, and ensuring migrants are employable in the host country's labour market.³⁵⁷

Best practice

In the following section we introduce examples of best practice which aim to offer solutions to the three main challenges: 1) the language barrier, 2) recognition of diplomas, and 3) access to jobs.

Austria: 'Mama lernt Deutsch'

To assist with the integration of young children, the local parliament in Vienna introduced the 'Mama lernt Deutsch' programme, which is designed to help young children learn the local language. When a mother brings her child into school, she also stays for a language class. The learning process includes discussions about healthcare, education and other issues related to living in Austrian society. The programme was implemented in 2006 and since then 8,000 mothers have completed the course.³⁵⁸

Spain: 'Get equal' and 'invisible curriculums' campaigns

This project reflects the fact that there are immigrant women who have studied in their countries of origin but whose diplomas are not recognised in Spain, thus forcing them to accept jobs in the domestic service and hospitality industries that are usually below the level of their professional qualifications. The project was founded by the Provincial Council of Gipuzkoa, Spain, in 2010 and is still ongoing. It intends to make the work and professional careers of immigrant women more visible. It is realised through collaboration with immigrant associations and public institutions. Via the project, migrant women who want the qualifications they earned in their country of origin to be recognised are offered personalised and individual advice, information and support. Talks are held to disseminate knowledge of the service in the towns of the province and at universities to raise awareness.³⁵⁹

The Czech Republic: entrepreneurship as a route out of social exclusion

This project in the Czech Republic has been run by the non-governmental organisation GLE ('reach your Goal, unLock your potential, Educate yourself') in cooperation with the local government in Prague, every year since 2008. The institution organises a series of lectures about how to set up a business locally, and offers regular networking meetings for migrants and foreigners with resident status in Prague. The project is financed by the city of Prague.³⁶⁰

357 Centrum pre výskum etnicity a kultúry, *Integrácia migrantov na lokálnej úrovni 2* [Integration of Migrants at the Local Level 2], Inštitút pre verejné otázky (Bratislava, 2012).

358 *Wien.gov.at*, 'Basisbildungskurse für Mütter – "Mama lernt Deutsch!"'.

359 Committee of the Regions, *Study on Practices of Integration of Third-Country Nationals*, 132–4.

360 GLE, 'Přihlaste se na podnikatelské semináře a networking pro cizince', 31 August 2015.


EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF ROMA

In the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020, the Commission calls on member states to ensure, as a minimum, primary school completion; to widen access to high-quality early childhood education and care; to ensure that Roma children are not subject to discrimination or segregation; and to reduce the number of early school leavers. Member states are also called upon to encourage Roma youngsters to participate in secondary and tertiary education.

Preschool education

The inclusion of Roma children from socially disadvantaged environments in preschool education in Central and Eastern Europe is lower than the national averages. In 2011 the World Bank, the UN Development Programme and the European Commission produced a joint study on communities with a high proportion of Roma children of preschool age. The attendance of Roma children aged 3–6 years was compared with that of non-Roma children of the same age from areas with a higher density of Roma than the national average.³⁶¹ The figure below provides an overview of the situation in four Eastern European countries.

Figure 3 Inclusion of Roma children in preschool education



Source: Graph created by the authors based on data from World Bank, *Toward an Equal Start: Closing the Early Learning Gap for Roma Children in Eastern Europe* (2012).

³⁶¹ World Bank, *Toward an Equal Start: Closing the Early Learning Gap for Roma Children in Eastern Europe* (2012).


To solve this problem it is essential that parents, especially mothers, are involved in the whole process of preschool education.³⁶² The education of children from socially disadvantaged environments should start from three years of age and should be implemented in an appropriate form, in cooperation with the mother—without removing the child from its natural environment.

In Slovakia, to overcome linguistic and social barriers, an ‘Institute of Teaching Assistants’³⁶³ has been set up, but there is still a deficit of qualified and professionally trained assistants from the Roma minority. Another idea that helps students from socially disadvantaged environments is that of a ‘zero class’, which is attended by pupils with psychological problems to help them catch up to the level of children who have grown up in a normal environment, in order to enable them to eventually move into mainstream education.

Early leavers from education

The portion of the young population that leaves the education system at the age of 16, under age and without qualifications, is unemployable. According to research by the Institute of Information and Prognosis in Education in Slovakia, every year around 3,500 students will drop out of the education system before their exams.³⁶⁴ The most common reasons for leaving school early are a socially disadvantaged family background (72.2%), poor grades (66.2%) and the low educational level of parents (61.4%).³⁶⁵

Figure 4 The most common reasons for leaving school early



Source: Graph created by the authors based on data from M. Pétiová et al., *Záškoláctvo a predčasné ukončenie povinnej školskej dochádzky z pohľadu riaditeľ'ov základných a stredných škôl. Záverečná správa z prieskumu* [Truancy and Premature Completion of Compulsory Education from the Perspective of Directors of Primary and Secondary Schools. The Final Report of the Survey].

362 V. Korčeková, *Rómske deti do materských škôl* [Roma Children in Preschool Education], Inštitút SGI (Bratislava, 2013), 1–2.

363 Slovak Republic, *Stratégia Slovenskej republiky pre integráciu Rómov do roku 2020* [Strategy of the Slovak Republic for Roma Integration to 2020] (2011), 26.

364 M. Pétiová et al., *Záškoláctvo a predčasné ukončenie povinnej školskej dochádzky z pohľadu riaditeľ'ov základných a stredných škôl. Záverečná správa z prieskumu*, [Truancy and Premature Completion of Compulsory Education from the Perspective of Directors of Primary and Secondary Schools. The Final Report of the Survey], Ústav Informácií a Prognóz Skolstva (Bratislava, 2013), 3–5.

365 Ibid., 6.

We can see from the graph that the environment in which young people live is not enough in itself to promote education. The number of young people who are unemployed is high and every year the number of dropouts who become long-term unemployed increases.

One of the ways to eliminate the number of young unemployed and unemployable people is to implement compulsory education up to the age of 18. After finishing primary and secondary school (up to the age of 16 years), students would continue for an additional two years in order to obtain a qualification from high school or from a combination of academic and vocational education (through school and practical training) certified by an employer. Acquiring a qualification and reaching adulthood would make young people more employable and increase the likelihood of them getting a job.

Assessment of ability and career advice

Despite the success in some measures and increased investment in the education of Roma pupils, it should be noted that most Roma pupils fail to complete their education. It is a challenge for them to socialise or integrate with others in the current education system, and this has disastrous consequences for them when trying to enter the labour market. The major problem is that the vast majority of Roma are educated in special schools.³⁶⁶ While there are many objective reasons for this, other reasons are based on weak legislation, a failure to correctly assess the ability level of the Roma children, and the agreement of parents to enrol their children into special schools for no real reason.

An example of good practice is the assessment of students by career consultants in primary schools. Pupils who are finishing their primary education are assessed and from these results the appropriate type of school and field of study are recommended for their secondary education. Should similar assessments of Roma pupils be carried out at the lower levels of primary school, teachers could adjust the educational process to meet the individual needs of pupils. This would create a space for new methods and forms of work to aid the development of the children's potential.

Employment and employability

Ensuring that there are enough job opportunities for citizens is one of the basic prerequisites for social and labour integration. A low level of education and a lack of skills are great disadvantages for people from excluded communities, and create difficulties for them when trying to enter the jobs market. The attitude of employers to employing Roma is often based on previous negative experiences of a poor work ethic, but may also be based on societal prejudices against Roma. This results in very low interest in and inclination for employing any Roma. There are no precise statistics about Roma unemployment but in districts with a high Roma population the unemployment rate is higher and there is also the highest proportion of

366 J. Harich, *Uplatnenie absolventov stredných škôl v praxi, sezóna 2011/2012* [Application of High School Graduates in Practice, 2011/2012 Season], Ústav Informácií a Prognóz Skolstva (Bratislava, 2012).

long-term unemployed.³⁶⁷ As the European Commission's *Report on the Implementation of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies 2014* states:

To close the employment gap between Roma and non-Roma, Member States will need to target simultaneously the supply and demand sides of the labour market. On the supply side, the low skill levels of Roma job seekers must be addressed with vocational training and counselling, combining targeted measures and effective access to mainstream employment services. On the demand side, measures are needed to give incentives to employers, such as recruitment subsidies, job trial and apprenticeship schemes.³⁶⁸

Best practice

The following paragraphs describe three examples of how European countries are tackling the issues of access to preschool education, access to the job market and social inclusion in the Roma context.

Hungary and Bulgaria: two years of compulsory preschool education

Despite the fact that Roma communities continue to face poverty, social exclusion and discrimination, the European Commission's report from 4 April 2014 referred to the progress achieved by the 28 member states. There has been good progress in ensuring that all Roma children complete at least their primary school education, including an increase in preschool participation in Finland from 2% to 60%, a new law in Hungary that makes two years of preschool compulsory for all children, a similar two-year obligatory preschool period in Bulgaria, and 'travelling teachers' who move with the Traveller communities in Ireland. At the same time, more efforts will be needed to tackle the issue of segregation in mainstream schools in several EU countries.³⁶⁹

Finland: Roma employment mediators

Over the past four years there have been some attempts to improve the employability of Roma, but these are too rarely combined with systematic measures targeting the demand side of the labour market by fighting discrimination and incentivising employers. Some promising practices include training mentors for Roma looking for work in Austria, EU-funded Roma employment mediators in Finland and a programme for work counsellors in Spain.³⁷⁰

367 Slovak Republic, *Stratégia Slovenskej republiky pre integráciu Rómov do roku 2020*, 32.

368 European Commission, *Report on the Implementation of the EU Framework*, 5.

369 *Ibid.*, 4.

370 European Commission, 'Roma Integration: EU Framework Triggers First Results', Press Release, 4 April 2014.

Slovakia: municipal company in Spišský Hrhov

In Spišský Hrhov, a small company owned by the village has been established that employs a significant number of the local Roma population. It undertakes construction and earthworks; builds concrete pavements; provides carpentry services; manufactures wood pulp; produces souvenirs and folk-art objects; manages and maintains municipal buildings, roads and communications; works the land; constructs wooden houses; and undertakes other similar tasks. The number of employees is now relatively stable, with a staff of around 10 people in the winter and around 30 during the rest of the year. The company has its own advanced machinery, mechanisms and technical equipment, a permanent management staff and other resources that make it ideal for skills development and practical training. The model of the Spišský Hrhov municipal company as a social enterprise was verified in 2006 and has been successfully applied in other villages.³⁷¹

CONCLUSIONS

It is clear that the number of migrants in the cities and regions of Europe is increasing every year and becoming a serious issue, not only for Western but also for Eastern member states. The proper identification of migrant needs and the creation of adequate concepts and solutions are basic requirements for maintaining and strengthening social inclusion in the cities.

As regards either Roma or migrants, the lack of a long-term integration strategy covering measures in areas such as education, housing, health and employment is likely to increase tensions between the majority and the disadvantaged minorities. This could result in the permanent exclusion of the minority through segregation or marginalisation, or lead to complete assimilation with the majority and the loss of the minority's complex identity.

Therefore, the ideal solution is a model of social inclusion, where acceptance of cultural diversity is preserved and the law of the country in question is respected by both sides (the minority and the majority). European and national bodies must increase the level of priority for this issue, set up strong communication channels with the regions, offer a space for the exchange of experience, train experts and provide adequate funding for local projects.

For this to work, however, a clear and precise control system must be implemented to guarantee that LRAs are not abusing the rights of minorities.

371 A. Mušinka, *Podarilo sa* [The Things that Worked] (Prešov: University Press Prešov, 2014).

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The European People's Party and EU institutions should

- organise a 'solutions market'. This would bring discussion about effective local solutions to the European table and offer the opportunity for the exchange of best practices between local governments and the non-governmental organisations that are in charge of the successful integration of minorities; and
- offer support to LRAs by creating small grants for the training of workers and experts in the area of the integration of migrants.

National/regional European People's Party member parties and national/regional governments should

- organise 'ideas markets' where the main obstacles to integrating minorities at the national and local levels can be discussed. Political representatives and professionals should attend these meetings;
- organise local meetings and cultural events, and print local newspapers, to discuss various topics related to migration or the Roma culture at the local level to prevent fear of the unknown among the majority;
- create national and local 'foreigners' advisory bodies', consisting of foreigners and migrants, to consider their needs and provide advice when planning and creating strategic documents for the regions;
- involve Roma and migrants in local politics and party structures and activities to engage them politically; and
- be strict about fulfilling valid action plans and maintaining continuity even when changing leadership due to elections.

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Vít Novotný

‘United in Diversity’ (or ‘Unity in Diversity’), *In Varietate Concordia*, is the official motto of the EU. In the second half of the 2010s, the EU is experiencing a profound crisis in which diversity is threatening to dispel unity. The member states’ opinions on the future of the EU are becoming increasingly divergent, due to the economic crisis of the late 2000s and early 2010s, the general globalisation of culture and the economy, and the rising instability in Europe’s neighbourhood. The unintended increase in ethnic and religious diversity is a consequence of the mass migrant and refugee inflow in 2015–16, the EU’s uncoordinated foreign and security policies, and systemic failures in asylum and border management. The rising internal and external adversity is the cause of a struggle between globalists and nationalists, one of the main divides in Europe today. For the European People’s Party (EPP), seeking unity in these circumstances is of paramount importance.

The chapters in the present volume address some of the questions raised by the current developments. The chapters also offer proposals for the EPP, European governments and civil society on how to deal with the current crisis of confidence. These suggestions include ideas on Islamism, terrorism and religion, as well as on various aspects of group identity and social cohesion.

EUROPEAN IDENTITY

The present volume concerns itself more with the questions of culture than with those concerning political institutions. For several authors in the volume, the starting point for their analysis is the concept of European identity. As Matevž Tomšič (‘Building a Common European Identity’) remarks, Europe shares a number of features with Western civilisation as a whole. These include the Judeo-Christian tradition, Enlightenment rationalism, social and political pluralism, autonomous institutions that represent social interests, the separation of secular and spiritual authority, and individualism. The combination of these features is unique to the West. However, Europe’s identity is also highly complex, as noted, for example, by Ábel Ravasz (‘Alternatives to Multiculturalism: Why Saying It has Failed is not Enough’), Serban Iosifescu (‘Autochthonous Minorities and the Structuring of National Education Systems’), Sergiu Constantin (‘The Protection of Autochthonous Minorities in Europe: Developments and Challenges’) and Tomšič himself.

372 With thanks to those authors who kindly provided their comments.

Tomšič also mentions that European culture is characterised by greater openness to outside cultures than is the case with other civilisations. He points out the existence of a growing values disorientation due to the presence of ideologies promoting relativism. He deems that ‘it is hard to criticise Muslims for not respecting our values and traditions in a context in which many Europeans themselves do not nurture them.’ Still, there should be zero tolerance of those who threaten this openness (including those who attempt to introduce the shariah) or the security of Europeans. Peeter Võsu (in ‘Public Expressions of Religious Faith’) stands more explicitly behind the idea of a Christian Europe. Iosifescu notes that the European identity is also open due to the process of EU enlargement, through which new peoples, cultures and languages are brought into Europe’s community.

Several authors take different perspectives on the issue. Antonis Klapsis and Panagiotis Kakolyris (writing on ‘Euro-scepticism and Nationalist Populism’); Thomas Volk (‘The Islamist Challenge’); and Ioanna Charalambous, Michalinos Zembylas and Sotiris Themistokleous (‘New Migration and the European Dilemma of Unity and Diversity’) point out that Muslims—whether settled or immigrant—are often framed as a cultural threat, as representatives of a civilisation that competes with the predominantly Christian Europe and is a threat to national security. A similar point is also made by Rien Fraanje (‘Room for Religion’), who remarks that the majority culture sometimes blames a minority for its mistakes even when they are ubiquitous in the majority culture.

Several chapters in the volume, including those by Tomšič, Klapsis and Kakolyris, and Luigi Crema (‘The Solidarity Principle and the Current Migration Emergency’), suggest that Europe’s economic crisis has weakened the Union. Lucie Tungul (in her chapter ‘Explaining Immigration to the European Public’) points to research that finds a clear link between immigration flows, economic conditions and anti-immigrant public opinion.

Forging a strong European identity is difficult in these circumstances. The rejection of the concept of an ‘ever closer union’ is now more widespread than ever before (Klapsis and Kakolyris). The challenges of mass immigration and Islamism are more difficult to handle than they would have been, had the European economy been experiencing economic growth and low unemployment. On the contrary, the current conditions are favourable to nationalists and to populists on both the right and the left, as Tomšič and Klapsis and Kakolyris argue. These movements tend to express anti-EU sentiments and share a reluctance to accept the fundamental principles of freedom, openness and tolerance. Klapsis and Kakolyris demonstrate this with examples from the UK (United Kingdom Independence Party), France (National Front, Front National), Poland (Law and Justice, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), Germany (Alternative for Germany, Alternative für Deutschland) and Greece (Golden Dawn, Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος – Χρυσή Αυγή; and Coalition of the Radical Left, Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς/Syriza).

On a separate issue, Tomšič notes that the neo-functional approach to European integration, ‘based on technocratic and non-political problem-solving’, neglects the cultural aspects of integration. Culture is now the stumbling block of further European integration. If Europe is to become a political and democratic body, it needs a common cultural identity and a common

feeling of belonging. In this context, Iosifescu mentions that economic markets by themselves cannot produce a political community. He points out that each member state should ask how much of the education provision should be dedicated to 'preserving cultural, spiritual and linguistic identity, and how much should be spent on this overarching EU dimension'.

Islamism and radicalisation

In his contribution to the volume, Volk contends that radical Islamism poses a serious threat to European societies. With followers in many countries, including EU states, Islamism aims to create a fear of Muslims. According to Volk, 'Islamism is a political ideology, which claims to be universally valid. . . . It misuses religion for political aims'. Although Islamism does not necessarily lead to violence, many of its forms embody anti-democratic attitudes, leading to a rejection of European constitutions and the rule of law. Islamists prey on religious illiteracy among young Muslims. They base their ideas on strict interpretations of the Koran which do not take into account the historical contexts of the Islamic holy texts. Prisons, in particular, are a fertile ground for radicalisation. Furthermore, those seeking information on Islam on the Internet are often directed to Islamist websites.

Terrorism

The terror attacks in Bulgaria, France, Belgium, Germany, UK and Sweden in the 2010s (and in Spain and the UK in the 2000s) have made it abundantly clear that European states are targets for Islamist groups and individual Islamist perpetrators. Islamic terrorism not only represents an attack on fundamental European values (Tomšič); it also creates the conditions for the growth of both Islamophobia and right- and left-wing populism, as witnessed in many European countries (Volk; Klapsis and Kakolyris).

The ideology of jihadism is one source of terrorism; the existence of the socio-political conflict is another, as pointed out by Sofiya Tsvetkova (in her chapter on 'Terrorism: History, Definition and the Case of Bulgaria'). Tsvetkova sketches the wider context for terrorism in Europe and Bulgaria, pointing out the previous anarchist, anti-colonial and new left phases, as well as the current religious fundamentalist one. She lists several goals of terrorist acts, including causing fear and finding new recruits. She recalls the terrorist violence perpetrated by ethnic Turks in Bulgaria in the 1980s in response to the fierce repression by the Communist state. Finally, she stresses that not all terrorist acts are Islamist in nature.

Religion and human rights

The question of religion is tackled from different angles in the volume. Although the Judeo-Christian religious tradition is one of the foundations of European culture, we are witnessing a withdrawal of Christianity from public life, a trend decried by Vösu. In Vösu's opinion, religious freedom and Europe's Christian culture are under pressure from both the political left and militant secularists.

Fraanje's chapter, like Vösu's, is devoted to the question of the place of religion and religious faith in public life. Fraanje cites two prominent thinkers, the liberal Martha Nussbaum and Rowan Williams, a clergyman with a close affinity to Christian Democratic thought. Nussbaum appeals to liberal–humanist values such as human dignity and justice, stating that expressions of religion need to have equality with non-religious arguments in the public domain. Fraanje, quoting Williams, then makes a distinction between programmatic and procedural secularism. Williams rejects the former, a doctrine which wants to remove all signs of religious commitment from the public domain. Programmatic secularism is also criticised in the chapter by Vösu. Whilst acknowledging differing views on the separation of church and state in European countries, he condemns the banning of crucifixes in classrooms and of other Christian symbols in the public sphere.

Fraanje agrees with Williams's proposition to promote the idea of procedural secularism, a policy which does not give advantage to one religious body over another. Williams also suggests that in order to respect public pluralism and preserve a free public space, the state cannot decide what is correct or not, and should exercise restraint. Vösu, arguing the same issue from an individual viewpoint, says that religious faith 'is a person's greatest motivator' and 'a denial of faith in public is a denial of one's identity'.

Finally, Vladimír Hanáček and Jan Málek ('The European People's Party and Human Rights') trace the religious and Enlightenment origins of human rights, following the writings of the twentieth-century Czech philosopher Božena Komárková in particular. The authors cite EPP documents that invoke freedom of religion as a fundamental human right, not least in view of the persecution of Christians in the Middle East. The authors criticise the notion of an ever-expanding list of human rights as promoted, for example, by the Party of European Socialists. Instead, Hanáček and Málek advocate a focus on key human rights, such as human dignity, freedom, justice and solidarity.

Against the backdrop of the increasingly secular societies in Europe, Islam stands out as a holistic religion, an ideology and a basis for law, as noted by Volk in his chapter. Salafism, the fastest growing manifestation of Islamism, aspires to a strict way of life modelled on that of the early period of Islam. The adherents of the purist form of Salafism live according to the rules of shariah, placing God's sovereignty over national sovereignty.

Volk argues that jihadist Islamists represent a small but dangerous grouping within Salafism. This grouping, which in Europe comprises about one-quarter of home-grown jihadists, combines asceticism with nostalgia. These values appear to give life meaning for those young people who adopt violent Islamism as a rebellion against modern society.

GROUP IDENTITY, INTEGRATION AND SOCIETAL COHESION

Group identity and its expressions are crucial factors in the debate about European identity. Both individualism and group belonging are deeply rooted in European history. That Europe's cultural heritage is highly heterogeneous is stressed by Tomšič, Iosifescu and Charalambous

et al. In his chapter, Constantin highlights the interplay between several European instruments that aim to protect and promote the continent's cultural diversity.

Ravasz argues that 'members of . . . groups can only fully experience their citizenship if the groups themselves are meaningfully empowered to become communities'. Iosifescu shares this opinion. He states that 'the marginalisation of minorities (autochthonous or otherwise) may jeopardise the inclusive character of European society and may affect European unity by creating social and political tensions within and among member states.' In support of this thesis, he quotes the 1996 *Hague Recommendations* of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The document emphasises the need for a balance between maintaining the minorities' identities (mother tongue, traditions and culture) and integrating them into the wider national (and European) society. For Miroslava Szitová, Marek Degro and Miroslav Pollák ('Local Solutions to Immigrant and Roma Integration'), the ideal solution is a model of social inclusion in which cultural diversity is preserved and the law of the country is respected by both minorities and the majority. Others, such as Charalambous et al., do not disagree, but warn against notions of 'ethnic absolutism', which generates dangerous divisions.³⁷³

The chapters illustrate how group, regional and national identities may clash. They also describe existing arrangements and projects that ensure peaceful coexistence and the participation of different groups in the construction of society.

Multiculturalism and its alternatives

The authors in the volume take differing views of the concept of multiculturalism, generally understood as a recognition of the rights and specific needs of ethnic and religious groups. For Tomšič, multiculturalism is an ideology which denies cultural differences and their impact on the functioning of society. Tomšič implicitly understands Europe to have one culture that comprises a variety of European subcultures. For Ravasz, multiculturalism is concerned with both European and non-European ethnic groups. It is not so much an ideology as a constitutional and legal reality. Ravasz draws a line between 'official multiculturalism' (as in the Netherlands or Sweden until recently), 'de facto multiculturalism' (as in Germany) and 'no multiculturalism' (as in France, Denmark, Hungary and the Czech Republic). The latter can be the result of either exclusivist definitions of nationhood or a failure to recognise the existence of different subgroups.

Tomšič and Ravasz differ not only in their understanding but also in their evaluation of multiculturalism. Tomšič argues that multiculturalism has neglected the fact that many elements of the European political system rest on specific cultural foundations. He argues that multiculturalism ignores the possibility that some traditions are not compatible with European norms. He notes that the integration of immigrants into Europe, particularly those from Muslim countries, has mostly failed. This is apparent from the poor educational achievements

373 The chapters in the volume do not discuss in depth the distinction between membership of autochthonous communities, on the one hand, and of immigrant communities, on the other.

and the high levels of unemployment, crime and religious extremism present in immigrant communities. The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium in 2015–16 have clearly weakened the idea of multiculturalism.

Ravasz agrees that the European variants of multiculturalism have sometimes produced fragmentation in society. Minority groups can be as intolerant of their own members as the rest of society. Despite this, Ravasz argues that there is no European country ‘that has been able to create an effective [and] functioning model of diversity management that does not include at least some elements of multiculturalism.’ This is because multicultural policies grant group rights and create desirable spheres of partial autonomy within society.

Tomšič and Ravasz also differ in their solutions. Tomšič suggests strengthening the common European culture through education and communication. In contrast, Ravasz proposes a set of measures that amounts to ‘an upgrade’ of multiculturalism. These approaches include interculturalism to create spaces for interactions between members of different groups, a strengthening of the civic principle in diversity management and the integration of local solutions into state frameworks. Ravasz argues that to foster social cohesion, people belonging to different groups need to be actively encouraged to take part in these discussions about the public good.

Specific issues concerning autochthonous minorities, Roma and immigrants are covered in the following subsections.

Autochthonous minorities

Three chapters in the volume deal exclusively with the question of traditional, or autochthonous, minorities. Constantin traces the historical development of the protection of minority rights, which led to the current return to group rights that had already existed in Europe between the two world wars. He explains that minority protection is based on the prohibition of discrimination and the protection and promotion of the distinct identity of minority groups. The Council of Europe is the originator of the only legally binding minority rights instrument in Europe, the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. However, France has never signed the convention, and several other countries have signed but not ratified it. Other international instruments exist but are poorly implemented. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Constantin continues, prohibits discrimination based on, among other things, membership of a national minority. He points out that in the 1990s the EU included the protection of minorities within the accession criteria for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, after countries have acceded to the EU, the issue of autochthonous minorities has become marginalised, with the focus shifting to the integration of immigrants. The author argues that today minority protection is primarily an ‘export product’, that is, the issue is promoted in relation to EU candidate countries rather than members. Internally, the Treaties leave it to the member states to regulate the protection of minorities. Constantin criticises this as a double standard and states that minority rights should be included in the *acquis communautaire*.

István Gergő Székely and István Horváth ('Minority Representation in the New EU Member States') look at the group rights of traditional minorities from the angle of electoral arrangements. The authors outline the various electoral arrangements in place for minorities. The prospects for group representation depend on the general features of the electoral system, including electoral thresholds, the electoral formula and the nature of districting. An increasing number of countries are implementing special electoral arrangements to facilitate minority representation, such as threshold exemptions and reserved seats. The authors note that academic opinion is mixed concerning the effects of facilitated representation, as the positive effects of participation can be offset by clientelism within the groups. The authors go on to consider the electoral arrangements in Central and East European countries, mentioning that only a handful of member states facilitate the political participation of members of autochthonous minorities in their capacity as group members. However, Székely and Horváth argue that electoral incentives for minority parties are necessary to ensure quality of representation. However, they also note that this participation takes the form of selective co-optation rather than 'true inclusion'.

Finally, Iosifescu devotes his chapter to the structuring of education systems in relation to autochthonous minorities. The author describes a variety of educational arrangements which differ widely in terms of recognition of minorities and minority rights, including linguistic ones.

Roma

Several chapters in the volume describe problems with implementing strategies for the integration of the Roma in the EU. The status of Roma in Europe varies from country to country: in a given country Roma can be an autochthonous minority, a minority group stemming from immigration, or both. As Iosifescu mentions, the Roma issue has only appeared on the EU's agenda relatively recently, with the enlargements in the 2000s (in Western Europe, most Roma were exterminated during the Second World War). Due to the intra-EU migration of a portion of the Roma, the issue requires EU-wide solutions. Iosifescu strongly argues that the Roma are a specific minority, whose separate identity should be encouraged rather than suppressed.

Szitová et al. look at the widespread economic, social and educational marginalisation of the Roma. The most significant problems are the education of the Roma in special schools, a lack of role models, weak legislation and prejudice. The authors maintain that local and regional authorities can develop more effective and reliable solutions to Roma integration than national governments. Szitová et al. describe several local initiatives in education and employment that have improved outcomes for the Roma. Innovative national-level solutions include compulsory preschool education in Hungary and Roma employment mediators in Finland.

Constantin notes that while the member states have the primary competences for including the Roma in economic and social life, the EU has a supporting role in providing legal and financial instruments. So far the 2011 EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020 has not succeeded in substantially improving the conditions for Romany citizens. Székely and Horváth mention special electoral arrangements for the Roma in several countries but note that the numerical thresholds for these arrangements are often prohibitive, and thus

the Roma cannot benefit from them. Politically, the Roma are heavily under-represented in the new member states and in the European Parliament. Iosifescu, quoting World Bank research, notes the economic benefits that would come about with equal opportunities for the Roma in labour markets. Tsvetkova points out concerns over the potential for Islamic radicalisation of the Roma minority in some areas of Bulgaria (even within Bulgaria, this appears to concern only a small section of the Roma population).

Immigrants and their descendants

Charalambous et al. and Ol'ga Gyárfášová and Grigorij Mesežnikov ('Public Policy, the Integration of New Minorities and Party Competition') remind us that, while countries such as France and Germany have been accepting immigrants for decades, others have traditionally been countries of emigration rather than of immigration. In the twenty-first century, Europe as a whole is a continent of immigration (large-scale movements between EU countries notwithstanding), and immigration is a key political concern. Taking the example of Cyprus, Charalambous et al. demonstrate how the ethnic division of the island complicates responses to the arrival of migrant workers. The authors challenge the notion that the centre-right is necessarily more xenophobic and anti-immigrant than the left. Tomšič argues for selective immigration policies that take into account the potential of individual migrants to integrate. In contrast, Charalambous et al. highlight the social, cultural and economic benefits of immigration. Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov note the positive economic impact of labour immigration in countries such as Germany. Crema points out that the principle of solidarity concerns not only people already inside the EU but also those outside its borders.

Crema notes that Europe is experiencing a 'migration emergency', as the massive increase in illegal immigration shows. This poses a great challenge to European solidarity, including interstate solidarity, solidarity in border management, and the role of governments when guaranteeing human and social rights. Crema proposes that the EU should abandon an immigration paradigm and adopt an emergency paradigm instead. 'This should be done in recognition of not only the unprecedented numbers of migrants, the tremendous difficulties they are fleeing and the concomitant urgent need for aid, but also the fact that they are likely to wish to return home in peacetime.' To deal with the issues, the creation of an EU agency for migratory issues is required (an idea which at the time of writing is being partly addressed by the European Commission, through its proposal for the creation of a European Union Agency for Asylum). An EU-level agency would be entrusted with processing asylum requests and thus would make a quota system more effective.

Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov remind us that the cohesion of European societies depends on the integration of immigrants. This is because failures in integration are exploited by right-wing populists, who could yet emerge on a much greater scale than today. For Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov, immigration is a source of benefits as well as challenges. The authors note the existence of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which is based on an evaluation of policy areas relevant to migrant integration: access to the labour market, family reunion, education, health care, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination. Despite certain shortcomings, the index is helpful because better integration

can benefit everyone in society. With its high MIPEX score, Germany is worth studying in relation to immigrant integration. In the countries of the Visegrád Four, the integration of immigrants is hampered by relatively inefficient public administrations as well as by the public perception of immigrants. In Europe more generally, the insecurity of their legal status makes the integration of immigrants difficult. Finally, the points that Szitová et al. make about local solutions to Roma integration can be applied to immigrant integration as well.

Political responses to immigration

Focusing especially on the Visegrád Four, France and Germany, Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov tackle the question of political responses to immigration. They note an increase in support for anti-immigrant populists, the radicalisation of the political mainstream and the changing tone of public debate in varying degrees in the countries concerned. Klapsis and Kakolyris share the same concern. Looking at how the moderate centre–right can respond, the authors note that no single model can be applied across Europe. As a general principle for the centre–right, they suggest addressing the electorate’s concerns, rather than assuming moral superiority.

Tungul (‘Explaining Immigration to the European Public’) remarks that successful immigration and integration policies require a public discourse encompassing many citizens, including immigrants. The EU and its member states are not ready for the challenge of large-scale immigration, especially since it is likely to be a permanent phenomenon. Still, Tungul cites opinion polls that support a European, rather than a national, approach to migration, although there are big differences between the member states. Perhaps paradoxically, countries that have been the major recipients of immigrants and asylum seekers seem more in favour of migration and can see the benefits of immigration. Negative views are most often found in those countries and regions with limited knowledge and experience of immigration. Tungul identifies a lack of reliable information as the greatest problem in the integration of immigrants into the majority society. The heavy politicisation of the debate is not helpful. Instead of being led by the voters, the elite should lead public opinion, provide balanced information and shape the debate. The role of the media is key in this process.

CONCLUSIONS

Reflecting suggestions from the authors in this volume, the following recommendations can be made.

General

- **The EPP** needs to engage with the ‘forgotten part’ of society without compromising on political pluralism and civil liberties.
- **The EPP** should promote a concept of the state which preserves a free public space, guaranteeing freedom of conscience.
- **All levels of government** need to make it a top priority to combat extremism and to intellectually engage with ideologies that neglect, or are even hostile to, European culture.

- **Civil society** in Europe needs to create a ‘values-defending culture’ aimed at safeguarding our individual rights and freedoms in a secular state.
- **State institutions and civil society organisations** should provide the conditions for the development of a ‘European demos’, including cultural education and targeted communication.

Religion and human rights

- **The EPP** should promote procedural secularism, a policy which allows different religious as well as secular opinions to thrive in the public sphere, with the secular state adopting an independent role.
- **The EPP** should promote policies that strengthen the role of religion as a source of inspiration for tolerance and social cohesion.
- **The EPP** should organise political events where different topics can be discussed from a faith-based viewpoint.
- **The EPP** should give the human rights agenda the highest priority, focusing on key rights, such as dignity, freedom and justice. This agenda should also be supported with regard to negotiations on EU enlargement.

Group belonging and diversity management

- **The EPP** should promote a debate about the question of individual versus community rights.
- **The EPP** should open a debate about national and European identities and about the principle of interculturalism, which aims to create a ‘connective tissue’ between and among majorities and autochthonous, immigrant and Roma minorities.
- **The EPP and national and regional governments** should ensure the right balance between maintaining minorities’ identities and taking responsibility for integrating minorities into the wider national and European society.

Integration of immigrants

- **Governments and civil society institutions** should take steps to intensify the integration of migrants.
- **Governments, assisted by civil society institutions**, need to develop concepts of citizenship with a focus on new immigrants. Integration on the basis of the civic (not ethnic or confessional) principle should be emphasised, in accordance with the existing liberal-democratic constitutional frameworks.
- **The EPP** should consider setting minimum standards for integration policies, applying MIPEX.
- **The EU institutions and governments at various levels** should organise ‘solutions markets’ to bring discussion about effective local and regional solutions to the European table.
- To assist integration, **the EU institutions and governments at various levels** should create national and local advisory bodies which involve people with a migrant background.

Islamism

- **European governments, supported by civil society**, and especially Muslims themselves, should understand that in responding to Islamic radicalisation, prevention is more important than de-radicalisation. Therefore, they need to
 - promote a critical reading of the Koran that includes discussing problematic sections of Islamic texts;
 - grant Muslims the right to religious education in schools, and therefore give them the opportunity to discuss religious issues, while making sure that religious education does not become an instrument of Islamism;
 - promote interreligious learning in schools;
 - employ more Muslim chaplains in prisons, armies and the police; and
 - strengthen education about Islam on the Internet.

Autochthonous minorities

- **The EPP** should consider promoting the more effective participation of people belonging to autochthonous minorities at different levels of decision-making.
- **National and regional governments** should take a proactive approach to the implementation of international obligations and domestic regulations concerning the rights of autochthonous minorities.
- **National and regional governments** should ensure that people who belong to autochthonous minorities are represented in party structures and can participate effectively in elected and consultative bodies.
- **National governments, assisted by EU institutions**, should take steps towards closing the gap between the external and internal dimensions of minority protection in the EU.
- **National governments and centre-right parties** should facilitate the representation of minorities in the European Parliament.
- **The EPP and national and regional governments** should ensure the use of minority languages in the public sphere (including in education) and promote multilingualism.

Roma

- **The EPP and national and regional governments** should consider the integration of the Roma minority a specific policy issue.
- **The EPP and national and regional governments** should protect and promote the Roma identity by adopting measures highlighting the distinctive characteristics of Roma culture, including language, history and traditions.
- **National and regional governments** should engage with Roma communities and civil society, ensure that the resources allocated for the national Roma integration strategies are sufficient, assess the implementation of these strategies through transparent monitoring mechanisms and reliable data collection, and share best practices.
- **EPP member parties** should include Roma candidates on their electoral lists for all levels of representation.

- As with the integration of immigrants, **the EU institutions and governments at various levels** should organise ‘solutions markets’ aimed at bringing discussion about effective local and regional solutions to the European table.
- **Governments at various levels** should adopt policies and practices to improve the knowledge of Roma issues among the majority population.

Political strategies and communication

- **The EPP parties** should deal directly with the issues raised by the populist parties. When doing so, they should bear in mind that populism is not a societal evil but a useful indicator of the failures of mainstream politics.
- **The EPP** should speak a simpler—but not simplistic—language.
- **The EPP** should use new technologies and political innovation to instigate active citizenship and political and electoral participation.
- **EPP politicians and the media** should promote a public discourse that encompasses a large number of citizens, including immigrants. Simple and clear facts are necessary for an informed discussion.
- **EPP politicians** should recognise and deal with public fears and lead public opinion by addressing all the topics surrounding the public discourse on immigration and minorities.

Despite the EU's official motto 'United in Diversity', the bloc is experiencing a profound crisis in which diversity is threatening to dispel unity. Instead of harmony, diversity increasingly spells conflict. A variety of factors are behind this strife, including terrorism, the uncertain position of religion in public life, the unclear situation of minority groups (including autochthonous minorities and the Roma), radical Islamism, insufficient integration of immigrants and a loss of personal status and identity due to globalisation. These phenomena are occurring against the backdrop of the recent economic crisis, instability in Europe's neighbourhood, and the uncontrolled influx of migrants and refugees in 2015–16. All these developments are feeding conflicts both among the member states and between the EU institutions and national governments, as well as a cultural war between globalists and identitarians that cuts across European societies.

The European People's Party, and governments at all levels, need to engage with the 'forgotten part' of society without compromising on pluralism and personal freedoms. They need to promote a concept of state which allows different religious and secular opinions to thrive. They should combat extremism and, in cooperation with civil society, encourage a public culture that defends tolerance and liberty. They should promote a critical reading of the Koran. Developing concepts of citizenship with a focus on immigrants is crucial, as is effective participation of autochthonous minorities and the Roma in public life. Taking such steps would ensure that internal and external adversity does not destroy European unity.

